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ABSTRACT 
The Impact of Resilience and Grit on Inductive and Deductive Reasoning  
Following Exposure to Combat-Like Environments 
Vasiliki Georgoulas-Sherry 
Cognitive processes have been shown to be severely affected by exposure to combat and war. 
While the negative impact of war on cognitive performance is apparent through numerous soldier 
narratives, the scientific investigation of this phenomenon is limited. Furthermore, the moderating 
influence of an individual‘s resilience and grit on cognitive functions following combat environments 
is unknown. Understanding this interaction is essential in further understanding individual cognitive 
performance. Because the psychological wounds inflicted by combat situations affect individuals‘ 
mental health, studying how such environments influence cognitive processes and performance can 
improve the training of our soldiers. This dissertation focuses on assessing how combat-like 
environments influence an individual‘s ability to effectively and efficiently reason, and further 
examines whether an individual‘s grit and resilience affect deductive and inductive reasoning in 
stressful environments. 
Participants were recruited from a private US military academy. The study used a pretest-
posttest mixed design to investigate possible cognitive decrements in individuals‘ ability to reason 
following exposure to war-like environments simulated by immersive and non-immersive 
technologies. Dependent measures included both inductive and deductive reasoning (as measured by 
The Letter Sets Test and Overton‘s (1990) version of the Wason Selection Task, respectively) by 
placing participants into the immersive or non-immersive conditions. Self-reported resilience and grit 
were tested for interaction effects to examine how an individual‘s resilience and grit influences an 
individual‘s ability to reason in war-like environments. These findings might give a richer 
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Background 
In the past decade, a number of acts of terror have exposed individuals to combat-like 
environments; these situations have been shown to produce psychological and physiological 
wounds in both military personnel and civilians. The psychological strain of a war-like 
environment places significant pressure and anxiety on even well-trained veteran military 
personnel, which can consequently affect cognitive functions such as decision making and 
reasoning (Eich & Forgas, 2003; Blanchette & Richards, 2004; Lieberman, Bathalon, Falco, 
Morgan III, et al. 2005; Blanchette, Richards, Melnyk, & Layda, 2007). Such psychological 
wounds are linked to numerous high-level cognitive processing deficits (Bremner et al. 1995; 
Buckley, Blanchard, & Neill, 2000; Emdad, Sondergaard, & Theorell, 2005). 
Reasoning is an essential cognitive function which has been shown to be negatively 
affected by combat. An individual‘s ability to reason is their ability to apply logic and validate 
information acquired in order to make sense of it (Walton, 1990). The process of reasoning 
permits an individual to think logically about an input proposition (i.e., a premise) and either 
validate or invalidate the output proposition (i.e., the conclusion) (Goel, Gold, Kapur, & Houle, 
1997). Reasoning has been classified into three all-encompassing categories: (1) deductive 
reasoning, (2) inductive reasoning, or (3) abductive reasoning. These categories are distinguished 
by the relationship between the premise and the conclusion. For example, deductive reasoning 
refers to the type of reasoning that allows the individual to take specific input propositions (i.e., 
premises) and construct a logical and valid output proposition (i.e., a conclusion) (Goel et al., 
1997). Inductive reasoning is characterized as the type of reasoning that allows the individual to 




reasoning, however, in inductive reasoning the generalized conclusion does not need to be valid, 
even if the premises are valid. Abductive reasoning is distinguished as the type of reasoning that 
allows an individual to utilize an incomplete set of observations (i.e., premises) to construct the 
likeliest possible conclusion (Thagard & Shelley, 2005).  
Central cognitive functions are pervasive in life and combat: almost all duties performed 
during combat involve various cognitive functions, such as reasoning. During extreme traumatic 
experiences such as combat or war, severe decrements to cognitive processing can extensively 
impair the soldiers‘ ability to execute tasks. For example, according to Lieberman et al. (2005), 
―firing a weapon at the right time at the correct target requires the following cognitive elements: 
vigilance and pattern recognition to detect the target; choice reaction time to fire at the correct 
target at the right instant; logical reasoning to determine whether firing a weapon at a selected 
target is tactically appropriate and permitted within the rules of engagement‖ (3). During combat, 
soldiers must be able to make decisions and reason efficiently and swiftly; any cognitive 
impairment can cause detrimental effects. This known devastating effect on cognitive 
processing, which was referred to as ―fog of war‖ by Carl von Clausewitz, can describe a 
soldier‘s mental state during time of combat (Lieberman et al., 2005).  
While soldiers‘ anecdotal narratives have long depicted the negative impact of war on 
soldiers, limited experimental work has addressed the degradation of reasoning that transpires in 
combat-like environments. The few studies that have investigated this cognitive decline have 
indicated that exposure to combat-like circumstances have detrimental effects on cognitive 
processing and performance, which supports the soldiers‘ narratives. Even fewer studies, if any, 
have examined an individual‘s measure of grit and resilience in relation to deductive and 




Resilience and grit play an integral role in personality and performance (Duckworth, 
Peterson, Matthews, & Kelly, 2007; Matthews, Eid, Kelly, Bailey, & Peterson, 2006). First, 
individuals who are resilient are more likely to adapt to significant adversity, trauma, or other 
stressors, and possess coping skills and mechanisms to efficiently and effectively navigate 
through trauma (McEwen & Stellar, 1993; Masten, 2001; Bonanno, 2004; Agaibi, & Wilson, 
2005; Friborg, Barlaug, Martinussen, Rosenvinge, & Hjemdal, 2005; Bonanno, Galea, 
Bucciarelli, & Vlahov, 2007; Campbell-Sills, Forde, & Stein, 2009). Second, individuals who are 
gritty are able to perform vigorously and persistently toward challenges without losing any 
energy or effort over a long period of time regardless of disappointment or failure. Such 
psychological constructs are essential in cognition.  
Trauma and stress play an important role in shaping individuals‘ cognitive development; 
their presence leads ―to physiological and neurological adaptions‖ which influences the way the 
mind develops (Van der Kolk, 2000; Ogle, Rubin, Siegler, 2013). Grit and resilience, two subtly 
different psychological constructs, are essential in the successful adjustment of an individual‘s 
mental state after challenging experiences that induce trauma and stress (Judge, Higgins, 
Thoresen, & Barrick, 1999; Steel, Schmidt, & Shultz, 2008). Therefore, one can assume that 
both constructs somehow affect the ability to reason. This dissertation, consequently, examines 
whether these psychological constructs influenced this high-level cognitive function during 
exposure to adverse environments. 
The influence of war environments on cognitive functions is important to investigate and 
assess as the United States has, and continues to, encounter numerous acts of terror and violence 
on home soil, in addition to the combat situations faced by active duty soldiers. Through this 




traumatic and stressful environments can learn how to construct new training, operations, and 
systems to focus on and mitigate the effects of adverse environments on cognition. Additionally, 
this dissertation also looked at the influence of computer-simulated war-like environments on 
cognitive performance. High intensity, stress-inducing, emotion-provoking training, both 
computer-simulated and real-world, must be constructed in efforts to educate soldiers on the 
cognitive impacts of war.  
Statement of the Problem 
Lieberman and colleagues (2005) argue that while there is anecdotal documentation of 
the influence of war-fighting environments on the ability to reason (e.g., process cognitive 
information and act quickly, effectively, and decisively in combat), there still is a need for 
scientific research to investigate reasoning in combat-like environments. The existing need to 
address the psychological and mental wounds that emerge from such trauma and stress has 
produced an increased interest in examining not only how individuals reason and make decisions 
in high-intensity situations, but to discover more effectual and mimetic platforms through which 
to better train and protect individuals who are exposed to adverse environments. Such research 
can also train soldiers on how to improve their reasoning during war-like environments for the 
success of our combat operations following acts of domestic terror (Dulmus, & Hilarski, 2003; 
DePrince, Chu, & Combs, 2008). Lastly, since psychological constructs are influential in how 
individuals behave and perform, individuals‘ resilience and grit must be further examined for 
mediating effects in reasoning. 
Due to the limited quantifiable research in the decrement of cognitive performance, and 
the continued acts of terror that produce combat and war-fighting environments, scientific 




environments. This dissertation investigates how combat-like environments through the use of 
computer-simulated war environments influence an individual‘s ability to inductively and 
deductively reason. This dissertation further examines how resilience and grit influences 
individuals‘ cognitive performance after engaging in an adverse state. As these individual 
psychological traits have been shown to be influential in the successful adjustment of an 
individual‘s cognition during and immediately after adverse situations, it is of utmost importance 
that the impact of these constructs on reasoning be investigated. 
Objectives of the Study 
The dissertation presented here aims to assess how individuals reason, both inductively 
and deductively, in a computer-simulated combat environment, and further analyzes the impact 
of resilience and grit on reasoning in such adverse environments. Due to the Army‘s approach of 
using technology to train soldiers and combat terrorism, this dissertation utilizes virtual war-
fighting environments to simulate combat environments that induce negative affect such as stress 
and anxiety. This dissertation also further examines the impact of grit and resilience on 
reasoning, as ongoing research into these psychological constructs suggests they are influential 
in the mental health of individuals exposed to stress. 
For this dissertation, I utilized a pretest-posttest mixed experimental design by randomly 
assigning participants to one of four conditions: (1) immersive virtual reality with a simulated 
combat scenario, (2) immersive virtual reality with a simulated non-combat scenario, (3) non-
immersive virtual reality with a simulated combat scenario, or (4) non-immersive virtual reality 
with a simulated non-combat scenario. While participants utilized one of two platforms, 
Bravemind or Virtual BattleSpace 3 (VBS3), scenario content was controlled for the two 




scenario; therefore, regardless of the condition, participants completed comparable scenarios. A 
pretest deductive and inductive reasoning task and posttest deductive and inductive task was 
administered to all participants in each condition. The pre- and posttest deductive reasoning tasks 
consisted of Overton‘s (1990) version of the Wason Selection Task, and the pre- and posttest 
inductive reasoning tasks consisted of Ekstrom, French, Harman, and Derman‘s (1976) The 
Letter Sets Test. The duration of the study was approximately a week, broken into two parts. In 
the first part of the study, participants completed the pretest deductive and inductive reasoning 
tasks to measure baseline reasoning abilities. Second, participants were assigned to participate in 
either an immersive or non-immersive condition (Bravemind or VBS3, respectively) with either 
a combat or non-combat environment. Third, participants completed the posttest deductive and 
inductive reasoning task. In the second part of the study, a week after completion of the first part 
of the study, participants completed four questionnaires: the Resilience Scale for Adults (RSA) 
scale, the Grit Scale, the Flexible Regulation of Emotional Expression (FREE) scale, and the 
Brief Self-Control Scale (BSCS) and a demographic survey. 
While research has shown the influence of affect and emotionality on reasoning, there is 
limited scientific research on the nature and severity of the cognitive deficits that arise in highly 
stressful situations such as combat-like environments (Stroebe, Schut, & Finkenauer, 2001; 
Dulmus, & Hilarski, 2003; DePrince et al., 2008). Therefore, this dissertation investigates how 
combat-like environments influence an individual‘s ability to inductively and deductively reason, 
and then further investigates the impact of resilience and grit on reasoning. Despite the 
progression of resilience and grit research, there are gaps as it relates to this dissertation study. 
Currently, there are no research projects that have examined the impact of resilience or grit on 




study investigates this limitation. This study further evaluates if participants with higher 
resilience and grit are protected from the effects of negative affect, and subsequently, produce 
similar or increased performance on deductive and inductive reasoning tasks than participants 
with a lack of resilience or girt. Furthermore, this dissertation utilized immersive virtual reality 
technology and non-immersive technology to simulate combat environments that soldiers are 
commonly exposed to. Through this, I first investigated if immersive virtual reality technology 
induced stronger affect than non-immersive technology, and second, I evaluated the 
effectiveness of the technology as a tool for military operations like training. 
This dissertation took the hypothesis that an individual‘s resilience and grit does play an 
integral role in the cognitive processes of inductive and deductive reasoning, such that 
individuals who reported as highly resilient and gritty are less likely to exhibit cognitive 
decrements in the ability of reasoning, even following exposure to combat-like environments, 
compared to non-resilient and non-gritty people. This dissertation will first consist of a review of 
the executive function of reasoning, and more specifically, explain the effects of affect on 
inductive and deductive reasoning. Second, this dissertation will analyze the limited research on 
the degradation of cognitive processes in combat-like environments. Third, this dissertation will 
discuss the psychological constructs of grit and resilience, particularly as it relates to reasoning, 
and its possible impact in stressful situations. Lastly, this dissertation will reflect on the 
incorporation of computer-simulated systems such as immersive and non-immersive virtual 
reality technology in the learning and training processes of Armed Forces.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This dissertation attempted to answer and investigate the following research questions:  




simulated combat-like environments? The dissertation investigates the effects of  
simulated combat on individuals‘ deductive and inductive reasoning performance. 
It was hypothesized that individuals in the combat simulated conditions would 
suffer from more cognitive impairments than individuals in the non-combat 
simulated conditions. 
Question 1b: Do immersive virtual technologies, like Bravemind, influence an  
individual‘s cognitive reasoning performance following immersion differently 
than non-immersive virtual technologies, like VBS3? The dissertation investigates 
the effects of the immersiveness of virtual technologies on individual reasoning. It 
was hypothesized that individuals in the immersive conditions would suffer from 
more cognitive impairments than participants in the non-immersive conditions. 
Question 2a: Does an individual‘s grit or resilience influence the way an individual 
inductively or deductively reasons? The dissertation investigates the impact of 
resilience and grit on an individual‘s ability to reason. It was hypothesized that 
highly gritty or resilient individuals would perform better, overall, on the 
reasoning tasks, than slightly resilient or gritty individuals.  
Question 2b: Furthermore, does an individual‘s grit or resilience influence cognitive  
performance immediately following exposure to simulated combat environments? 
The dissertation not only investigates whether an individual‘s resilience or grit 
influences reasoning, but also investigates the interaction following exposure to 
an adverse environment simulated by immersive and non-immersive technologies. 
It was hypothesized that individuals who reported higher grit or resilience would 




combat than individuals who did not report higher grit or resilience. 
Significance 
Limited research and anecdotal evidence have shown the negative impact of combat and 
trauma on an individual‘s ability to perform numerous cognitive functions on the battlefield 
(Blanchette & Campbell, 2012). However, it is necessary to further investigate this cognitive 
degradation through scientific research in order to address questions about how people reason in 
adverse environments, and whether an individual‘s grit and resilience could impact their 
inductive and deductive reasoning abilities. An increased interest in investigating an approach to 
better understanding higher cognitive functioning performance in stressful settings is useful for 
supporting people‘s ability to successfully function cognitively. This dissertation aims to 
examine those questions.  
This dissertation is one of the only studies to investigate the impact of two necessary 
psychological constructs for success, grit and resilience, on reasoning, an integral function in 
adverse environments. This dissertation is also one of the first of its kind to utilize a 
methodology consisting of a pretest-posttest design with immersive and non-immersive virtual 
technology conditions to simulate combat-like environments and the possible cognitive 
decrements as seen in real-world environments. While grit and resilience have been shown to 
play an important role in success, this dissertation is interested in expanding the understanding of 
the relationship between these two psychological constructs and cognition. Furthermore, while 
limited studies have examined the impact of high intensity environments on reasoning, there are 
no studies, that the author is aware of, that utilized pretest-posttest analysis to investigate an 
individual‘s ability to deductively and inductively reason. 




cognitive impairments that arise following exposure to stressful environments. As shown in 
previous research, there is a causal link between understanding cognitive impairment in the 
moment and the ability to comprehend or predict cognitive impairment in future situations 
(Raslear, Hursh, & Van Dongen, 2011; Whitney, Mossbarger, Herman, & Ibarra, 2012); this 
dissertation attempts to further investigate those findings. Additionally, the results from this 
dissertation could be used during the military recruitment process, in order to measure whether 
certain individuals‘ cognitive performance would be more or less likely to suffer from adverse 
environments. While soldiers might anticipate deficits in complex cognitive tasks in combat, 
these findings could be used to train soldiers to better reason, more efficiently and effectively. 
According to Lieberman et al. (2005), ―it is likely that some of the well-documented, often 
tragic, errors that have occurred in combat can be attributed to impaired cognitive function … 
understanding non-pathological reactions to intense emotional experiences and their impact on 
cognitive processes is of considerable importance‖ (7).  
While this study utilized a military student population, research has shown similar 
decrements in cognitive abilities among civilian emergency personnel and disaster victims 
(Levenson & Acosta, 2000). Therefore, research in investigating how individuals reason in high-
intensity situations, like this dissertation, can also help agencies find more effective platforms 
through which to better train and protect individuals who are likely to be exposed to adverse 
environments, like first responders or even children from violent communities.  
Additionally, this dissertation can benefit the Armed Forces, police, and fire and 
emergency departments with quantitative data on the degradation of cognitive performance in 
highly stressful environments. This dissertation can promote novel ways to assess interventions 




cope with stress. As stated by Blanchette and Campbell (2012), ―objective documentation of the 
nature and severity of cognitive performance decrements in simulated combat may provide 
insight into causes, management, and treatment strategies to mitigate such deficits‖ (4). This 
dissertation aimed to explore the destructive impact of the exposure of combat-like environment 
on cognitive performance, through helping with the facilitation of training and operations both 
through real-life and virtual methodologies. Furthermore, according to Lieberman et al. (2005), 
―such information would also be useful for [the] formulation of mathematical models to predict 
cognitive degradation in combat-like environments‖ (8). 
This dissertation is divided into five chapters. This first chapter provides a background of 
the dissertation study, statement of the problem, study objectives, research questions posed, and 
this dissertation‘s significance. Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature. Chapter 3 describes 
unpublished research conducted by the author in the 2016 Spring semester at the United States 
Military Academy that was conducted outside of this dissertation and used as a data source, 
which laid the groundwork for the research questions in this dissertation. Chapter 4 characterizes 
the methodology employed to address the research questions. Chapter 5 reveals the results and 
findings of this dissertation. Chapter 6 concludes with the discussion of the current research. 
CHAPTER II. 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
An individual‘s ability to reason and apply logic has been of much interest in the field of 
cognitive psychology, and significant research has been conducted on individual‘s reasoning 
abilities while in adverse and stressful circumstances (Stroebe et al., 2001; Dulmus, & Hilarski, 
2003; DePrince et al., 2008). However, to the author‘s knowledge, few, if any, studies have 




exposure to war-like environments.  
In the past decades, the US and European allies have had to navigate acts of terror and 
violence on home soil that have mirrored overseas war-fighting environments (Ashenafi, 2014; 
Bondarenko, 2014). For instance, the events of September 11, 2001 carried out by Al Qaeda 
extremists on US soil created a state of emergency unparalleled in recent history. A few years 
later, the bombings at the Saint Michel subway station in France orchestrated by the Armed 
Islamic Group, and the suicide bombings in the United Kingdom subway transit buses carried 
out by the British Al Qaeda placed civilian populations, swiftly and unexpectedly, in war-like 
circumstances (Ashenafi, 2014; Bondarenko, 2014). These representative acts of terror created 
war-like environments which produced psychological and physiological wounds to military 
personnel and civilians alike, the large majority of whom were unequipped to navigate such 
extreme circumstances. However awful a terrorist shooting or bombing may be, they are discrete 
events that last only a few minutes and are never experienced again; in contrast, solders are 
deployed for months at a time and may be repeatedly exposed to trauma. 
According to Karadzhov (2015), ―war [results] in the destruction of the political systems, 
social structures and infrastructure of war-affected countries, and [also has] detrimental effects 
on the physical, socio-emotional and psychological functioning of survivors‖ (3). Prior research 
has indicated that exposure to adverse circumstances such as war-like environments can 
significantly affect individuals‘ reasoning due to the interactive nature of affect and cognition 
(Oaksford, Morris, Grainger, & Williams, 1996; Blanchette & Richards, 2004; Skitka, Bauman, 
& Mullen, 2004; Hayes & McAllister, 2005; West & Orr, 2005; Blanchette & Campbell, 2012; 
Sinatra, Kienhues, & Hofer, 2014). It is essential we investigate ways to improve reasoning in 




domestic terror (Dulmus, & Hilarski, 2003; DePrince et al., 2008). 
In war-like environments, individuals must be able to reason quickly and effectively. 
However, cognitive functions can be impeded due to the intensity and duration of extreme affect 
(Palfai & Salovey, 1993; Jung, Wranke, Hamburger, & Knauff, 2014). For example, US citizens 
reported increased feelings of depression, anxiety, and other psychological and physical strains 
in the week following the terrorist acts of September 11
th
 (Ashenafi, 2014; Bondarenko, 2014). 
In 2006, Small, Lerner, and Fischhoff investigated how participants‘ anger and sadness 
differentially influenced causal judgments about the attacks of September 11
th
; results show that 
participants‘ anger caused more causal attributions than their feelings of sadness. In 2002, David 
et al. assessed poor cognitive functions (specifically, concentration and memory) in both 
deployed and non-deployed veterans of the Persian Gulf War after exposure to combat; their 
findings show that deployed military veterans showed more cognitive deficits and disturbances 
in mood than non-deployed military veterans. 
The psychological and physical strain of a war-like environment sets significant pressure 
and anxiety on even well-trained veteran military personnel, which can consequently affect 
cognitive functions such as decision making and reasoning (Eich & Forgas, 2003; Blanchette & 
Richards, 2004; Lieberman et al., 2005; Blanchette et al., 2007). While research shows that 
psychological wounds are linked to numerous high-level cognitive processing deficits, there are 
gaps in the literature that explore the relationship between an individual‘s grit and resilience and 
their impact on reasoning following adverse experiences such as combat or war (Bremner et al., 
1995; Buckley et al., 2000; Emdad et al., 2005). Therefore, the author investigate how exposure 
to combat or other adverse environments affect an individual‘s ability to effectively and 




in this context.  
Understanding how individuals reason during and after exposure to traumatic and 
stressful environments is essential for individualized well-being. Most individuals experience 
some sort of life-threatening or violent encounter during their lifetime (Ozer, Best, Lipsey, & 
Weiss, 2003; Bonanno, 2004); therefore, while this dissertation utilized a military sample, and 
specifically targets exposure to combat-like environments, this can be generalized to a broader 
population. According to Bonanno (2004), ―epidemiological studies estimate that the majority of 
the U.S. population has been exposed to at least one traumatic event, defined using the DSM–III 
criteria of an event outside the range of normal human experience, during the course of their 
lives‖ (754). Consequently, since most individuals are likely to be exposed to some form of 
adverse situation, research focusing on how individuals function cognitively after exposure to 
such environments is essential to better understand human performance. While Bonanno (2004) 
reveals that most individuals are actually able to endure the ―temporary upheaval of loss or 
potentially traumatic events remarkably well, with no apparent disruption in their ability to 
function at work or in close relationships, and seem to move on to new challenges with apparent 
ease,‖ while others do not fare as well (755). Additionally, adverse experiences can affect 
individuals differently, regardless of previous exposed adversity (Yehuda, McFarlane, & Shalev, 
1998; Luthar, Cicchetti, & Becker, 2000; Zoellner, Fitzgibbons, & Foa, 2001; Bonanno, 2004). 
In one example, an individual can be resilient when facing workplace struggles, but might be less 
resilient when facing familial challenges (e.g., a critical illness or death). In another example, an 
individual who has previously overcome hardships, might be either more or less likely to 
overcome further adversity.  




adverse situations, many researchers have attempted to look at the short-term and long-term 
effects of these difficult circumstances on individuals (Luthar et al., 2000; Bonanno, 2004; 
Luthar, 2006; Southwick, Bonanno, Masten, Panter-Brick, & Yehuda, 2014). For example, the 
American Psychological Association (APA; 2014) found that, ―at some point, most people will 
be exposed to one (or more) potentially life-threatening traumatic experiences, and this can 
influence their mental health and result in conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD)‖ (1). These short- and long-term effects on mental health can severely damage cognitive 
functioning. Consequently, in order to protect cognitive health and performance, there is a need 
to address these psychological wounds. Lieberman and colleagues (2005) argue that anecdotal 
documentation and evidence of the influence of adverse environments, and more specifically, 
war-fighting environments on the ability of reasoning in military personnel exists, there is still a 
need for scientific research that examines the effects of war-fighting environments on the 
cognitive function of reasoning. 
The author utilized a pretest-posttest experimental design to measure how individuals 
inductively and deductively reason when they are placed in adverse environments with the 
objective of scientifically investigating the possible cognitive decrements that are seen in soldier 
narratives and anecdotal evidence. Due to the Army‘s approach to using technology to train 
soldiers and combat terrorism, this dissertation utilized computer-simulated virtual reality 
systems to mimic stressful and challenging environments that soldiers are commonly exposed to. 
This study utilized two different virtual reality platforms to measure if different virtual reality 
platforms are more conducive to eliciting similar affect found in real-world adverse 
environments: (1) the immersive technology of Bravemind and (2) the non-immersive 




individual‘s grit or resilience (as measured by self-report surveys) could impact reasoning 
abilities. 
This paper, then, will first provide a review of the cognitive processes of deductive and 
inductive reasoning. Secondly, this paper will review relevant literature that discusses the 
interactive nature of affect and reasoning. Thirdly, this paper will discuss the grit and resilience 
constructs, particularly as they relate to reasoning. Lastly, this paper will review the influence of 
immersive and non-immersive virtual reality technologies in training and learning operations. 
Understanding Reasoning 
An individual‘s ability to reason is that person‘s ability to apply logic and validate 
information acquired, in order to make sense of it, and either justify or alter thoughts, beliefs, and 
practices based on the information the person has at that time (Walton, 1990). Angeles (1981) 
defines reasoning as a method ―to deceive, to argue, to debate, to doubt, to persuade, to express, 
to explain, to apologize, to rationalize … any form of conscious activity can be affected and 
structured by the reasoning process‖ (240). Reasoning allows for individuals to use logic and 
rationale to consciously infer conclusions about statements. Others define reasoning as ―the 
process of inference and the process of passing from certain propositions already known or 
assumed to be true, to another truth distinct from them but following from them‖ (Walton, 1992, 
281). Reasoning may also be operationalized as the collection of mental processes that aids in 
systematizing and classifying existing information and generating novel knowledge, 
subsequently utilized for future mental processes. Reasoning is a discourse which deduces one 
proposition from another; an individual‘s ability to reason allows for the creating and yielding of 
propositions and the progression of shifting towards conclusions from such propositions 




human talent that has allowed the creation of highly developed societies characterized by 
complex technologies, advanced medicine and sophisticated economies‖ (3). 
More simply, reasoning is a cognitive function that produces conclusions from given 
premises: it is the process that assesses discourse (Knauff, Mulack, Kassubek, Salih, & Greenlee, 
2002). According to Thagard & Shelley (2005), reasoning ―is the process of using existing 
knowledge to draw conclusions, make predictions, or construct explanations‖ (12). An 
individual‘s ability to reason allows an individual to think rationally about an input proposition 
(i.e., a premise) and either validate or invalidate the output proposition (i.e., the conclusion) 
(Goel et al., 1997). Philosophers identify three all-encompassing categories of reasoning: (1) 
deductive reasoning, (2) inductive reasoning, and (3) abductive reasoning. These categories are 
distinguished based on the relationship between the premise and the conclusion.  
Deductive and inductive reasoning are a hallmark of formal operational thought 
(Wassertheil-Smoller & Smoller, 2015). Deductive reasoning refers to the type of reasoning that 
takes specific input propositions (i.e., premises) to construct a logical and valid output 
proposition (i.e., a conclusion). An individual who utilizes deductive reasoning is able to shift 
from a general premise to a more particular conclusion (Goel et al., 1997). Inductive reasoning is 
characterized as the type of reasoning that gathers specific observations or information (i.e., 
premises) and forms a generalized conclusion. Unlike in deductive reasoning, however, in 
inductive reasoning, the conclusion does not need to be valid, regardless of whether the premises 
are valid. An individual who utilizes inductive reasoning is able to use a number of observations 
to make generalizations that can be correct or incorrect. Abductive reasoning is distinguished by 
the type of reasoning that utilizes an incomplete set of observations and forms the likeliest 




reasoning is able to use some information to derive the best or most logical conclusion. These 
reasoning categories can yield different types of conclusions (see Table 1). In this dissertation, 
the author investigated the individuals‘ ability to deductively and inductively reason. 
 Table 1. Similarities and Differences in Deductive and Inductive Reasoning 
 Deductive Reasoning Inductive Reasoning 
Also Known ―Top-down‖ reasoning ―Bottom-up‖ reasoning 
 
Methodology Theory -> Hypothesis ->  
Patterns -> Observation 
Observation -> Patterns -> Hypothesis -> 
Theory 
 
Premises Based as facts or general principles  Based on observations of specific cases 
 
Validity If the premises are true, the conclusion 
must be true. 
If the premises are true, the conclusion is 
probably true. 
 
Example All men are mortal.  
Jon is a man.  
Therefore, Jon is mortal 
Parrots and doves are birds. 
They can fly. 
Therefore, all birds can fly. 
 
 
As Walton (1990) explains, reasoning is ―the act or process of exercising the mind, 
referring to actual thought processes‖ (404). Reasoning is essential to human interaction as it is 
the process of a logical way of thinking (Walton, 1990); it is significantly correlated to critical 
thinking, problem solving, intellect, and decision making (Stasser, & Stewart, 1992; Halpern, 
1998; Dwyer, Hogan, & Stewart, 2014; Savery, 2015). Therefore, reasoning is a fundamental 
cognitive function that is all-encompassing in an individual‘s everyday life (Blanchette & 
Campbell, 2012). The ability to reason, however, is also limited by other cognitive factors such 
as deficits in information acquisition, such as the limitations of working memory and impaired 
performance of attention. Furthermore, an individual‘s knowledge and understanding of the 
world can create practical limitations on their ability to reason (Giere, 1988; Brewer & 
Samarapunga-Van, 1991; Cheng, Bell, & Liu, 1997; Johnson-Laird, 1999; Johnson-Laird, 2006). 




been at the center of a theoretical shift in the past decade (Chater & Oaksford, 2001). According 
to Evans (2002), ―while reasoning has traditionally been confined to the realm of logic, recent 
data suggest that reasoning should be modeled in a way that integrates a range of contextual 
factors in addition to, and sometimes rather than, logic‖ (978). While the psychology of 
reasoning has generally been grounded in the dimension of logic, contemporary research 
proposes that reasoning should be measured in a manner that incorporates a range of contextual 
elements such as environment, culture, and point of view. Particularly, it is essential to 
investigate and further understand how people reason: the neural and cognitive processes that 
become engaged, how cultural and individualized factors impact the inferences that individuals 
draw, or how the situations or experiences that individuals go through effect reasoning overall. 
The author focuses on how the process of reasoning can be influenced by environmental context 
and individualized psychological constructs.  
Understanding Deductive Reasoning  
According to Blanchette and Campbell (2012), ―deductive reasoning in particular has 
often been seen as a hallmark of human intelligence and of the potential for logical thinking‖ 
(159). Deductive reasoning consists of the method in which inference is constructed logically 
through valid conclusions from a set of premises (Wassertheil-Smoller & Smoller, 2015). The 
process of deductive reasoning consists of drawing a conclusion that is based on multiple 
arguments that are commonly presumed to be truthful or legitimate. Through deductive 
reasoning, individuals assume that the set of premises are truthful, and consequently, the 
conclusions that arise from these valid premises must in turn, produce legitimate truthful 
conclusions (Walton, 1990). According to Heit and Rotello (2010), deductive reasoning is ―more 




more accurate, reasoning‖ (805). Individuals who use deductive reasoning adopt rules, 
properties, and facts to reach a conclusion. Deductive reasoning starts out with a general 
premise, or hypothesis, and explores the possibilities to draw a particular, logical conclusion. 
Deductive reasoning is a ―broad term covering the encoding and combination of 
statements using logical connectives, transitive inference or syllogistic reasoning and 
propositional reasoning‖ (Watters & English, 1995, 702). For successful reasoning, individuals 
must have the capacity to generate arguments and examine the legitimacy of those arguments in 
order to construct and assess hypotheses, to then critique and review the validity of these 
arguments, and to lastly determine probable conclusions from those arguments. Furthermore, 
according to Watters and English (1995),  
At a more general level, Goldman (1986) identified two main competing theories 
in defining the role of cognition in deductive reasoning: the mental logic theory 
and the mental models theory. The mental logic theory assumes that individuals 
possess schemata for holding and implementing sets of rules that carry out 
mental derivations. The main support for this theory comes from Rips (1983) 
through computer simulations. Johnson Laird‘s (1983) implementation of the 
mental models theory argues that people interpret premises as representations 
constructed from "tokens" arranged in a particular structure rather than verbal 
associations. Subjects make associations and construct imagistic representations 
based on developing or identifying analogies between the elements of the 
premise (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). Markovits (1993) has attempted to 
reconcile Piagetian theories on the development of possibility and necessity in 




arguing that the generality of logical reasoning varies with the degree of 
abstraction of the corresponding mental model (702). 
Through deductive reasoning, the legitimacy of the input proposition (i.e., the premise) 
logically ensures the legitimacy of the output proposition (i.e., the conclusion). For example, in 
deductive reasoning, an individual can state:  
―All men are mortal. Jon is a man. Therefore, Jon is mortal.‖  
Consequently, for this logical process to be appropriate, and for the conclusion to be truthful, the 
input premises must be accurate. Therefore, if we assume that the premises, ―All men are mortal‖ 
and ―Jon is a man,‖ are logical and true, so is the conclusion that ―Therefore, Jon is mortal.‖ An 
individual who utilizes deductive reasoning must start from statements that he assumes to be 
correct. To go back to the previous example, ―all men are mortal‖ and ―Jon is a man,‖ are 
assumed to be correct statements. The individual, then, uses deductive reasoning to draw 
conclusions that must be true since the assumptions are true; consequently, the individual is able 
to validly state, ―Therefore, Jon is mortal,‖ and assume it to be true, because the previous 
propositions were true as well. 
Deductive reasoning, also known as ―top-down‖ reasoning, progresses from the general 
to the particular (see Figure 1). According to Johnson-Laird (1999), ―one of the main cognitive 
functions of deductive reasoning is to organize knowledge in ways that allow one to derive 
parsimonious conclusions from sets of premises‖ (116). An individual who utilizes deductive 
reasoning uses premises that are not questioned or debated; it is critical that they are truthful. For 
example, the statement, 
―All squares are rectangles. All rectangles have four sides. 




consists of two premises that are truthful. As a result, the statements, ―all squares are rectangles‖ 
and ―all rectangles have four sides‖ are essential in legitimizing the conclusion, ―all squares have 
four sides.‖ As Wassertheil-Smoller & Smoller (2015) explain, ―in deductive reasoning, we hold 
a theory and based on it we make a prediction of its consequences. That is, we predict what the 
observations should be if the theory were correct. We go from the general — the theory — to the 
specific — the observations‖ (3). Deductive reasoning presumes that the central law from which 
the argument (or premise) emerges what is appropriate in all circumstances; particularly, 
regardless of the situation, experience, or event, the premises are always truthful. For example, 
for deductive reasoning to work, each premise like ―all rectangles have four sides‖ must always 
be true, and that, for instance, there will never be a rectangle that has three or five or any other 
quantity sides.  
Figure 1. Deductive Reasoning 
 
There is a limitation within the logical process of deductive reasoning; namely, that 
deductive reasoning depends strongly on the accuracy of the initial premise. If this premise is 
erroneous, not only does it endanger the process of deductive reasoning, but the entire process of 
logical reasoning (Wassertheil-Smoller & Smoller, 2005). For example, if an individual makes 
the statements,  
―All even numbers are divisible by 4. 6 is an even number.‖  




the logic behind the conclusion, ―therefore 6 is divisible by 4‖ becomes invalid because the 
premises are incorrect. If the initial premise is invalid, as shown in the example, the process of 
deductive reasoning becomes faulty, and the whole process of logic is threatened (Wassertheil-
Smoller & Smoller, 2005). While the achievability of perfect deductive reasoning is beyond the 
scope of this paper, the limitations are important to consider when evaluating this process in 
order to understand any constraints within the process of logic and reason. 
A number of external factors have been shown to impact an individual‘s ability to 
deductively reason. Affect is a crucial element that influences deductive reasoning (Evans, 
Newstead, & Byrne, 1993). Particularly, it has been shown that negative affect worsens 
normative thinking and leads to reduced accuracy in judgment (Palfai & Salovey, 1993; Channon 
& Baker, 1994; Oaksford et al., 1996; Goel & Dolan, 2003; Blanchette & Richards, 2004; 
Blanchette, 2006). Positive affect, on the other hand, can facilitate creativity and integrative 
thinking according to research (Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson 1985; Isen, Daubman, & 
Nowicki 1987; Salovey, Hsee, & Mayer, 1993). However, contradictory findings have also been 
found. Negative affect has been shown facilitating attention to detail, detection of errors and 
problems, careful information processing, and calculated and purposeful information acquisition 
and processing; positive moods have been shown to yield more apparent and heuristic 
information acquisition and processing which consequently impacts deductive reasoning (Isen et 
al., 1985, 1987; Mackie & Worth, 1989; Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990). In the 
upcoming pages, this chapter will further review the effects of affect on deductive reasoning. 
Understanding Inductive Reasoning 
Inductive reasoning consists of the method by which inference is constructed logically  




According to Heit (2000), inductive reasoning ―gathers together particular observations in the 
form of premises, then it reasons from these particular premises to a general conclusion‖ (569). 
When individuals use inductive reasoning, or ―bottom-up processing,‖ they are able to make a 
number of observations, and then represent a more generalizable conclusion based on all of the 
observations that were made (see Figure 2). According to Heit and Rotello (2010), inductive 
reasoning is ―particularly influenced by quick heuristic processes that tap into associative 
information about context and similarity that does not necessarily make an argument logically 
valid‖ (805).  
Figure 2. Inductive Reasoning 
  
Individuals who inductively reason use a set of observations to find different patterns to 
generate explanations, construct generalizations, and develop theories (Heit, 2000). According to 
Wassertheil-Smoller & Smoller (2015), ―in inductive reasoning, we go from the specific to the 
general … we make many observations, discern a pattern, make a generalization, and infer an 
explanation or a theory‖ (3). For example, through inductive reasoning, an individual can reason 
that: ―Agnes is a grandmother‖ and ―Agnes wears glasses‖ and generalize then, ―Therefore, all 
grandmothers wear glasses.‖ Through inductive reasoning, individuals first are able make a 
number of observations such as: ―Agnes is a grandmother‖ and ―Agnes wears glasses.‖ Second, 
individuals who are inductively reasoning are then able to distinguish patterns and construct 





There are limitations within the logical process of inductive reasoning, namely, that 
inductive reasoning ―is not a valid method of proof‖ (Wassertheil-Smoller & Smoller, 2015, 11). 
For example, even if the premises or observations are all true, there is still a possibility that the 
conclusion or generalization is false. For example, an individual who utilizes inductive reasoning 
can reason that: ―Ms. Jones, Ms. Sweets, and Ms. Smith are teachers,‖ and ―They are all nice,‖ 
then ―Therefore, all teachers are nice.‖ In this example, even though both observations are 
truthful, ―Ms. Jones, Ms. Sweets, and Ms. Smith are teachers‖ and ―they are nice,‖ the 
generalization is not correct. For this generalization to be truthful, an individual must 
exhaustively meet every teacher in the world to determine if they indeed are ―all nice.‖ Out of 
the millions of teachers, there might be at least one mean teacher. This example is different from 
the deductive reasoning example that was previously utilized. In the deductive reasoning 
example, ―all rectangles have four sides,‖ there is no rectangle that has more than or fewer than 
four sides; the definition of a rectangle is contingent on the quantity of sides, and we need not 
exhaustively try to find a rectangle with more or fewer sides because it cannot exist. This is not 
true, however, of the inductive reasoning example listed above, and consequently, inductive 
reasoning can be faulty. Particularly, the logical process of inductive reasoning sustains 
inferences, but does not validate the inferences as accurate (Heit, 2000). Take the previous 
inductive reasoning example mentioned above: while Agnes is a grandmother and she wears 
glasses, not all grandmothers must wear glasses, and the definition of grandmother is not 
dependent on whether or not one wears glasses. 
Inherently, inductive reasoning is ambiguous and indeterminate; particularly, ―it only  




theory of evidence‖ (Goel et al., 1997). Unlike with deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning 
permits the probability that the supposition is incorrect, even if all of the observations are valid. 
Such generalizations made from inductive reasoning are categorized as either weak or strong, 
instead of accurate or inaccurate, which refers to the likelihood of the conclusion being right or 
wrong. It is important to stress that while inductive reasoning is at greater risk of leading to 
erroneous conclusions, deductive reasoning can be difficult, if not impossible, to apply in non-
axiomatic systems. Inductive reasoning is therefore more applicable many in real-life situations 
(Heit, 2000; Heit & Rotello, 2010). 
Furthermore, unlike deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning can be characterized as 
―contingent,‖ as its generalizations can be dependent on individuals‘ experiences. This, too, can 
be viewed as a limitation within the inductive reasoning process. Therefore, the logic behind 
inductive reasoning can be continuously faulty as an individual‘s experiences or observations 
might not justify the validity of the generalizations that are being made. For example, an 
individual who inductively reasons is more than likely constructing generalizations that are 
dependent on past experiences, and consequently, that individual‘s inductive reasoning abilities 
can become erroneous. Going back to the previous example, an individual‘s past experiences 
(i.e., knowing that Ms. Jones, Ms. Sweets, and Ms. Smith are teachers and that they are nice) 
gives this individual the generalized claim that all teachers are nice. This individual uses past 
experiences and observations to make a generalizable conclusion; while the premises are valid to 
the individual, the conclusion cannot be authenticated because it is contingent on those past 
experiences. If, this individual thought that Ms. Jones, Ms. Sweets, and Ms. Smith were mean 
(and that this was true in past experiences), that individual would have then concluded that all 




As with the research on deductive reasoning, research on inductive reasoning shows that 
affect impacts an individual‘s ability to inductively reason (Evans et al., 1993). For example, 
research shows that positive moods have been shown to promote imagination, ingenuity, creative 
and integrative thinking (Isen et al., 1985; Isen et al., 1987; Salovey et al., 1993), increase 
working memory load (Seibert & Ellis, 1991), enhance the ability to interpret information and 
increase cognitive flexibility (Isen & Daubman, 1984; Isen, 1999), and increase performance on 
a number of cognitive tasks (Ashby & Isen, 1999; Isen, 1999). Negative moods have been shown 
to decrease accuracy of judgment, deteriorate cognitive processing, and diminish decision 
making (Palfai & Salovey, 1993; Channon & Baker, 1994; Oaksford, Morris, Graigner, & 
Williams, 1996; Goel & Dolan, 2003; Blanchette & Richards, 2004; Blanchette, 2006). Again, as 
with deductive reasoning, conflicting results have also been found. In the next section, this 
dissertation will further review past literature on how affect effects deductive and inductive 
reasoning. 
The Impact of Affect on Deductive and Inductive Reasoning  
Mood and affect are highly influential in higher level cognitive processes, such as 
memory, learning, reasoning, and decision making (Kunda, 1990; Markovits & Nantel, 1989; 
Kunda, 1990; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Eich & Forgas, 2003; Blanchette & Richards, 2004; 
Blanchette, 2006; Blanchette & Richards, 2010). Particularly, mood and affect have been shown 
to have differential effects on cognition; mood and affect can either impair (Phillips, Smith, & 
Gilhooly, 2002), benefit (Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978), or have no effect (Phillips, Bull, 
Adams, & Fraser, 2002) on cognitive functions (Martin & Kerns, 2011). According to Chaffar 
and Frasson (2005), ―recent researches [sic] in neurosciences and psychology have proved that 




term memorizing, problem solving, decision-making, etc.‖ (202). Affect is therefore essential in 
cognitive processes. 
Mood and affect have been shown to shape judgment, logic, interpretation, reasoning, 
and decision making (Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Jung et al., 2014; Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & 
Kassam, 2014). As Jung et al. (2014) explain, ―research shows complex effects of emotion on 
decision making and reasoning,‖ noting further that ―logicality is affected by emotion and that 
different emotions promote specific forms of thinking‖ (570). According to Oaksford et al., 
(1996), particularly, affect consists of  
several dimensions, namely, a cognitive dimension (in the appraisals/ evaluations that 
lead to the emotion and the conscious, subjective elements linked to the emotional 
response), a behavioral dimension (in the form of facial expressions of emotion or action 
tendencies) and a physiological dimension (that includes changes in autonomous nervous 
system activity related to arousal). (570)  
In this upcoming section, I discuss previous literature that has looked at the effects of affect on 
inductive and deductive reasoning. 
Research dating back as far as seventy years has explored the relationship between affect 
and reasoning. In 1946, Lefford investigated the impact of emotional content on deductive 
reasoning by having participants evaluate the logical validity of 20 non-emotional and 20 
emotional syllogisms. Results show that participants were more likely to make mistakes when 
they had to reason the validity of the emotional syllogisms than the non-emotional syllogisms. 
As Lefford (1946) explains, ―in dealing with subject matter which arouses an emotional reaction, 
the subject does not retain his capacity for correct reasoning‘‘ (148). On top of this, Lefford 




problem is especially acute today, in a war-torn world, where only action based, on objective of 
analysis and rationality of thought can lead to success‖ (150). Further findings revealed that 
when participants were reasoning about emotional content, participants were more likely to 
support logical fallacies associated with those syllogisms, and less likely to construct logically 
valid inferences than when they were reasoning over emotionally provoking content. As 
Lefford‘s research reveals, emotional content negatively influenced ―correct reasoning‖ or 
―logicality,‖ such that ―logicality was impaired by affective state, affective trait, and affective 
contents‖ (150). 
As a pioneer in this research, Lefford‘s (1946) findings show that, ―unbiased reasoning is 
rare in affective stimulus situations‖ (152). Particularly, Lefford‘s results suggest that reasoning 
with no bias or judgment was nearly unobtainable when emotions and affect were present. For 
example, as Lefford explains, ―the overall frequency distribution of correct validity judgments 
for the emotional syllogisms was J-shaped with most students having low scores while the 
distribution for the non-emotional syllogisms was basically normally distributed‖ (152) which 
indicates that participants did not provide correct valid judgments when completing emotional 
syllogism at the same rate as when they completed non-emotional syllogisms. However, Lefford 
(1946) did note the possibility that the distribution might have been skewed due to the order of 
syllogisms presented; when emotional syllogisms were presented first, the distributions were ―J-
shaped,‖ and when non-emotional syllogisms were presented first, the distribution for the 
emotional syllogisms were bimodal rather than simply J-shaped. Regardless of the potential 
concern, Lefford‘s (1946) analysis did express the importance of further investigating the impact 
of affective states on cognitive performance. 




Salovey (1993) distinguished emotions in order to investigate the effects of elated and depressed 
moods. In their study, seventy-two undergraduate participants were first placed in one of three 
conditions where they watched a film where the emotional content (depressed, elated, or neutral) 
varied, and then asked to complete an inductive and deductive reasoning task following their 
respective film. Results show that participants who watch the depressed film were more likely to 
perform poorly on the inductive reasoning task compared to the participants who watched the 
elated or neutral film. However, participants who watched the depressed film performed better 
on the deductive reasoning task than the participants in the other two conditions. Participants 
who watched the elated film performed worse on the deductive reasoning task than participants 
in the other two conditions, but performed better on the inductive reasoning task. Furthermore, 
participants who watched the depressed film performed significantly slower on the inductive 
reasoning task than participants who watch the neutral film, while participants who watched the 
elated film performed significantly slower on the deductive reasoning task than participants who 
were in the other two conditions. According to Palfai and Salovey (1993), ―depressed and elated 
mood states produced distinct information processing styles that effected performance on 
deductive and inductive reasoning tasks differentially‖ (57). Particularly, Palfai and Salovey‘s 
(1993) study examined the influence of affect on reasoning abilities suggesting that both positive 
and negative moods impacted an individual‘s ability to reason, both successfully and 
unsuccessfully.  
Oaksford et al. (1996) conducted three studies similar to Palfai and Salovey‘s (1993) 




the Wason Selection task
1
 in participants who were placed in one of three affective state 
conditions (positive, neutral, or negative). Results from all three studies show that participants 
who were either in the positive or negative affective state conditions were less likely to provide 
accurate answers on the Wason selection task than participants who were in the neutral affective 
state condition. These findings support previous claims that affect influenced an individual‘s 
ability to reason, suggesting that participants who were in the affective state conditions (both of 
positive or negative) were more likely to provide illogical statements and inaccurate propositions 
than individuals who were the neutral affective state condition (Blanchette, 2006; Blanchette & 
Richards, 2004; Kemp, Chua, McKenna, & David, 1997). Congruent findings were revealed in 
Melton (1995) who investigated the presence of positive affect on deductive reasoning. Melton 
(1995) found that participants who were in the positive mood condition suffered from more 
reasoning impairments than those in the neutral mood condition when tasked to complete a 
syllogistic reasoning activity. Furthermore, a study by Blanchette (2006) also found similar 
results to those of Palfai and Salovey‘s (1993), Melvin‘s (1995) and Oakford et al.‘s (1996) 
studies. In Blanchette‘s (2006) study, participants were first presented with a number of non-
emotional words which were paired with emotional images from the International Affective 
Picture System (IAPS; Center for the Study of Emotion and Attention, 1995). Then, participants 
were asked to complete a number of inductive and deductive reasoning tasks; these reasoning 
tasks included both emotional and non-emotional content. Congruent with previous research, 
participants exhibited decreased reasoning abilities when completing deductive and inductive 
reasoning tasks with emotional content than when completing deductive and inductive reasoning  
                                               
1
 The Wason Selection task is a logic puzzle (composed of four-cards) constructed by Peter 
Wason (1966) which assesses deductive reasoning. The reasoning problems consist of four cards 




tasks with non-emotional content.  
Comparable results were also found in Radenhausen and Anker (1988), who also 
examined the relationship between affect and reasoning. In their study, fifty-seven participants 
were placed in one of three conditions: participants who heard negative emotionally-provoking, 
non-emotionally-provoking, or positive emotionally-provoking statements. Then, participants 
were asked to complete a reasoning task (which consisted of 48 positive, neutral, or negative 
syllogisms) with respect to their condition, and a cognitive functioning task. Throughout the 
study, their mood was self-assessed. Individuals who heard negative statements showed 
modestly decreased performance on both cognitive tasks compared to participants who were in 
the other two conditions. Unlike Palfai and Salovey‘s (1993) or Oakford et al.‘s (1996) results, 
Radenhausen and Anker (1988) found no significant differences in task performance within the 
non-emotional and positive emotional conditions suggesting that only negative emotions 
impacted reasoning. 
To further expand on this research, in 2011, Blanchette and Lesse conducted three 
different studies specifically focusing on deductive reasoning and the impact of affect on 
logicality. In their first study, Blanchette and Leese‘s (2011) participants were asked to complete 
a number of deductive syllogisms that evoked either negative or neutral emotions. In their 
second study, Blanchette and Leese‘s (2011) participants were asked to pair the reasoning stimuli 
with neutral or emotional images. In their final study, Blanchette and Leese‘s (2011) participants 
were asked to pair the reasoning stimuli with neutral or emotional words. In all three studies, 
Blanchette and Leese (2011) measured participants‘ skin conductance response (SCR). 
According to Blanchette and Leese (2011), ―despite the fact that semantic content was exactly 




less normatively logical responses when reasoning about contents conditioned to be emotional ... 
similar findings were obtained using syllogisms with emotional/neutral words‖ (235). 
Additionally, ―a larger increase in skin conductance in response to an emotional stimulus was 
associated with a lower level of logicality in a deductive-reasoning task, an important link 
between emotion-related physiological changes and reasoning‖ (240). Blanchette and Leese‘s 
(2011) study furthers the research focusing on the relationship between affect and reasoning by 
utilizing physiological assessments to measure the interest. 
Additionally, Wranke, Jung, and Hamburger (2009) measured the influence of affect on 
reasoning by asking participants to complete a version of the Wason Selection Task (which 
included positive, neutral and negative content). Prior to the task, participants were placed into 
one of three conditions: (1) the success group (the positive affect group), (2) neutral group (the 
neutral affect group), or (3) the failure group (the negative affect group). Conditions were based 
on feedback from participants‘ performance on a manipulated intelligence test; for example, 
participants who did well on the test were placed in the success group, participants who did 
poorly on the test were then placed in the failure group, and the rest were placed in the neutral 
group. Findings reveal that affect hinders an individual‘s reasoning performance such that 
participants in the negative condition underperformed more than any other participants; 
participants in the positive mood condition performed better than the negative condition 
participants, but still did worse than participants in the neutral group. Importantly, Wranke et al. 
(2009) suggest that while mood is influential in an individual‘s ability to reason, ―mood might 
result in a pre-load of cognitive resources and thus has a devastating effect on logical reasoning 
performance‖ (532). Particularly, Wranke et al. (2009) report that affect might influence 




Furthermore, in another comparable study, Ifenthaler (2015) analyzed the impact of 
negative and positive affect on reasoning processes by recruiting eighty-one participants who 
were randomly placed into one of three mood induction conditions (either negative, neutral, or 
positive affect). While in the different conditions, all participants were asked to solve numerous 
inductive reasoning tasks. Ifenthaler‘s (2015) findings, similar to other studies, show that 
participants who were in the negative affect condition performed worse on the inductive 
reasoning tasks than participants who were in the positive or neutral affect condition. In 2012, 
Eliades, Mansell, Stewart and Blanchette examined the effects of affect on reasoning by 
conducting two experiments across two countries. In both of the studies, findings show that 
individuals who were asked to complete syllogisms with emotional content showed decreased 
cognitive performance (i.e., impaired logicality) than when asked to complete syllogisms with 
non-emotional content. This study, unlike others described above, suggested that ―reasoning 
about emotional contents which are intrinsically linked to the stimuli, produces impairments to 
logical reasoning‖ (475).  
In regards to the effects of solely positive affect on reasoning, research shows that 
individuals who display positive affect are more likely to be flexible in their thinking processes 
and facilitate better inductive reasoning skills (Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson 1985; Isen et 
al., 1987). In Isen et al.‘s (1985; 1987) two studies, researchers measured the impact of positive 
affect on inductive reasoning by utilizing a word association task. In the first study, ―affect was 
induced by means of word-association to affectively balanced words,‖ while in the second study, 
―where word type (positive, neutral, negative) was a second factor along with affect, in a 
between-subjects design, associates to positive words were also more unusual and diverse than 




significantly influences cognitive organization and flexibility, essential in inductive reasoning. 
Furthermore, even moderate levels of positive affect exhibit similar influences to reasoning and 
decision making, thus suggesting that any level of positivity can positively impact reasoning 
(Schiffenbauer, 1974; Isen et al., 1978; Isen, Means, Patrick, & Nowicki, 1982; Isen & Shalker, 
1982; Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Isen & Means, 1983; Isen & Patrick, 1983; Isen, Pratkanis, 
Slovic, & Slovic, 1984). 
In an attempt to understand this phenomenon, Tiedens and Linton (2001) posit that, ―the 
experience associated with some emotions, such as anger and contentment, can lead to feelings 
of certainty, while emotions such as surprise, fear and worry can lead individuals to feel 
uncertain or unsure about their current situation‖ (973). As Tiedens and Linton (2001) argue, the 
uncertainty which emerges from affect leads individuals to a state of ―bounded rationality.‖ 
According to Croskerry (2002), ―this is significant for reasoning ability in that individuals in a 
state of emotionally aroused bounded rationality may fail to consider other important information 
presented once they have reviewed information that satisfies their own interest‖ (1186). 
Particularly, individuals might miss specific details or cues needed to better reason. 
Consequently, when individuals are in a heightened affective state, they might be less likely to 
process information efficiently, and subsequently, be incapable of attaining a rational conclusion.  
With the need to better understand the presence of heightened affective states on logic, 
research investigating the relationship between reasoning and affect has also looked at the 
presence of more extreme emotionality. In 1994, Channon and Baker compared performance on 
a deductive reasoning task with a clinically depressed and non-depressed undergraduate sample. 
Participants were asked to complete a number of categorical syllogisms by drawing the 




depressed and non-depressed participants (as measured by the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI)) 
and their ability to correctly complete the syllogisms, with non-depressed participants 
outperforming the depressed participants on the deductive reasoning task. Findings also revealed 
that depressed participants were more likely to make errors than non-depressed participants. 
Interestingly, however, in 2006, Johnson-Laird, Mancini, and Gangemi (2006) found that 
participants who suffered from Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) and different phobias 
reasoned better when participants completed syllogisms that were associated with their 
psychopathology only (i.e., participants with OCD performed better on OCD contextual 
syllogisms than other syllogisms, and participants with phobia(s) performed better on phobia 
contextual syllogisms). However, it is important to stress that Johnson et al. (2006) might credit 
this reasoning enhancement on the ―result of prolonged rumination, [where] patients become 
expert reasoners about those matters pertaining to their illness‖ (836) suggesting that prior 
knowledge, more than affect, could have impacted reasoning in this context.  
According to Jung et al. (2014), ―emotions can have a significant effect on the way we 
think, reason, decide, and solve problems‖ (570). In four experimental studies, Jung et al. (2014) 
investigated how affect influenced reasoning and logic. In their first two studies, participants 
were first asked to complete an intelligence test while their affect was manipulated through 
researcher feedback (i.e., if they performed poorly, excellent, or average), similar to Wranke et 
al.‘s (2009) study methodology. Participants were then asked to complete a set of logical 
inference problems, either within the context of logical propositional calculus or in a Wason 
Selection Task paradigm; each set of logical inference problems included negative, neutral, or 
positive content. In their last two studies, Jung et al. (2014) recruited participants with anxiety 




consisted of subject matter associated with their respective anxiety disorder. Findings from all 
four studies suggest that affect influenced participants‘ performance on reasoning. Specifically, 
participants who were in the positive mood condition were more likely to perform better on 
reasoning tasks than participants who were in the negative mood condition. However, 
participants who were in the neutral mood conditions performed better, overall, on the reasoning 
tasks compared to participants who were in either the negative or positive mood conditions. 
Importantly, Jung et al. (2014) revealed that the problem‘s content also significantly influenced 
reasoning abilities, as shown in the last two studies conducted. Specifically, participants who 
were arachnophobic were more likely to exhibit diminished reasoning abilities when completing 
spider-content reasoning tasks than participants who suffered from exam phobia; participants 
who suffered from exam phobia were more likely to show decreased reasoning performance 
when completing exam-content problems than participants who were arachnophobic. These 
findings, along with previous studies mentioned, further support the claims that emotions or 
affect significantly influences reasoning (Palfai & Salovey, 1993; Eich & Forgas, 2003; 
Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Lerner et al., 2014). 
In another study, Hamburger, Jung, and Wranke (2009) measured how affective states 
influenced reasoning to determine if these states, especially in reference to phobic content, could 
impair reasoning performance. In their main study, sixteen participants (seven participants in the 
control condition, who were classified as non-arachnophobic participants, and nine participants 
in the experimental condition, who were classified as arachnophobic) were asked to complete a 
conditional reasoning task that incorporated different emotional content: (1) neutral content, (2) 
negative content, or (3) arachnophobic-related content. Findings from this study showed that 




reasoning tasks that incorporated arachnophobic-related content than the conditional reasoning 
tasks that incorporated neutral or negative content. As Hamburger et al. (2009) show, 
―processing anxiety relevant topics may elicit a fear response resulting in a decrease of cognitive 
resources which might be responsible for the impaired reasoning performance‖ (31). Findings 
revealed that non-arachnophobic participants performed significantly worse on the conditional 
reasoning tasks that incorporated negative content compared to the conditional reasoning tasks 
that incorporated neutral and arachnophobic-related content. However, participants who were 
classified as non-arachnophobic control participants ―did not reason worst on spider phobia 
relevant inferences since those problems represent individually meaningful and emotion eliciting 
contents in particular for spider phobics but not for non-phobics‖ (31). Findings showed that 
affect did influence reasoning, however, as individuals who suffer from many phobias are more 
likely to avoid their phobia. These individuals are therefore more likely to show a fear response 
during exposure, which might make them reason less accurately when confronted with relevant 
phobic problems. 
Prior research studies have shown that affect significantly impairs deductive reasoning 
and syllogistic logic, but much of the findings have been facilitated in a laboratory setting. Only 
a limited number of studies have investigated the effects of affect that emerge from more 
personal and extreme incidents. For example, in 2013, Caparos and Blanchette assessed 
deductive reasoning in victims of sexual abuse and compared them to age- and education-
matched control groups by asking the participants to complete categorical syllogisms; the 
categorical syllogisms included topics that were neutral, generally emotional, and related to 
sexual abuse. Participants were assessed for their degree of grief and influence triggered by the 




decreased performance on the deductive reasoning task compared to the control group during 
abuse-related and neutral problems. Interestingly, victims of sexual abuse who reported higher 
levels of distress following the abusive experience additionally exhibited improved relative 
logicality in reasoning about emotional content (specifically, abuse-related), compared to non-
emotional content. This finding supports Johnson-Laird et al.‘s (2006) results that show that 
individuals reason better when presented with associated contextual factors. According to 
Caparos and Blanchette (2013), ―trauma can have a negative impact on some aspects of higher-
level cognitive function, but that reasoning about personally meaningful negative emotional 
contents does not necessarily lead to impaired logicality‖(14). Particularly, while results show 
that affect could impact reasoning, this study further explains that an individual‘s ability to 
reason about personal and individualized traumatic experiences does not inevitably influence 
their cognitive performance. As Caparos and Blanchette (2013) explain, ―the significantly 
decreased logicality in reasoning about abstract stimuli is consistent with the possibility of 
deficits in generic decontextualized abstract reasoning ability‖ (13). Importantly, Johnson-Laird 
et al.‘s (2006) further expresses the significant impact of emotion on the cognitive function of 
reasoning.  
In a similar study, Blanchette, Lindsay, and Davies (2014) researched deductive 
reasoning in a congruent sample of female victims of sexual abuse. Participants were asked to 
identify the validity of inferences after they were presented with different stimuli; their levels of 
emotional distress as related to the sexual abuse experience were also recorded. Findings 
revealed ―some differences between controls and victims of sexual abuse that were consistent 
with the literature on trauma-exposure, PTSD and cognitive function ... on neutral problems, 




impact of trauma-exposure on neutral reasoning is consistent with the literature referred to 
previously, suggesting a link between trauma-exposure and deleterious effects on cognitive 
function‖ (14). This study, as well as the previous two discussed, further support the deleterious 
relationship between affect and reasoning. Unlike the other studies discussed in this section, 
these three studies explore the impact of trauma and adverse effects that were not laboratory-
induced or artificially produced. 
As the aforementioned research suggests, affect plays an integral role in reasoning. 
However, as this section depicts, there is a scientific debate on how affect influences reasoning, 
as some research suggests that affect might impair reasoning (Hamburger et al., 2009; Caparos & 
Blanchette, 2013; Jung et al., 2014), while other studies suggest that affect might not be so 
deleterious (Tiedens & Linton, 2001; Johnson-Laird et al., 2006). 
Deductive and Inductive Reasoning in Adverse Environments 
As portrayed in the previous section, research shows that affect and mood significantly 
influence deductive and inductive reasoning. It would make sense then, that situations, 
experiences, and environments that induce affect and emotions also influence deductive and 
inductive reasoning. While there are a limited number of studies, research shows overwhelming 
findings that stress, trauma, and other adverse situations induce various affective states, which in 
turn, impact cognitive functioning, and more specifically, reasoning. This section introduces 
research that evaluated the effects of traumatic and stressful environments on deductive and 
inductive reasoning. 
In 2005, Lieberman, Bathalon, Falco, Kramer, et al. investigated the effects of affect on  
cognitive functioning, while also measuring selected physiological factors (i.e., heart rate, blood  




Navy SEAL training; and (2) during a US Army Ranger training exercise; both time periods 
were described as high-stress and high-intensity military training. Participants were first asked to 
complete a number of computer-based cognitive tests and then participate in either the ―Hell 
Week‖ of U.S. Navy SEAL training or a US Army Ranger training exercise. The NAVY Seal 
team and US Army Rangers performed poorly on a number of cognitive functions, including 
reasoning, while they were placed in the stressful computer-simulated combat environment, 
compared to when they were in the non-stressful computer-simulated combat environment. 
According to Lieberman et al. (2005), ―the deficits observed were greater than those typically 
produced by alcohol intoxication, treatment with sedating drugs, or clinical hypoglycemia‖ (C9). 
Researchers further showed that strong affect produced deleterious effects on higher-level 
cognitive functioning and cognitive resources, and these effects were worsened by the presence 
of combat-like stress environments.  
In a similar study, and to further investigate affect on reasoning during high levels of 
stress, Lieberman et al. (2005) conducted another study using U.S. Army officers. The thirty-one 
US Army officers were asked to complete intense military exercises during 53 hours of extreme 
heat; these military exercises were utilized as an induction stimuli because they produced acute 
levels of stress and imitated combat-like environments. Participants‘ mood, cognitive and 
physical performance, sleep, body composition, testosterone, and saliva cortisol) were assessed 
before, during, and after the military training. Additionally, mood and cognitive assessments 
were given to measure attention, memory, pattern recognition, and reasoning (Goel et al., 1997; 
Klauer, Willmes, & Phye, 2002; Blanchette & Richards, 2004; Lieberman et al., 2005; 
Blanchette, 2006). Results showed considerable decreases in cognitive functions during imitated 




deleterious effects on cognitive functions such as reasoning. This investigation serves as another 
example of the detrimental effects of negative affect on cognitive performance. 
In 2004, Blanchette and Richards recruited thirty war veterans that had served in battle 
(from the Second World War to the 1992 Gulf War). Participants were asked to reason out 
combat- and war-related contextual syllogisms; the syllogisms were monitored in degrees of 
affect with some categorized as emotional and others as non-emotional. Researchers evaluated 
war veterans‘ syllogistic task performance to assess if reasoning improved or worsened when 
individuals were involved in emotional contexts. Blanchette and Richards (2004) found that 
veteran participants exhibited erroneous logic reasoning abilities when the context was emotional 
compared to when the context was non-emotional, even though all syllogisms contained combat 
and war-related content. Like other studies, Blanchette and Richards (2004) show that reasoning 
is significantly influenced by individuals‘ induced affect and mood. 
In 2007, Blanchette et al. conducted a study investigating how participants were able to 
reason after they were exposed to the London terrorist attacks. Blanchette et al. (2007) recruited 
participants from the United Kingdom and Canada and examined their reactions within one week 
and then again six months following the attacks. Participants were asked to reason three types of 
syllogisms (neutral, somewhat emotional, and emotional) that were associated with terrorism; 
along with the participants‘ location during the terrorist attacks, participants were asked to self-
report their mood and feelings of risk. Findings showed that, regardless of the time (one week or 
six months), participants were more likely to reason about neutral problems more accurately than 
emotional or somewhat emotional syllogisms. Participants showed increased cognitive 
performance when they completed neutral contextual syllogisms than when they completed 




―participants in London (United Kingdom) provided more logically valid answers when 
reasoning about problems related to terrorism and were less likely to answer on the basis of 
beliefs, despite reporting higher levels of emotions‖ (49). Interestingly, these findings also 
revealed that the participants who were closer in proximity to the London terrorist attacks 
showed fewer impairments than participants who were further from it. 
In another study by Blanchette et al. (2012), researchers compared the reasoning abilities 
of thirty-two veterans, half of whom were diagnosed with PTSD and half of whom were 
mentally healthy. Participants were asked to complete a number of reasoning tasks that consisted 
of neutral, emotional, and combat-related content. Overall, veterans who were diagnosed with 
PTSD were more likely to reason inaccurately and illogically and perform worse overall in the 
reasoning tasks than mentally healthy veterans; interestingly, ―veteran‘s reasoning was most 
accurate in relation to war-related syllogisms compared to neutral content, but not significantly 
different to generally emotional content … this effect decreased with increased level of combat 
experience‖ (160). Blanchette‘s findings suggest that mental disorders such as PTSD can be 
further linked to many cognitive deficits, such as insufficiencies in working memory and 
executive function. However, Blanchette‘s findings are similar to her previous research that 
indicates that individuals reason better when presented with syllogisms that consist of their 
respective fear or phobia.  
In a subsequent study by Blanchette (Blanchette & Campbell, 2012), researchers 
investigated how emotion impaired reasoning by examining the reasoning patterns of British 
veterans. Participants were asked to complete syllogisms that included combat-related, neutral, 
or emotional content. Findings revealed veterans who had the lowest degree of combat exposure 




veterans who experienced more severe combat encounters, however, exhibited decreased 
performance in syllogisms overall, regardless of content. While Blanchette and Campbell (2012) 
expected to show decreased performance when completing combat-related and emotional 
syllogisms, specifically their study did support the common notion that affect can contribute to 
cognitive strain. According to Blanchette and Campbell (2012): 
New paradigms in the psychology of reasoning have included a consideration for general 
contextual factors that may impact on the reasoning process, including individuals‘ goals 
and motivations. We suggest that emotions are one such important contextual factor that 
influences reasoning. The classic literature on thinking and reasoning has typically 
ignored the possible influence of emotion, except to consider it a source of disruption. 
We review findings from studies where participants were asked to reason about 
personally relevant emotional experiences such as sexual abuse, war, and terrorist attacks. 
While some findings are consistent with the view that incidental emotions have a 
deleterious effect on reasoning, a number of findings also suggest a beneficial impact of 
emotion. For instance, veterans reasoned more logically about combat-related syllogisms 
than structurally identical syllogisms with neutral contents; victims of sexual abuse 
reporting more negative emotions following the events also reasoned more logically on 
abuse-related contents, relative to neutral contents. This may be associated with integral 
emotions, when the affective reaction is relevant to the semantic contents reasoned about. 
We propose that the positive impact of integral emotions on reasoning can be explained 
by increased utility of problem content and increased utility of reasoning (162). 
As depicted in the aforementioned studies, decrements in logical reasoning are linked to 




Within this framework, then, this dissertation investigates similar hypotheses as those explored 
in the previous studies. This study targets both individuals‘ ability to perform inductive and 
deductive reasoning tasks, and further the analysis by exploring how individuals‘ resilience and 
grit moderates these outcomes. 
Resilience as a Factor in Reasoning 
According to Litz (2014), ―the resilience construct has received a great deal of attention 
in the stress and trauma fields especially as a result of September 11th, an event that raised the 
specter of a future with mass violence, terror and loss in the consciousness of citizens, care-
communities, academics and policy-makers‖ (5). For a number of decades, social scientists have 
considered the definition of resilience to be problematic and complex due to the numerous 
attempts to operationalize this psychological construct. Resilience has been researched in various 
environments and contexts, which would add to the complication of its operationalization 
(Cicchetti & Garmezy, 1993; Gordon & Song, 1994; Kaufman, Cook, Arny, Jones, & Pittinsky, 
1994; Luthar & Cushing, 1999; Tarter & Vanyukov, 1999; Luthar et al., 2000; Southwick, 
Douglas-Palumberi, & Pietrzak, 2014). For example, the American Psychological Association 
(APA; 2014) defines resilience as ‗‗the process of adapting well in the face of adversity, trauma, 
tragedy, threats or even significant sources of stress‖ (para. 4). Michael Rutter (1985, 1987, 
1993, 1999, 2006), who is recognized for his work in child psychology, defines resilience as ―the 
positive end of the distribution of developmental outcomes among individuals at high risk‖ 
(Rutter, 1985, 599). Luthar et al. (2000) characterize resilience as a  
dynamic process encompassing positive adaptation within the context of significant 
adversity … implicit within this notion are two critical conditions: (1) exposure to 




despite major assaults on the developmental process. (545) 
Similar to the definition proposed by APA (2014), Hutchison, Stuart, and Pretorius (2010) 
identify resilience as the capacity to acclimate to strenuous and distressful situations and events. 
These are just a few of the definitions that can be found describing the psychological construct of 
resilience. 
Due to the wide range of disciplines that have investigated resilience, the definition of 
this construct continues to vary. For example, George Bonanno (2004) who has focused on 
resilience within the context of trauma and loss, characterizes resilience as a ―stable trajectory of 
healthy functioning‖ after a stressful events, or a brief period of disequilibrium of health (20). As 
he further explains,  
resilience pertains to the ability of adults in otherwise normal circumstances who are 
exposed to an isolated and potentially highly disruptive event such as the death of a close 
relation or a violent or life-threatening situation, to maintain relatively stable, healthy 
levels of psychological and physical functioning. (20)  
Bonanno‘s definition of resilience appears to be distinguished by the lack of any 
psychopathology after exposure to a stressful or traumatic experience. Rachel Yehuda (2004), 
who studies resilience within the context of psychiatry and neuroscience however, defines 
resilience differently. According to her, resilience is operationalized as a ―reintegration of self 
that includes a conscious effort to move forward in an insightful integrated positive manner as a 
result of lessons learned from an adverse experience‖ (Yehuda, 2004, 29). In Southwick et al. 
(2014), Bonanno‘s definition of resilience does not allow for a resilient individual to also suffer 
from any mental illness such as PTSD or depression after traumatic event; individuals are either 




on a continuum,‖ and resilience can be found in varying degrees dependent on an individual‘s 
age and varying experience level (Yehuda, 2004; Southwick et al., 2014). For example, some 
people might be more resilient in a workplace environment and adapt well to those particular 
types of stressors, while others might suffer more. Other individuals might be more resilient 
when they are exposed to familial challenges such as the death of a loved one than others. As 
Southwick et al. (2014) write, 
that individuals may be more resilient in some domains of their life than others, and 
during some phases of their life compared with other phases; and that there are likely 
numerous types of resilience (e.g., acute resilience; emergent resilience) that depend on 
context (e.g., resilience for a traumatized Cambodian refugee may be different than 
resilience for an American who lives through a hurricane, or than an individual suffering 
with chronic schizophrenia).  
According to Southwick et al. (2014), ―determinants of resilience include a host of 
biological, psychological, social and cultural factors that interact with one another to determine 
how one responds to stressful experiences‖ (5). Particularly, research has revealed that the 
factors that influence a person‘s resilience can be psychological (Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004; 
Campbell-Sills, Cohan, & Stein, 2006), environmental (Haskett, Nears, Ward, & McPherson, 
2006), biological (Charney, 2004; Stassen, Angst, Hell, Scharfetter, & Szegedi, 2007), or genetic 
(Tannenbaum & Anisman, 2003; Feder, Nestler, & Charney, 2009; Southwick & Charney, 
2012). As Ann Masten (2001), who is known for her work in childhood resilience, explains, in 
order to understand resilience, researchers must take an array of factors into account because 
individuals function differently across a number of aspects in their lives. She defines resilience 




that threaten the viability, the function, or the development of that system‖ (Masten, 2001, 227). 
Her definition of resilience considers the individual as an entity, consisting of the different 
systems that make up an individual. According to Southwick et al. (2014): 
Determinants of resilience may also differ depending on context and specific challenges. 
For example, some of the determinants of resilience that are relevant for a firefighter in 
the United States may differ from those that are relevant for a mother living in an 
impoverished country. While it is useful for researchers to identify general principles 
related to resilience, it is also important to recognize that successful determinants may 
vary from one person to the next based on multiple factors such as personality, specific 
challenges, resources available, and environmental context. In addition, there is evidence 
suggesting that resilience is associated with the ability to employ a variety of coping 
strategies in a flexible manner depending on the specific challenge, and then to use 
corrective feedback to adjust those strategies. Further, the determinants of resilience may 
vary depending on the age and maturity of the individual. For example, having parents 
that are highly protective may foster resilience during infancy and early childhood but not 
during later childhood and adolescence (5) 
For the purposes of this dissertation, resilience is operationalized as an individual‘s 
ability to appropriately adapt to significant adversity, trauma, or other stressors (McEwen & 
Stellar, 1993; Masten, 2001; Bonanno, 2004; Agaibi, & Wilson, 2005; Friborg et al., 2005; 
Bonanno et al., 2007; Campbell-Sills et al., 2009; Litz, 2014). While the definition of resilience 
continues to be measured and analyzed, there are numerous factors agreed upon, and this 
operationalization is derived from these factors. Particularly, resilient individuals have the 




to Litz (2014),  
Another reason why I believe that the ability to bounce back is the right way 
to operationalize resilience is that it acknowledges that everyone has a line 
that can be crossed and which leads to severe initial disruption of normal 
functions and functioning. For example, even the most mature, healthy, 
battle-tested, well-trained, well-supported, decorated and hard-nosed senior 
non-commissioned officer has a breaking point. In my view, the truest test of 
the capacity for resilience is the ability to bounce back from entirely 
understandable and human crushing blows (i.e. serious disruptions in 
biological, psychological, social and spiritual capacities). Moreover, it is 
unhelpful and misguided to expect people to be resistant and unscathed by all 
experiences. Yet, a great deal of attention and resources have been devoted to 
training people in the high-risk dangerous occupations in the hope of creating 
minimally disrupted professionals who can grow positively from stress and 
exposure to traumatic stressors. Arguably, these initiatives have failed to 
draw sufficient attention to training leaders, peers and individuals about what 
to do if understandable psychic injuries occur. Also, few resources have been 
devoted to studying the causes of bouncing back from high-magnitude 
impacts and disruptions (2) 
Resilient individuals are not without negative thoughts and emotions. Instead, they are more 
likely to possess coping skills and mechanisms to efficiently and effectively navigate through 
trauma, and successfully balance positive with negative feelings. Individuals who are resilient 




show a ―stable trajectory of healthy functioning‖ across a period of time and possess a more 
positive outlook (Bonanno, Papa, & O‘Neill, 2001; Bonanno, 2004). Individuals who are 
resilient possess ―protective factors that foster the development of positive outcomes and healthy 
personality characteristics among children exposed to unfavorable or aversive life 
circumstances‖ (Bonanno, 2004, 20).  
Resilience plays an integral role in an individual‘s character (Luthar, & Zigler, 1991; 
Olsson, Bond, Burns, Vella-Brodrick, & Sawyer, 2003; Connor, & Davidson, 2003; Friborg et 
al., 2005; Agaibi, & Wilson, 2005). A resilient individual possesses ―great strength, flexibility, a 
capacity for mastery, and resumption of normal functioning after excessive stress that challenges 
individual coping skills‖ (Agaibi, & Wilson, 2005, 197). Someone who is resilient has the ability 
to survive intense levels of trauma and stress from a number of emotionally provoking 
experiences and can protect his mental stability and psychological health (Harel, Kahana, & 
Wilson, 1993; Harel, Kahana, & Kahana, 1993; Yehuda, McFarlane, & Shalev, 1998; Bonanno, 
2004; Wilson, Wilson, & Drozdek, 2004).  
Resilience has been associated with a number of psychological constructs. This includes 
cognitive appraisal, locus of control, perception of predictability and control, dispositional 
optimism, learning, experience/expertise, affectivity, motivation, effort, social support systems, 
and other individual difference characteristics (Lazarus, 1990; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; 
Seligman, 1998; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). In addition, resilience has been linked to 
numerous psychological constructs such as grit, self-esteem, and hardiness (Duckworth & 
Seligman, 2005; Duckworth et al., 2007; Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, & Ter Weel, 2008), 
agreeableness (Davey, Eaker, &Walters, 2003), and openness, conscientiousness, and emotional 




to intellectual mastery (Gardner & Harmon, 2002), and the ability to disengage from issues and 
conceptualize problems (Block & Kremen, 1996).  
Resilience has been shown to predict increases in self-efficacy (Wright, Zautra, & Going, 
2008), decreases in pain catastrophizing through positive emotions (Ong, Zautra, & Reid, 2010), 
well-being in teachers (Pretsch, Flunger, & Schmitt, 2012), decreases in posttraumatic growth 
among patients with coronary heart disease (Chan, Lai, & Wong, 2006), increases in mental 
health in older adults (Nygren et al., 2005; Mehta et al., 2008; Gooding, Hurst, Johnson, & 
Tarrier, 2012), decreases in preschool behavior problems (Conway & McDonough, 2006), 
increases in relative absence of depressive symptoms (Dias, Santos, Souza, Nogueira, Torres, 
Belfort, & Dourado, 2015), increases in academic achievement for low-income African 
Americans (Strayhorn, 2010), entrepreneurial success (Ayala & Manzano, 2014), and increases 
in successful adaptation and life satisfaction in college students (Cazan & Truta, 2015). 
It is important to note that in order for individuals to be characterized as resilient they 
must have been exposed to some critical threat to their development (Luthar & Zigler, 1991; 
Masten et al., 1999; Luthar et al., 2000; Masten, 2001). As Masten (2001) explains, ―there must 
be current or past hazards judged to have the potential to derail normative development … 
hazards are actuarially based predictors of undesirable outcomes drawn from evidence that this 
status or condition is statistically associated with higher probability of a bad outcome in the 
future‖ (229). A lack of challenge and adverse experience prevents an individual from having the 
opportunity to bounce back from and overcome hardships. 
While resilience has recently been linked with psychological constructs such as grit, 
hardiness, and perseverance, resilience is distinct from these constructs. According to Luther et 




we believe that there is considerable value in retaining resilience as a distinct construct … 
resilience encapsulates the view that adaptation can occur through trajectories that defy 
―normative‖ expectations … the conceptual distinctiveness of resilience lies in evidence 
that positive adjustment patterns occurring with, versus without, conditions of adversity 
often have different correlates and thus reflect distinct constructs. (551)  
The existence of grit does not demand an adverse environment or situation; however, this is not 
the case within the presence of resilience. Resilience is categorized as a process of positive 
adaptation where an effort is made to continue and maintain homeostasis during traumatic or 
challenging circumstances (Luthar et al., 2000). Furthermore, according to Duckworth et al. 
(2007), ―grit is distinguished from resilience by the heightened and persistent focus on goal 
achievement amidst stressful and adverse conditions‖ (Duckworth et al., 2007, 1087).  
Due to the lack of research in this area, this dissertation looks to investigate if resilience 
influences the higher cognitive function of reasoning, and more specifically, if resilience impacts 
deductive and inductive reasoning. Particularly, this dissertation is interested in evaluating 
whether participants‘ resilience protected their cognitive performance from the affect that was 
induced by computer-simulated combat-like environments. Specifically, the author hypothesized 
that individuals who self-reported as more resilient (who measured high on the Resilience Scale 
for Adults (RSA)) were more likely to exhibit no deficit in their deductive and inductive 
reasoning skills regardless of the negative affect that was induced by the computer-simulated 
combat-like environments. Additionally, the author hypothesized that individuals who self-report 
as less resilient (who measured low on the RSA) were more likely to exhibit deficits in their 
deductive and inductive reasoning skills regardless of the affect (combat or non-combat 




Grit as a Factor in Reasoning  
For the last two decades, grit has been characterized as integral in personality and 
performance (Duckworth et al., 2007; Matthews et al., 2006; Duckworth, Quinn, & Seligman, 
2009; Duckworth & Eskreis-Winkler, 2013). Grit is defined as ―a positive, non-cognitive trait 
based on an individual‘s passion for a particular long-term goal or end state, coupled with a 
powerful motivation to achieve their respective objective,‖ (Duckworth et al., 2007, 1087). Grit 
promotes a perseverance of effort in prevailing over challenges that individuals must face on the 
path to success, and is utilized ―as a driving force in achievement realization‖ (Duckworth et al., 
2007, 1087). Particularly, grit promotes an individual‘s ability to continuously preserve and work 
hard over a period of time on highly valued goals (Duckworth & Gross, 2014). According to 
Singh and Jha (2008), grit ―refers to the determination to accomplish an ambitious, long-term 
goal despite the inevitable obstacles‖ (41). 
Grit has been identified as a trait that allows an individual to perform vigorously and 
persistently toward challenges without losing energy or effort over a long period of time 
regardless of disappointment or failure (Duckworth et al., 2007). A person that is gritty is able to 
overcome obstacles to complete any tasks. While most individuals might perceive such difficulty 
and failure as indications to walk away and start something new, gritty individuals persist 
(Duckworth et al., 2007). Individuals who are categorized as gritty are more likely to self-
maintain and self-regulate their feelings of commitment and willpower over a long time, 
regardless of any challenges or failures they might face. As Duckworth et al. (2007) explain, 
their passion and willpower towards the long-term goal ―is the overriding factor that provides the 
stamina required to ‗stay the course‘ amid challenges and set-backs‖ (1088).  




accomplished; gritty individuals are more likely to characteristically possess traits that are above 
a normal person‘s ability (Duckworth et al., 2007; Robertson-Kraft & Duckworth, 2014; 
Laursen, 2015). Individuals who are characterized as gritty are distinguished by their inclination 
to maintain ―effort and interest over years despite failure, adversity, and plateaus in progress,‖ 
while individuals who are not characterized as gritty are dispirited, easily prone to distractions, 
and commonly preoccupied by new interests (Duckworth et al., 2007, 1088).  
Even though grit has been delineated and defined as a unique personality trait, grit is still 
frequently linked with other psychological constructs such as perseverance, tenacity, motivation, 
self-control, and resilience (Duckworth et al., 2007; Maddi, Matthews, Kelly, Villarreal, & 
White, 2012; Duckworth & Gross, 2014). Grit, however, is distinct from each of these 
constructs. Perseverance is defined as ―the steadfast pursuit of a task, mission, or journey in spite 
of obstacles, discouragement, or distraction‖ (Duckworth et al., 2007, 1088), while grit is 
characterized as a feature of perseverance. Specifically, grit allows an individual to persistently 
attempt to accomplish a goal successfully, despite challenges over a long period of time. Unlike 
perseverance, grit incorporates an element of passion
2
, which many researchers credit as the 
reason why individuals maintain high effort while attempting to accomplish a task over a long 
period of time (Duckworth et al., 2007; Maddi et al., 2012). Furthermore, grit is distinct from 
tenacity and motivation. While tenacity is defined as the determination needed to accomplish and 
complete a task, passion
2
, which is integral to the definition of grit, is not a characteristic of 
tenacity. Therefore, an individual who is tenacious might be very determined, but not have the 
passion that gritty individuals possess. Similarly for motivation, according to Maehr and Meyer 
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 Passion here is defined as a drive that is empowered by a person‘s needs, actions, and wishes 
(Duckworth et al., 2007, 1088). It is important to note however, that Credé et al‘s (2017) current 
meta-analytic research suggests passion is not the construct within grit that is predictive (Credé et 




(1997), motivation can be conceptualized as ―direction, intensity, persistence and quality of what 
is done…particularly, motivation explains behavior‖ (373). Simply, motivation gives reasoning 
behind individuals‘ desires, actions, and needs. The difference between a gritty individual and a 
motivated individual is that gritty individuals‘ thoughts, actions, and feelings are relatively stable 
across time and situation, whereas motivational individuals have situational differences in what 
they want and need (Borghan et al., 2008; Von Culin, Tsukayama, & Duckworth, 2014). 
While grit and self-control are highly correlated with one another, have been shown to 
predict intelligence and success, and have been used synonymously, grit and self-control are also 
very distinct from one another (Duckworth et al, 2007; Duckworth & Gross, 2014). Self-control 
has been defined as the ―capacity to regulate attention, emotion, and behavior in the presence of 
temptation‖ (Duckworth & Gross, 2014, 320). Individuals, who possess high levels of self-
control, have a high degree of regulation; however, this is not necessarily towards the pursuit of a 
goal. Equally, individuals who are categorized as highly gritty possess a persistence and passion 
to persevere over a long period of time, but might lack self-control and regulation from other 
temptations outside of their goal. As Duckworth and Gross (2014) affirm, ―some paragons of 
self-control lead undistinguished lives devoid of a focused lifelong passion, and some gritty and 
exceptionally successful people are famously undisciplined in life domains other than their 
chosen passion‖ (320).  
While the psychological constructs of resilience and grit have been associated with one 
another, an overwhelming amount of research continues to maintain the distinction between grit 
and resilience (Perkins-Gough, 2013). While resilience possesses a complex array of definitions, 
resilience emerges from hardship, trauma, or adversity (Stratta et al., 2011). In contrast, grit is 




conceptualized as a trait whereas resilience is a dynamic process. Additionally, grit and 
resilience differ from one another within the context of time and function. As Duckworth and 
Gross (2014) explain, ―the overarching difference between these two constructs is the 
―timescale‖ and ―nature of the enemy‖ (323). For example, gritty individuals are more likely to 
maintain a goal over a long period of time regardless of challenges or failure, whereas 
individuals who are resilient do not necessarily need to maintain a goal over an extended period 
of time. Furthermore, an individual need not overcome some adversity to become gritty, while 
resiliency develops from hardship. 
Grit plays an integral role in an individual‘s performance. In 2007, Duckworth et al. 
conducted six different studies to assess the role of grit on individuals‘ performance. The first 
study, which recruited 545 participants from a website by inviting individuals to validate the Grit 
Scale, found that grit is strongly associated with educational attainment; results revealed that 
highly gritty individuals had higher levels of education than slightly gritty participants. In the 
second study, 706 participants recruited in a similar way as in the first study, completed the Grit 
Scale and the Big Five Inventory
3
 (BFI) to assess the relationship among the constructs. While 
this particular study did not assess the influence of grit on performance, it did show a significant 
association with all the Big Five dimensions, which are essential traits in individual performance. 
In the third study, 139 undergraduate students were asked to complete the Grit scale and report 
scholastic measures (i.e., GPA and SAT scores). Gritty individuals outperformed their less gritty 
counterparts, suggesting that grit positively influences academic performance. In their fourth and 
fifth study, Duckworth et al. (2007) recruited participants (N= 1218 and N=1310, respectively) 
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from the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, NY to assess the impact of grit 
on successful performance in a military context. Grit predicted success in the USMA‘s rigorous 
summer training and later military performance suggesting that gritty individuals are more likely 
to complete rigorous summer training and excel in military performance than non-gritty 
individuals. In the final study, researchers recruited 175 participants from the 2005 Scripps 
National Spelling Bee to complete the Grit Scale, and compared them to Spelling Bee records. 
Through this analysis, Duckworth et al. (2007) showed that highly gritty individuals 
outperformed slightly gritty individuals in the Spelling Bee. In all, findings revealed that grit 
positively impact performance by improving and increasing academic and nonacademic 
contexts. 
Congruent findings were also found in Duckworth and Quinn (2009) who first recruited 
1218 participants and then 1308 participants to complete the Grit Scale and an assessment on 
scholastic success; results revealed a significant positive relationship between grit and 
performance, implying that highly gritty individuals outperform slightly gritty individuals in a 
scholastic context. Kelly, Matthews, and Bartone (2014) also reported similar results as previous 
Duckworth studies; results revealed that grit predicted the attrition rate of Cadet Basic Training 
(CBT), academic and physical performance, and success in military officer candidates with a 
USMA sample. These studies support the claim that ―grit affects a range of cognitive, scholastic, 
occupational, and social outcomes‖ (Gurven et al., 2016, 2).  
Grit has also been shown to impact affect. Singh and Jha (2008) explored the association 
between grit and life satisfaction and positive and negative affect and happiness by administering 
the Grit Scale, the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS), the Positive and Negative Affect 




students. Findings showed a significantly positive correlation amongst grit, life satisfaction, 
positive affect, and happiness suggesting that highly gritty individuals are more likely to show 
life satisfaction, positive affect, and happiness than slightly gritty individuals; a significant 
negative correlation between grit and negative affect revealed that highly gritty individuals are 
less likely to exhibit negative affect than slightly gritty individuals. 
In 2014, Von Culin et al. conducted two cross-sectional studies to investigate the 
relationship of grit and its two subfacets: (1) perseverance of effort and (2) stability of interest on 
happiness and its three subfacets (1) engagement, (2) pleasure and (3) meaning. Results revealed 
that happiness‘ subfacet of engagement is strongly correlated to grit‘s subfacet of perseverance 
of effort, however, happiness‘ subfacet of pleasure is even more strongly inversely correlated to 
grit‘s subfacet of stability of interest. Overall, results showed that grit is significantly positively 
correlated with happiness and its subfacets, implying that highly gritty people are more likely to 
show higher levels of happiness, engagement, pleasure, and meaning than slightly gritty people. 
Von Culin et al. (2014), further suggest that these findings might show that individual 
differences in grit may originate from variations in what makes individuals content. 
While numerous studies support the presence of grit and the distinction amongst similar 
constructs, a recent contrasting opinion has been given attention, which suggests that the validity 
of assertions made by grit literature might need to be re-examined (Credé & Kuncel, 2008; Credé 
& Niehorster, 2012; Credé, Tynan, & Harms, 2017). Specifically, Credé et al.‘s (2017) meta-
analytic review of grit literature proposed that current findings do not support the contention that 
grit is a higher-order construct that is distinguished by two lower-order facets (perseverance of 
effort and consistency of interest), arguing that  




structure … and results indicate that the practice of combining perseverance and 
consistency scores into an overall grit score appears to result in a significant loss in the 
ability to predict performance. (29) 
As Credé et al. (2017) further explain, perseverance is a better predictor of performance than 
either overall grit or consistency of interest. Additional findings from Credé et al.‘s (2017) meta-
analytic review show only modest relationships between grit and academic performance. Also, 
Credé et al. (2017) indicate that the strong correlations between grit score and overall 
conscientiousness ―is so strong as to not only limit the incremental value of grit scores for the 
prediction of performance over and above conscientiousness but also suggest that grit may be 
redundant with conscientiousness‖ (31). In all, Credé et al. (2017) claim that grit research may 
have ―fallen victim to the jangle fallacy4‖ and that ―grit as currently measured is simply a 
repackaging of conscientiousness or one of the facets of conscientiousness‖ (32). While research 
by Credé et al. (2008; 2012; 2017) criticizes grit, there is still strong evidence supporting the 
need to further investigate this psychological construct for its significant role in numerous 
contexts, and more particularly, in military samples. In response to Credé‘s article, Duckworth 
responded to criticisms by stating that while she agrees that her effect sizes were smaller than she 
might have reported, her effect sizes were still considered ―small-to-medium‖ range; 
additionally, while Credé reports that grit and conscientiousness are identical to one another, 
Duckworth promotes conceptualizing grit as ―a member of the conscientiousness family, but one 
with independent predictive powers‖ (Kamenetz, 2016). 
Current research on grit has only scratched the surface on this construct, and further 
research must be conducted to understand the psychological mechanisms of grit. Therefore, I 
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investigate if grit affects performance on inductive or deductive reasoning tasks. I am interested 
in evaluating whether participants‘ grit protects their cognitive performance from the affect that 
was induced by computer-simulated combat-like environments. Specifically, the author 
hypothesized that individuals who self-report as less gritty (measured low on the Grit Scale) are 
more likely to exhibit a deficit in their deductive and inductive reasoning skills regardless of the 
negative affect induced by the computer-simulated combat-like environments. I further 
hypothesized that individuals who self-report as highly gritty (measured high on the Grit Scale) 
are more likely to exhibit no deficit in their deductive and inductive reasoning skills regardless of 
the negative affect induced by the computer-simulated combat-like environments. Due to the 
problematic synonymity with other constructs, I utilize the Brief Self-Control Scale (BSCS) to 
control for self-control. 
Immersive versus Non-Immersive Technology 
War-fighting and numerous other traumatic and stressful environments induce a variety 
of emotions that severely affect individuals exposed to these situations. According to Rizzo et al. 
(2006) ―war is perhaps one of the most challenging situations that a human being can experience 
... the physical, emotional, cognitive and psychological demands of a combat environment place 
enormous stress on even the best-prepared military personnel (245). As Rizzo, Morie, Williams, 
Pair, and Buckwalter (2005) explained, ―when immersed in the emotional ―fog of war‖ the 
potential exists for optimal human decision-making and performance of goal-directed activities 
to be seriously compromised‖ (4). The US Army has provided their soldiers with numerous 
efforts in military training to facilitate learning, including real world combat training that 
stimulates emotional responses to conditions that are similar in combat environments. However, 




immersive virtual reality (VR) technologies in an effort to train soldiers on their ability to 
perform tasks (that they commonly perform in the field) in computer-simulated combat-like 
environments. Particularly, the US Army has commissioned virtual reality technology to train 
soldiers (Corrin, 2005). In his article, Corrin (2005) describes a specific example of an Army 
sergeant who utilized VR to train his soldiers reporting,  
when new recruits had trouble with the rifle range or the obstacle course, his team had 
those recruits play [America’s Army] and required them to complete those levels in the 
game … when the recruits did so, they then went back to the range and usually passed the 
range tests. (27) 
Such technology can be vital for military success. As Corrin (2015) describes, 
The Army is readying its force of the future, starting with how it trains new recruit. Those 
recruits comprise a generation raised on technology, including video games that simulate 
warfare. Now the Army is capitalizing on that tech savvy by rolling it into training 
doctrine and preparing troops for future battles. Virtual reality will be a key part of that 
tech-based training, building on training doctrine from previous generations and 
maintaining traditional and proven tactics, techniques and procedures. Here, the old 
school meets the new school as new soldiers get a taste of the theater without ever 
boarding a plane. Col. David Cannon, training capabilities manager for the Army's 
integrated training environment at Training and Doctrine Command. ―This is the first 
time where we really must build a synthetic environment that immerses soldiers and 
helps them thrive in the chaos and ambiguity and win in a complex environment.‖ Virtual 
reality is an increasingly critical part of soldier preparation. ―We use virtual to make them 




 ―We're an Army that's engaged, but we're an Army that's learning‖ (28) 
According to Witmer and Singer (1998), ―virtual reality is a computer-based artificial 
environment that presents synthetic sensory information to a user in a form that seems real rather 
than synthetic‖ (231). These computer-simulated worlds, which can be categorized as either 
immersive or non-immersive technologies, are able to imitate the feeling of immersion to three-
dimensional environment; current virtual reality systems present a realistic illusion of 
engagement in a virtual world (Ausburn & Ausburn, 2004). Bowman and McMahan (2007) 
describe virtual reality as ―complex technologies that replaced real-world sensory information 
with synthetic stimuli such as 3D visual imagery, spatialized sound, and force or tactile 
feedback‖ (3). Soldiers are able to be trained in safe environments, but, at the same time, be 
immersed in computer-simulated combat-like environments that induce similar emotionality that 
is found in real world war-fighting environments. As Rizzo et al. (2005) explains, ―what is 
apparent is that virtual environments are ideal set ups for military training in that they enable the 
participants, i.e. soldiers, to experience a particular situation within a controlled area‖ (5). As 
Rizzo and Buckwalter (1997) explain, ―VR offers the potential to develop human testing and 
training environments that allow for the precise control of complex stimulus presentations in 
which human cognitive and functional performance can be accurately assessed and rehabilitated‖ 
(123). Additionally, Kim, Rosenthal, Zielinski, and Brady (2014) report that  
VRs permit the scientific study of human behavioral responses in a controlled laboratory 
setting alongside ecologically valid contextual cues, this approach has the capability of 
enhancing both internally and externally valid experimental designs … VEs can be 
valuable in the experimental investigation of neurobehavioral processes (e.g., emotion, 




Particularly, immersive and non-immersive VR technologies are essential tools in research.  
 Immersive and non-immersive virtual reality systems provide valuable applicable 
military training, especially in computer-simulated dangerous environments (Tarr & Warren, 
2002; Rizzo et al., 2005, 2006). As such, these military simulation training scenarios can help 
teach soldiers how to respond and react to different stimuli. Particularly,  
a virtual reality simulation enables them to do so but without the risk of death or a serious 
injury ... they can re-enact a particular scenario, for example engagement with an enemy 
in an environment [,] in which they experience this but without the real world risks. 
(Kim, Rosenthal, Zielinski, & Brady, 2012, 143) 
Bowman and McMahan (2007) further explain that such simulation is a ―good compromise‖ 
between real-world training operations and the conventional alternatives of classroom-based 
learning. Particularly, VR, both immersive and non-immersive, provides a method of mimicking 
and simulating an environment and providing the user ―a sense of being there, taking control, 
and personally interacting with that environment with his/her own body‖ (3). Virtual reality 
allows the user to immerse and interact with a computer-generated environment in a naturalistic 
manner (Riva, 2009; Tarr & Warren, 2002). For example, the Armed Forces can teach their 
infantry numerous combat tactics engaging them in a virtual scenario with computer-simulated 
adversaries, troops, and supporters. With such potential, it is clear ―that virtual environments are 
ideal set ups for military training in that they enable the participants, i.e. soldiers, to experience a 
particular situation within a controlled area‖ (Bowman & McMahan, 2007, 3). As Vora et al. 
(2002) explain, ―simulating the actual battlefield for soldiers who will be facing combat is 
possibly the strongest area in which virtual reality can prepare troops during training‖ (560).  




immersive and non-immersive virtual reality technologies. Immersive virtual reality 
technologies are defined here as platforms that allow an individual to be fully immersed in a 
simulated environment through tactile, auditory, and visual apparatuses; this includes but is not 
limited to head mounted tracking systems, tactile or vibrating floor boards, and body sensors. In 
most instances, in immersive virtual reality technology, individuals must subject their entire 
body to the computer-simulated systems as they move around the environment. Non-immersive 
virtual reality technologies are defined here as platforms that allow an individual to be slightly 
immersed in a simulated environment, through common-use video games that do not allow the 
user to be immersed more than through the use of a video game screen and controller. This 
dissertation will follow similar previous definitions of immersive and non-immersive virtual 
reality technologies,  
From a technological point of view, VR can be immersive, where the user 
interacts with it using a head-mounted display (HMD) and a tracker position 
sensor, or non-immersive, where the HMD is substituted by an external monitor. 
The HMD is a display device that presents computer-generated images to each 
eye separately, giving the illusion of a three-dimensional space and depth of field. 
Worn on the head or as part of a helmet, it covers the user‘s eyes, isolating them 
from the real world. When coupled with a tracker position sensor, the HMD also 
becomes an input device that transmits the user‘s movements to the computer that 
continuously update[s] the virtual environments according to the user‘s point-of-
view. Being the key element that distinguishes VR from the other existing media, 




a successful virtual experience (Gorini, Capideville, De Leo, Mantovani, & Riva, 
2011, 99) 
Additionally, according to Witmer and Singer (1998), ―an immersive virtual environment 
(IVE) is one that perceptually surrounds an individual, who perceives himself or herself to be 
enveloped by, included in, and interacting with a continuous stream of stimuli‖ (232). 
Specifically, through immersive virtual environments, users are able to immerse themselves in 
computer-simulated worlds that mimic real-life scenarios, which consequently yields a sense of 
―presence.‖ As individuals become immersed in this environment, they ―react strongly when first 
experiencing immersive VR ... seeing the stereoscopic graphics pop out of the screen, and 
realizing that head movements change their view of the virtual world all provide a unique 
experience‖ (Bowman & McMahan, 2007, 3). Immersive virtual reality provides a more unique 
experience than engaging with traditional desktop platforms, or non-immersive technology. For 
example, as expressed in Goslin and Morie (1996), through immersive virtual reality 
technologies, it is highly likely that an emotional reaction or affective state would arise in an 
individual ―through strategic use of imagery and sound in a virtual environment, which will 
enhance the sensation of immersion in the simulation and thereby help to compensate for the 
inadequacies of contemporary technology‖ (96). For example, a study by Flanagan, McAnally, 
Martin, Meehan and Oldfield (1998) showed that virtual reality users were more likely to 
behave, act, and feel differently within immersive versus non-immersive virtual reality 
technologies. 
Virtual reality tools and apparatuses have become essential in educational disciplines, 
which promotes an exemplar application in military training (Hoffman & Vu, 1997). Based on 




and Cocking‘s (2000), immersive and non-immersive technologies can be adequate training 
resources and can induce similar physiological responses found in real world environments. In 
the 1920s, Thorndike (1923) hypothesized that transfer of knowledge and training can occur 
between different constructs, but are dependent on the similarities present in both constructs 
(e.g., from real life to simulation), which he labeled as ―Theory of Identical Elements.‖ 
Specifically, ―the level of training transfer depends on the level of similarity between training 
and performance environments… in other words, the theory states that there is a positive 
correlation between the similarities between training and performance environments and the 
level of training transfer‖ (Thorndike, 1923, 165). While Thorndike (1923) was not discussing 
the learning capabilities of immersive and non-immersive virtual reality technologies, his 
theories can still be applied to learning and performance within modern technology. 
Furthermore, ―the more elements (i.e., content and procedure) of one situation are identical to the 
elements of a second situation, the greater the transfer, and thus the easier learning in the second 
situation‖ (Tracey & Mandel, 2012, 44). Therefore, the more elements that are found in virtual 
reality technologies, the greater the likelihood there will be learning. For example, from this 
theory, one can assume that the more realistic the environments and sensations produced by 
virtual reality, the greater the probability a soldier can learn from the simulation; as technological 
advances continue to increase, so does the likelihood of learning advancement. In the 1960s, 
Overton (1964) postulated the ―state-dependent learning theory‖ which suggests that increased 
learning and recall occurs when the individual mimics the same physiological conditions that 
were present when he was first learning material; particularly, for best learning, the same 
physiological state must be present as was in the initial time of learning. Overton‘s (1964) theory 




process of learning.  
Research continues to advocate that immersive and non-immersive virtual reality 
technologies can produce similar emotional responses as real world situations (Rizzo et al., 2005, 
2006). According to Rizzo et al. (2005), if immersive and non-immersive technologies are to: 
effectively transfer to criterion environments that may engender a range of innate stress 
reactions, then that training should be conducted while the user is experiencing a similar 
range of emotional states … since, military operations are constantly in a state of 
dynamic change, learning theory would dictate that optimal VR training should also 
include training under a wide range of emotional states in order to promote successful 
performance in military environments that may inherently induce a dramatic range of 
emotional states‖ (3).  
Virtual reality apparatuses can facilitate affect-inducing virtual military training simulations that 
can subsequently provoke psychological and physiological strains that individuals experience 
under real world military training circumstances (Rizzo et al., 2005). Such virtual military 
training simulations attempt to target and promote comparable internal affective stimulus cues 
with what is anticipated in combat environments. Furthermore, in the early 2000s, Bransford et 
al. (2000) further explained the importance of transfer in learning suggesting that all learning is 
transfer and learning is a continuous dynamic process, expanding on Thorndike‘s (1923) theory 
of identical elements. Therefore, as VR attempts to produce affect-inducing simulations, learning 
is continued. 
While research indicates that immersive and non-immersive technologies ability induces 
real-world affect, emotive response, and physiological arousal, recent research has attempted to 




examined the differences between immersive and non-immersive technology in individual 
affective states. Participants‘ mood was measured while one group of participants was placed in 
an immersive condition and the rest were in a non-immersive condition. Through the recruitment 
of 120 undergraduate participants, Ivory and Kalyanaraman (2009) revealed that participants 
who were engaged in the immersive simulation reported more emotionality than participants who 
were engaged in the non-immersive simulation, suggesting that immersive technology produced 
more emotionality. In 2004, Tamborini, Eastin, Skalski, and Lachlan investigated the difference 
between immersive virtual environment technology and traditional desktop computer platform 
technology and their influence on emotionality. In this study, participants were assigned to one 
of four conditions: observing a (1) non-violent video game or (2) violent video game, or playing 
(3) a violent traditional desktop computer platform video game or (4) a violent immersive virtual 
environment technology game. Self-report measures on hostile feelings and trait aggression were 
recorded. While Tamborini et al. (2004) found that any exposure to violence increased 
aggressive feelings, results further revealed that participants in the immersive virtual 
environment technology condition exhibited more aggressive feelings than participants in the 
other conditions. 
Similar results were found in Persky and Blascovich (2008). In the first of two studies, 
Persky and Blascovich (2008) recruited 66 participants and assigned them to either the 
immersive virtual environment technology (IVET) condition or traditional desktop computer 
platform (DTP) condition; all participants were asked to complete the same first-person shooting 
simulation, regardless of platform. While participants were engaged in their respective condition, 
behavioral measures such as ―the number of shots taken, number of hits to opponents, the 




& Blascovich, 2008, 62). Once participants completed their game playing, they were asked to 
complete several self-report measures that focused on post-game aggressive feelings and other 
game play outcomes. Results from this study determined that individuals in the IVET condition 
exhibited more aggressive behavior, more enjoyment, greater presence, and more intense 
aggressive manners (as determined by the proportion of head shots) than participants in the DTP 
condition. The second study by Persky and Blascovich (2008) recruited 137 participants and 
followed the same methodology as the first study. Similar results from the secondary study 
showed that participants in the IVET condition reported more enjoyment in game experience, 
more aggressive feelings and behaviors, greater presence, and more intense aggressive manners 
(as determined by the proportion of head shots). Persky and Blascovich‘s (2008) studies revealed 
that playing violent video games on an IVET platform led to increased aggressive feelings and 
behavior than a traditional DTP. Like previous studies, this dissertation looked at the influence of 
immersive and non-immersive virtual reality and any distinctions in their impact.  
In 2007, Persky and Blascovich measured the relationship between different virtual 
environment technologies (IVET versus DTP), subject matter (non-violent content versus violent 
content), and participants‘ gender on video game play. Similar to previous findings, results 
showed an interaction effect suggesting that participants were more likely to express higher 
levels of aggressive affect when they were playing the violent content game in an IVET 
platform, and were more likely to express lower levels of aggressive affect in the other 
conditions. Female and male participants reported no differences, suggesting that gender did not 
influence the impact of VR technologies on affect. These findings furthered the research 
investigating the different affective states that emerge from different degrees of immersion. 




between immersive and non-immersive virtual reality by assessing if higher levels of 
immersiveness induces feelings of presence by looking at participants‘ emotive responses 
following exposure to virtual reality. Riva et al. (2007) recruited 61 undergraduate participants to 
engage in two different computer simulations (an anxious environment and a relaxing 
environment) on one of two platforms (immersive and non-immersive); the sequential order of 
these simulations was counterbalanced. According to Riva et al. (2007),  
The results confirmed the efficacy of VR as affective medium: the interaction with 
―anxious‖ and ―relaxing‖ virtual environments produced anxiety and relaxation, 
respectively ... the data also showed a circular interaction between presence and 
emotions: on one side, the feeling of presence was greater in the ―emotional‖ 
environments; on the other side, the emotional state was influenced by the level of 
presence. (339) 
Findings revealed that the degree of affect increased with the levels of immersion. 
Specifically, congruent to other findings, participants in the immersive virtual reality condition 
exhibited more feelings of anxiety or relaxation (depending on the environment) than 
participants in the non-immersive virtual reality environments, supporting the notion that 
immersive virtual reality conditions produced more affect than non-immersive virtual reality 
conditions. Findings from this study further supported the effectiveness of virtual reality as an 
effective stimulus.  
In 2014, Kim, Rosenthal, Zielinski, and Brady furthered the research on the distinct 






. Importantly, unlike previous research, this study investigated the effects of immersion on 
affect as measured by skin conductance and self-reported emotional arousal. Kim et al. (2014) 
explain, ―the fully immersive system induced the highest sense of presence … the results showed 
that different technological platforms evoked unique response patterns‖ (882). The results 
revealed that individuals who participated in IVET showed higher levels of skin conductance 
than individuals who participated in DTP. This study, similar to previous research, further 
supports that IVET increases emotive responses more so than DTP.  
According to Tamborini et al. (2004) ―social psychologists have hailed immersive virtual 
reality technology as a promising tool for experimental research, given its potential to ameliorate 
methodological problems such as the experimental control/mundane realism tradeoff, lack of 
replication, and unrepresentative sampling‖ (355). Furthermore, ―virtual simulation has been 
empirically validated to be effective in the transfer of skills to the live environment‖ (Stevens & 
Kincaid, 2015). As the previous research shows, both immersive and non-immersive virtual 
reality technology possess the ability to help individuals feel engrossed and engaged in the 
various contexts that they perceive within the technology, even though current research promotes 
immersive virtual reality environments as a better stimuli. Such technology can elicit suitable 
feelings and behaviors (coherent with the context of the simulation), which in turn, facilitates the 
utilization of such apparatuses for the purposes of military training and operations (Persky & 
Blascovich, 2008; Etengoff, 2008). This technology allows for significant influence in users‘ 
feelings and experiences both within and outside of the game itself (Rizzo et al., 2005; Persky & 
Blascovich, 2008). 
                                               
5
 The Stroop Test is a psychological test that measures interference in the reaction time of a task; 
the task consists of exhibiting a color name, with some names printed in the same color as the 
name (i.e the color name ―green‖ is printed in green), and others are printed with a different 




Due to the limitations of previous research, this dissertation examined the influence of 
immersive and non-immersive virtual reality technology on the higher cognitive function of 
reasoning, and more specifically, deductive and inductive reasoning. Particularly, this 
dissertation was interested in evaluating whether immersive simulated combat scenarios impact 
individuals‘ ability to reason deductively and inductively differently than non-immersive combat 
scenarios, particularly, by measuring the exposure of distinct simulated combat experiences on 
individual reasoning.  
CHAPTER III. 
PILOT WORK 
 In Spring 2016, the author of this dissertation conducted a study at the United States 
Military Academy, aimed at identifying cognitive factors that could predict resilience and grit. 
Successfully identifying cognitive factors that predict an individual‘s resilience and grit could 
have significant impact on military recruitment processes, training, and operations, including the 
use of new pre-screening markers to determine which recruits might be more gritty or resilient. 
Subsequent knowledge of these characteristic traits might help predict which recruits are less 
likely to suffer from cognitive deficits and mental issues. With this proactive approach, 
identification and understanding of these predictive factors can also contribute to the increased 
presence of resilience and grit among soldiers during stressful situations such as combat 
environments. While there are ethical issues that surround psychological testing during 
recruitment, practical implementation of this work could assist those individuals who exhibit 
responses that could indicate a lack of resilience, by ensuring appointment for those individuals 
to non-combat duties, or by presenting them with more opportunities to take part in courses that 




a practical implementation for recruitment has often been utilized by the Armed Forces, such as 
assessments given in recruitment processing to predict what position a given recruit is best suited 
for (Cornum, Matthews, & Seligman, 2011). 
According to Former United States Army General George Casey (2011), ―the Army is 
leveraging the science of psychology in order to improve our force‘s resilience… we are moving 
beyond a ―treatment-centric‖ approach to one that focuses on prevention and on the enhancement 
of the psychological strengths already present in our soldiers‖ (1). This proactive approach can 
potentially help service members remain mentally healthy by promoting resilient and gritty 
behaviors during high stress and combat environments; this approach focuses on predictive 
factors that might prevent a more dramatic negative effect, resulting in psychological disorders 
such as major depressive disorder or PTSD. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The Spring 2016 study sought to investigate a number of ideas: 
I. Hypothesis 1: This study aimed to discover the cognitive factors that predict an 
individual‘s resilience and grit. Specific cognitive factors include four areas designed to 
test memory, reasoning, concentration, and planning. We hypothesized that increased 
performance in memory, reasoning, concentration, and planning tasks will be significant 
predictors of resilience and grit. 
II. Hypothesis 2: We hypothesized that individuals who are more academically successful 
are more likely to be highly resilient and highly gritty than individuals who are less 
academically successful. 
III. Hypothesis 3: We hypothesized that individuals who major in STEM disciplines are more 




Humanities disciplines. This hypothesis is similar to Duckworth et al.‘s (2007) study, but 
we further this investigation by looking at the participant‘s major as a possible factor in 
grit. Additionally, Vasterling et al. (2006) reveal that veterans with higher SAT math 
scores are more likely to be resilient and less likely to suffer from PTSD than participants 
with lower SAT math scores. A study by Saigh, Yasik, Oberfield, Halamandaris, and 
Bremner (2006) shows that slightly resilient children score significantly lower on math 
subtests, but not on performance subtests, than comparison groups. In 2008, Kanevsky, 
Corke, and Frangkiser found that participants in an intervention program who did well on 
a math exam were more likely to self-report as resilient. This project attempted to 
replicate the findings of the previous studies. 
IV. Hypothesis 4: Due to our interest in evaluating the self-report resilience scale as a 
measure of resilience, we hypothesized that individuals who were highly resilient would 
have lower levels of ECG and GSR, while individuals who were slightly or moderately 
resilient would have higher levels of ECG and GSR. This study evaluated the accuracy of 
the self-report resilience scale, the Resilience for Adults (RSA) scale. Due to the 
limitations of self-report surveys, we evaluated the current resilience self-report measure 
through the use of Bravemind, an immersive virtual reality system. We asked participants 
to take part in a Bravemind scenario (i.e. engage in an immersive virtual reality 
environment). We collected participants‘ electrocardiography6 (ECG) and Galvanic skin 
responses
7
 (GSR) recordings. Previous research has shown that low levels of ECG and 
GSR are a marker for resilience; this negative relationship suggests that highly resilient 
individuals have lower levels of GSR and ECG, while less resilient individuals have 
                                               
6
 ECG measures the electrical activity of the heart over a period of time. 
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higher levels of GSR and ECG (Oldehinkel, Verhulst, & Ormel, 2008; Thayer, Åhs, 
Fredrikson, Sollers, & Wager, 2012; Dienes, 2007; McQuiggan, & Lester, 2006). We 
further investigated this by collecting self-reports of resilience (using the RSA) and 
measuring that against the participants‘ ECG and GSR recordings. As indicated by 
previous research, we hypothesized that highly resilient individuals would have lower 
levels of ECG and GSR, while slightly resilient individuals would have higher levels of 
ECG and GSR. If this hypothesis was supported, then this study would add to the 
evaluation, validation, and authentication of this current resilience self-report. This would 
also further support our findings. 
V. Hypothesis 5: This study was interested in evaluating Bravemind‘s ability to induce 
affect commonly found in combat-like environment. We hypothesized that Bravemind 
would induce an affective state; specifically, that during the simulated combat 
environment, an individual‘s level of ECG and GSR would increase compared to a non-
combat simulation environment. Participants‘ ECG/GSR was measured two different 
times; during combat simulated environment (IEDs were utilized) and non-combat 
simulated environment. Previous research has shown that virtual reality systems such as 
Bravemind can produce a visceral feeling of being in a simulated world (Baranowski, 
Buday, Thompson, & Baranowski, 2008; Frasca, 2001; Buckwalter et al. 2012; Rizzo, 
Hartholt, Grimani, Leeds, & Liewer, 2014; Rizzo, Difede, Rothbaum, Daughtry, & 
Reger, 2013; Rizzo et al. 2013; Rizzo et al. 2012; Rizzo et al. 2012). 
Methods 
Participants 




at West Point, NY. The study utilized Sona Systems, an online human management tool to 
recruit participants. Cadets who were enrolled in PL100: General Psychology for Leaders, 
PL150: Advanced General Psychology, or PL300: Military Leadership at the time of the study 
were able to use Sona to gain extra credit in their respective course. Cadets who were sensitive to 
virtual reality environments (sensitivity in this context included nausea, headaches, or motion 
sickness) or reported previous combat experience were excluded from this study. Fifty-two 
participants between the ages of 18-25 were utilized in this study. Approximately, 54% of 
participants were freshmen (or ―plebes‖ as labeled by USMA; class of 2019), while 42% were 
juniors (or ―cows‖ as labeled by USMA; class of 2017), and the rest of the participants were 
seniors (or ―firsties‖ as labeled by USMA; class of 2016). Most participants were males (86.5%), 
which is consistent with the overall USMA population. 75% of the participants majored in 
STEM disciplines, while the rest majored in Humanities disciplines. 
Apparatuses 
Bravemind: Bravemind is a clinical, immersive, virtual reality (VR) based exposure 
therapy tool that was first created to assess and treat post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
(Institute of Creative Technologies, 2012). While this tool was first constructed for clinical 
purposes, this study did not utilize this system for clinical assessment, but instead for its VR 
scenario. This study is not the only study to utilize Bravemind for its VR scenario. In 2013, 
Rizzo et al. configured Bravemind as a VR tool for cognitive assessment purposes and to provide 
psychological resilience training prior to combat deployment (Rizzo et al., 2013; Rizzo et al., 
2013; Rizzo et al., 2012; Rizzo et al., 2012). 
Bravemind provides visual displays, and auditory and tactile or haptic feedback. To use 




positions the user; the user utilizes a game controller to move around in the simulated world. As 
part of the Bravemind system, users were asked to sit on a chair on top of a vibro-tactile floor 
board called ―Rumblefloor,‖ which vibrates during the bombings, shootings, gunfire and other 
combat sounds, consistent with the numerous sounds of the system. The Bravemind scenario that 
participants engaged in during this study consisted of the participant driving down a desert road 
of an Afghan city in a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV or HUMVEE).  
Biometric Measures: During the study, the participants were asked to wear a GL 
Neurotech BioRadio (https://glneurotech.com/bioradio/bioradio-wireless-physiological-monitor). 
The GL Neurotech BioRadio (see Figure 3) is a wearable biomedical device with programmable 
channels for recording and transmitting combinations of human physiological signals. The 
wearable, wireless, physiology monitor streams data to a computer via Bluetooth. For this 
particular study, the BioRadio was used to capture participants‘ ECG and GSR during the 
Bravemind scenario. 
Figure 3. GL Neurotech BioRadio and its Applications 
 
 
GL Neurotech BioRadio’s Galvanic Skin Response (GSR): The GL Neurotech BioRadio 
is utilized to measure electrical activity from the surface of the skin, also known as Galvanic skin 
responses (GSR). According to Fere (1988), ―the skin conductance response, also known as the 
electrodermal response, or galvanic skin response, is the phenomenon that [sic] the skin 
momentarily becomes a better conductor of electricity when either external or internal stimuli 




nervous system. GSR has been studied for more than 100 years using similar methodology, and 
has been linked to arousal, stress, affect, and self-reported emotionality (Adelmann & Zajonc, 
1989; Shi, Ruiz, Taib, Choi, & Chen, 2007; Lindley, Nacke, & Sennersten, 2008). The GL 
Neurotech BioRadio utilizes a passive non-invasive method of recording GSR. The set up 
consists of three surface adhesive snap electrodes that are placed on the front and back of the 
hand (see Figure 4).  
Figure 4. Placement of GL Neurotech BioRadio‘s GSR sensors 
 
 GL Neurotech BioRadio’s Heart Rate Measurement (Electrocardiography recordings): The 
GL Neurotech BioRadio is utilized to measure the electrical activity of the heart, or 
electrocardiography (ECG). GL Neurotech BioCapture uses surface electrodes to monitor the 
rhythm of heart muscles as they contract and expand. ECG, like GSR, has been investigated for 
over 100 years, and has been linked to stress, health, wellbeing, and emotionality (Lane et al. 
2009; Thayer, Ahs, Fredrikson, Sollers, & Wager, 2012). The set up consists of two surface 
adhesive snap electrodes, one on each clavicle bone (see Figure 5). 






IQ Test (Cambridge Brain Sciences): The Cambridge Brain Sciences IQ Test is a web-
based platform for the assessment of cognitive functions (see Appendix A). The IQ Test is 
comprised of 13 subtests: Monkey Ladder Test, Grammatical Reasoning, Double Trouble, Odd 
One Out, Spatial Search, Rotations, Feature Match, Digit Span, Hampshire Tree Task, Polygons, 
Spatial Chunking, Moving Flanker, and Analogical Reasoning. Each subtest was administered to 
participants in a structured, non-random fashion and consisted of an instruction page prior to 
each subtest. Each subtest was different in content and time length; no subtest took longer than 
180 seconds. It is important to note that the Cambridge Brain Sciences IQ Test is not well-
documented, unlike the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS), but this test was utilized as it 
requires significantly less time and was more accessible to the sample of participants.  
According to the Cambridge Brain Sciences IQ Test, the subtests that measure reasoning 
include: (1) Grammatical Reasoning, (2) Odd One Out, (3) Double Trouble, and (4) Analogical 
Reasoning. The subtests that measure concentration include: (1) Feature Match, (2) Polygons, 
and (3) Rotations. The subtests that measure memory include: (1) Monkey Ladder Test, (2) Digit 
Span, and (3) Hampshire Tree Task. The subtests that measure planning include: (1) Spatial 
Search, (2) Spatial Chunking, and (3) Moving Flanker. Participants‘ scores from each subtest and 
composite score for each construct was recorded. 
Overall Academic Development (Original Questionnaire):  
The first questionnaire administered was the Overall Academic Development 
questionnaire. The OAD is designed to assess general scholastic achievement; this included but 
is not limited to participants‘ SAT Verbal and Mathematics scores, self-report verbal and spatial 




consisted of: the Cumulative Quality Point Average (CQPA - a cadet‘s overall grade point 
average in all three pillars – academic, physical, military – combined), the Academic Program 
Score Term (APST: current term grade point average from only the academic pillar), the Term 
Quality Point Average (TQPA: a cadet‘s grade point average in all 3 pillars combined, for one 
term), the Academic Program Score Cumulative (APSC: overall grade point average from only 
the academic pillar), the Core GPA, the GPA in Humanities, and the GPA in STEM (Science, 
Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) courses. 
The Resilience Scale for Adults (Wagnild & Young, 1993)  
The third questionnaire (self-report) that was administered was the Resilience Scale for 
Adults. The RSA is an overall positively worded 32-item scale (see Appendix C). The RSA 
consists of three different sections. The first section of the RSA includes 25-items on a 7-point 
Likert-type scale; these items are rated on a 7-point scale from 1= strongly disagree to 7 = 
strongly agree, with higher scores indicating higher degree of resilience. The second section 
includes two questions on mental and physical health, while the third section includes similar 
health questions with a ―yes‖ or ―no‖ response. According to Hjemdal, Friborg, Martinussen, and 
Rosenvinge, (2001) ―the scale is intended to measure the protective resources that promote adult 
resilience …it contains five factors: personal competence, social competence, family coherence, 
social support, and personal structure‖ (30). The RSA consists of intrapersonal and interpersonal 
protective factors presumed to facilitate adaptation to psychosocial adversities (personal strength, 
social competence, structured style, family cohesion, social resources). Cronbach‘s alpha 
coefficients ranged from .72 to .94 supported the internal consistency reliability of the RSA 
(Hjemdal et al., 2001; Friborg et al., 2005; Ahern, Kiehl, Lou Sole, & Byers, 2006). Friborg et 




social intelligence, personality, and cognitive abilities with all the RSA factors significantly 
inter-correlated (ranging from r = 0.31 to 0.57). Particularly, ―concurrent validity was indicated 
by high correlations between the RSA and other well-established valid measures of constructs 
linked to resilience and outcomes of resilience, such as depression (r = -0.37), life satisfaction (r 
= 0.30), morale (r = 0.28) and health (r = -0.26)‖ (Wagnild & Young, 1993, 172).  
Grit Scale (Duckworth et al., 2007) 
The second questionnaire (self-report) administered was the Grit Scale (Duckworth et al., 
2007). The Grit Scale measures grit using 12 items; these items are rated on a 5-point scale from 
1= not at all like me to 5 = very much like me (see Appendix D). Specifically, the twelve-item 
Grit Scale assesses ―trait-level perseverance and passion for long-term goals and perseverance 
for long-term goals that reflect passionate interests or personally valued aim‖ (Duckworth & 
Quinn, 2009, 166). This instrument has been shown to predict achievement in vocational, 
academic, and vocational domains (Duckworth et al., 2007; Duckworth & Quinn, 2009). Reverse 
scoring in questions targeting the consistent pursuit of passionate interests (six out of the twelve 
items) is used to compute grit scores. In prior research, grit scores have been positively related to 
self-efficacy scores (Rojas, Rejer, Toland, & Usher, 2012). Furthermore, according to 
Duckworth et al. (2007), ―the resulting 12-item Grit Scale demonstrated high internal 
consistency ( =.85) for the overall scale and for each factor (Consistency of Interests,  =.84; 
Perseverance of Effort,  = .78)‖ (1091). Cronbach‘s alpha coefficients ranged from .73 to .83. 
Reliability and construct validity of the scale were found in research predicting performance of 
military cadets (Duckworth et al., 2007). According to Maddi et al. (2012), ―this scale has shown 
adequate reliability and validity across a variety of achievement realms requiring sustained and 




comparable to the current study was identified by Kelly, Matthews, & Bartone (2014) who 
measured grit as a possible predictor of academic performance among USMA cadets from the 
class of 2010. Results showed a mean score of grit (M = 3.77) during Cadet Basic Training.  
Immersive Reality Survey (IRS) (Original Questionnaire):  
The final questionnaire (self-report) that was administered was the IRS. The IRS was 
constructed to assess participants‘ opinions of Bravemind and their experience to feelings of 
immersiveness and presence. This survey was administered after the Bravemind scenario (see 
Appendix E). 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited using Sona Systems, a human subject online management 
tool. Data collection was split into two parts: (1) in the first part of the study, participants were 
asked to complete the IQ test and self-report surveys and (2) in the second part of the study, 
participants were asked to participate in a Bravemind scenario while wearing a GL Neurotech 
BioRadio. 
For the first part of the study, participants were asked to complete the IQ test via the 
website: www.cambridgesciences.com. After participants completed the 13 subtest challenges 
and scores were recorded for analysis, they were asked to complete the self-report surveys 
through an online survey tool, Select Survey. Once participants completed the surveys, they 
contacted the researcher to schedule the second part of the study.  
The second part of the study was held at the USMA‘s Department of Behavioral Sciences 
and Leadership (BSL) Institute of Creative Technology (ICT) Laboratory. After the participant 
was greeted by the researcher, participants were then suited with the GL Neurotech BioRadio 




calibration of the GL Neurotech BioRadio system, participants were asked to don appropriate 
apparatuses (i.e., the headphones, head mounted display, video game controller, and seat on 
Rumblefloor board) to engage in the Bravemind system. Participants then engaged in the 
Bravemind virtual reality immersive simulation scenario for fifteen minutes; the virtual reality 
simulation scenario consisted of a HUMVEE driving scene in the desert streets of Iraq. In the 
virtual reality simulation scenario, each participant encountered five improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs). During this scenario, under a standardized time span, the first IED was fired 
three minutes into the scenario, the second IED was two minutes after the first IED, the third 
IED was three minutes after the second IED, the fourth IED was two minutes after the third IED, 
and the fifth (and last) IED was three minutes after the fourth IED. After participants completed 
the fifteen minutes of Bravemind, participants removed the GL Neurotech BioRadio and the five 
electrodes. Lastly, the researcher administered the final self-report survey, the IRS. 
Results 
Hypothesis 1: This study sought to discover the cognitive factors that predict an 
individual‘s resilience and grit. Specific cognitive factors included four areas designed to test 
memory, reasoning, concentration, and planning. We hypothesized that increased performance in 
memory, reasoning, concentration, and planning tasks will be significant predictors of resilience 
and grit. 
Due to the exploratory nature of this hypothesis, a step-wise multiple regression was 
performed with participants‘ age, country of citizenship, economic status, major, class year, 
Term Quality Point Average (TQPA), Cumulative Quality Point Average (CQPA), Academic 
Program Score Term (APST), Academic Program Score Cumulative (APSC), Core Grade Point 




(calculated by adding all thirteen subtests), and performance on memory, reasoning, 
concentration, and planning tasks. Participants‘ resilience served as the dependent variable.  
Resilience. Spatial ability and the IQ subtest: Double Trouble (which is one of the 
cognitive tasks that measures reasoning) were the only significant predictors of resilience [F (2, 
49) = 5.132, p = .009] (see Table 2). Post hoc tests using the Benjamini-Hochberg
8
 procedure, 
however, revealed non-significance in both predictors (see Table 3). 
Table 2. Predictors of Resilience 
Order Entered Variable R
2
 F Sig 
1 Rate your spatial ability .080 4.329 .043 
2 IQ Assessment: Double 
Trouble (Reasoning) 
.173 5.132 .009 
 
Table 3. Benjamini-Hochberg Procedure of Predictors of Resilience 
Order Entered Variable P-Value B-H B-H adjusted  
1 Rate your spatial ability .009 (1/29)*.05 .002 
2 IQ Assessment: Double 
Trouble (Reasoning) 
.043 (2/29)*.05 .003 
 
Grit. CQPA was the only predictor that was listed as a significant predictor for 
participants‘ grit [F (1, 51) = 4.548, p = .038] suggesting that as grit increases, so does CQPA 
(see Table 4). However, post hoc tests using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure revealed non-
significance in CQPA as a predictor (see Table 5).  
Table 4. Predictors of Grit 
Order Entered Variable R
2
 F Sig 
1 CQPA .065 4.548 .038 
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 The Benjamini-Hochberg procedure is an approach to controlling the false discovery rate in 
multiple comparisons (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995; Thissen, Steinberg & Kuang, 2002) which 
is thought to balance between Type I and Type II errors better than more traditional family-wise 
error rate tests such as Bonferroni. We utilized the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure in order to 
conceptualize the rate of type I errors in null hypothesis testing when completing numerous 
comparisons. Particularly, through the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure, we were able to control 
for the expected amount of ―discoveries‖ (i.e., rejected null hypotheses) that are incorrect (false 
rejections) (Thissen et al., 2002). This procedure allows for ―less stringent control of Type I 
errors compared to familywise error rate (FWER) controlling procedures (such as the Bonferroni 
correction), which control the probability of at least one Type I error‖ (79). The procedure helps 





Table 5. Benjamini-Hochberg Procedure of Predictors of Grit 
Order Entered Variable P-Value B-H B-H adjusted  
1 CQPA .038 (1/29)*.05 .002 
 
Hypothesis 2: This study sought to examine if academic success (as measured by 
participants‘ APSC) impacted resilience or grit. We hypothesized that individuals who were 
more academically successful were more likely to be highly resilient and highly gritty than 
individuals who were less academically successful. 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to measure the impact of a cadet‘s 
academic success on their resilience or grit. Findings revealed no statistical significance 
suggesting that highly resilient individuals (M = 2.1875, SD = .750) exhibited similar academic 
success (similar APSC score) as slightly resilient individuals (M = 2.0556, SD = .715) (t (50) = 
.605, p = .548, NS). Furthermore, results showed no statistical significance, suggesting that 
highly gritty individuals (M = 2.4722, SD = .654) exhibited similar scholastic success as less 
gritty individuals (M = 2.2500, SD = .681) (t (50) = -1.116, p = .270, NS).  
Hypothesis 3: We hypothesized that individuals who majored in STEM disciplines were 
more likely to be highly resilient and highly gritty compared to participants who majored in 
Humanities disciplines. This hypothesis was similar to Duckworth et al.‘s (2007) study, but 
furthered this investigation by looking at the participant‘s major as a possible factor in grit. An 
independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare resilience and grit in STEM majors and 
Humanities majors. Results showed no statistical significance, suggesting that STEM majors 
were not more (or less) resilient (t (50) = .658, p = .514, NS) than participants who majored in 
Humanities. Further results also revealed no statistical significance, suggesting that STEM 




Hypothesis 4: Due to my interest in evaluating the self-report resilience scale as a 
measure of resilience, we hypothesized that individuals who were highly resilient would have 
lower levels of ECG and GSR, while individuals who were slightly or moderately resilient would 
have higher levels of ECG and GSR. In order to investigate this hypothesis, we first obtained 
participants‘ overall resilience score by calculating the composite score from the RSA; 
participants were then broken down into three groups, slightly resilient (RSA composite of 110 - 
128), moderately resilient (RSA composite of 129 - 149), or highly resilient (RSA composite of 
150 - 170). Due to overall higher than normal self-reported resilience within all participants, I 
utilized the range of scores found in this study (110 to 170) to split participants into three levels 
of resilience (slightly, moderately, or highly) in order to increase variability among participants. 
The RSA‘s range is originally scored from 25-175.  
ECG: Results showed that highly resilient individuals (M= 64.73, SD= 4.02) possessed 
lower levels of ECG, than that of moderately resilient participants (M= 71.33, SD= 3.93) or 
slightly resilient (M= 75.93, SD= 6.05) (F (2, 49) = 21.768, p < .001) (see Table 6). Further 
analysis using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure confirmed significance (see Table 8) between 
highly resilient and slightly resilient participants, and moderately and highly resilient participants 
(see Table 7 and 8), but no statistical significant differences between moderately resilient and 
slightly resilient participants.  
GSR: Findings revealed that highly resilient individuals (M= 26.67, SD= 6.38) possessed 
lower levels of GSR than moderately resilient (M= 30.92, SD= 5.29) or slightly resilient 
participants (M= 36.56, SD= 6.41) (F (2, 49) = 9.236, p < .001) (see Table 6). Post hoc tests 





Table 6. Mean Differences in Slightly, Moderately, and Highly Resilient Individuals 
 
Table 8. Benjamini-Hochberg Procedure of Post Hoc Comparisons 
Order Entered Variable P-Value B-H B-H adjusted  
1 ECG: Low vs. Highly 0.000000174 (1/12) *.05 .0042 
2 ECG: Moderately vs. Highly 0.000089 (2/12) *.05 .0083 
3 GSR: Highly vs. Low 0.0002465 (3/12) *.05 .0125 
4 ECG: Moderately vs. Low .019 (4/12) *.05 .0166 
5 GSR: Moderately vs. Low .032 (5/12) *.05 .0208 
 
Hypothesis 5: This study was interested in evaluating Bravemind‘s ability to induce 
affect commonly found in combat-like environments. We hypothesized that Bravemind would 
induce an affective state; specifically, that during the simulated combat environment, an 
individual‘s level of ECG and GSR would increase compared to a non-combat simulation 
environment. Participants‘ ECG/GSR was measured two different times; during combat 






Highly Resilient F P 
 M SD M SD M SD   
ECG 75.93 6.05 71.33 3.93 64.73 4.02 21.768 <.001 
GSR 36.56 6.41 30.92 5.29 26.67 6.38 9.236 <.001 





Resilience Level of Resilience  Sig. 
ECG Slightly 
Resilient 
Moderately Resilient .019 
Highly Resilient <.001 
Moderately 
Resilient 
Slightly Resilient .019 
Highly Resilient <.001 
Highly 
Resilient 
Slightly Resilient <.001 
Moderately Resilient <.001 
GSR Slightly 
Resilient 
Moderately Resilient .032 
Highly Resilient <.001 
Moderately 
Resilient 
Slightly Resilient .032 
Highly Resilient .086 
Highly 
Resilient 
Slightly Resilient <.001 









T P Mean Diff 
 M SD M SD    
ECG 83.71 5.17 54.35 3.44 38.317 <.001 29.356 
GSR 52.24 6.33 28.69 3.78 21.944 <.001 23.550 
 
ECG: Participants‘ level of ECG increased when participants were exposed to the combat 
simulated environment (M= 83.71, SD= 5.17) compared to the non-combat simulated 
environment (M= 54.35, SD= 3.44), (t (51) = 38.317, p < .001), suggesting that when 
participants were exposed to the combat environment they exhibited a stronger ECG reaction 
than when participants were exposed to the non-combat environment, indicating a presence of 
arousal and physiological reaction to this immersive VR environment (see Figure 6 & 7 and 
Table 9). 
Figure 6. Image of GSR and ECG data During Non-Combat Environment 
 
 
Figure 7. Image of GSR and ECG data During Combat Environment 
 
 
GSR: Participants‘ level of GSR increased when exposed to the combat simulated 




28.69, SD= 3.78), (t (51) = 21.994, p < .001), suggesting that when participants were exposed to 
the combat environment, they exhibited a stronger GSR reaction than when participants were 
exposed to the non-combat environment. The increased GSR reactions indicate the presence of 
arousal and physiological response to this immersive VR environment (see Figure 6 & 7 and 
Table 9). 
Discussion 
Overall, findings suggest that most cognitive tasks (which measured memory, 
concentration, and planning), and scholastic achievement did not predict grit or resilience. 
However, this study did show a modest relationship between the higher cognitive function of 
reasoning and resilience; importantly, more research needs to be conducted to further investigate 
this relationship. Through this study, we were able to evaluate the RSA scale as a possible 
effective measurement for resilience. Additionally, we also assessed Bravemind and its ability to 
induce similar affect as is seen in combat-like environments by using ECG and GSR recordings 
and measurements. 
First, results from this study showed no statistical significant differences in performance 
on cognitive tasks between highly resilient and slightly resilient people and highly gritty and 
slightly gritty individuals. Furthermore, performance on cognitive tasks did not predict grit or 
resilience. The current study did not match the results of previous research. For example, Staal, 
Bolton, Yarosh, and Bourne (2008) reported that soldiers who were more resilient performed 
better on cognitive tasks than soldiers who were less resilient. Particularly, Staal et al. (2008) 
showed that different cognitive abilities produce mitigating effects on lasting negative 
psychological impact of stress; however, this study did not match Staal et al.‘s (2008) findings. 




that measured four cognitive constructs (memory, planning, reasoning, and concentration), and 
then self-report resilience and grit. Perhaps the IQ test that was provided to participants (the 
Cambridge IQ test) is not an accurate or reliable stimulus to test participants‘ cognitive 
performance. First, the test has never been utilized as a stimulus to measure intelligence or 
cognitive constructs (memory, concentration, planning, or reasoning). Second, cadets were not 
monitored while they completed the Cambridge IQ Test, and observation during this 
performance might have shown how much interest cadets placed on this task. For future 
research, stimuli that have already been tested such as the Wason Selection Task (for assessing 
reasoning abilities) or the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale ((WAIS) i.e., for assessing 
intelligence and cognitive ability) would be beneficial since these existing instruments provide 
the advantages of well-known reliability and validity. 
Second, participants‘ scholastic success did not predict resilience or grit, and resilience or 
grit did not impact scholastic success. These results did not match previous research; previous 
studies have shown that academic achievement was associated with patience, discipline, and 
integrity, which have been shown to be associated with grit and resilience (Caprara, Vecchione, 
Alessandri, Gerbino, & Barbaranelli, 2011; Csikszentmihalyi & Wong, 2014). However, the 
sample of participants might have hindered the results of the study as the sample included only 
52 participants, and therefore, possessed low statistical power. Further research on this particular 
hypothesis must be conducted with a possibly broader sample of participants to determine 
whether resilience or grit are associated with scholastic success, or other constructs that have 
been linked to scholastic success. 
Third, this study attempted to evaluate the current resilience self-report measure, the 




resilience in an individual. As shown in this study, highly resilient participants possessed lower 
levels of ECG and GSR, while slightly resilient individuals possessed higher levels of ECG and 
GSR. As previous research has determined, low levels of ECG and GSR are a marker for 
resilience (Oldehinkel et al., 2008; Thayer, et al., 2012; Dienes, 2007; McQuiggan, & Lester, 
2006), a finding replicated here. Within these findings, ECG and GSR showed that the self-rating 
of resilience was valid; the RSA would be further utilized in the dissertation study as it was 
shown to be a valid indicator of resilience. 
Fourth, this study evaluated Bravemind as an effective virtual reality tool that induced 
appropriate affective states in a participant. As this current study showed, during exposure to the 
combat environment, an individual‘s level of ECG and GSR increased compared to a neutral, 
non- combat environment.  
As shown, in this study, an individual‘s spatial ability and scores on the reasoning task, 
Double Trouble, predicted resilience in participants. While this particular finding does not 
suggest that an individual‘s ability to reason might predict resilience, since significant findings 
were only found in one test of reasoning, this topic might be of interest. 
As in every study, this study has limitations. First, this study was a correlational study 
that investigated the predictive factors of resilience and grit, and as such, suffered from many 
threats to internal validity, lacked control over independent variables, and therefore lacks the 
ability to make causal statements. 
Second, the current study sampled from the USMA Corps of Cadets population, and 
included 7 female and 45 male participants. While the results were skewed due to the gender 
difference in enrollment, the population sample held true to the then current ratio of gender at the 




were males, and 17% were female. This study‘s sample included 14% female participants, and 
the rest males, similar to the population at USMA. While it is important to note that the USMA 
population attempts to limit gender differences as it prides itself on uniformity, it is still 
important to look at any possible gender differences.  
Third, it can be said that due to the short length of study and the lack of true experimental 
design, there was a limitation in determining if participants‘ performance on cognitive tasks and 
academic success predicted resilience and/or grit. Particularly, grit is ―based on an individual‘s 
passion for a particular long-term goal or end state‖ (Duckworth et al., 2007, 1087). Therefore, 
this particular study might not have been able to create the passion that is needed to provoke 
gritty people to excel in cognitive tasks. Possibly, the study did not promote enough interest for 
the participants to truly work on the different tasks to promote a perseverance of effort, and 
consequently, no significance was detected. While Duckworth and Quinn (2009) were able to 
attain significant findings on grit with a similar population, their stimuli included the execution 
of West Point‘s rigorous summer training program, not a sixty minute study with no overarching 
goal. Additionally, the recruiting process could also be a limitation. Specifically, participants 
were recruited using a recruitment tool that was available to students in the three USMA 
mandatory courses. While each USMA cadet must take these courses, and thus, allow for a great 
sample of the population, this recruitment process cannot differentiate between the participants 
who were interested in this study with the participants who were participating in the study solely 
to receive credit.  
Additionally, as participants were members of the Corps of Cadets, this sample of 
participants did not provide a broad sample of resilience and grit; specifically, the sample of 




highly gritty. No participants reported as slightly resilient or slightly gritty, such that we had to 
alter the scores‘ ranges. Therefore, due to the lack of variability, these results might not be 
generalizable for a broader population, where individuals report slightly resilient and/or gritty. 
The USMA curriculum demands some resilience and grit within their cadets, something that is 
not expected in other institutions. Further analyses with non-military cadet samples need to be 
investigated. 
While most findings were not statistically significant, this study did show a possible 
relationship between reasoning and resilience. Research in this specific topic was further 
investigated in this doctoral dissertation.  
CHAPTER IV.  
METHODOLOGY FOR DISSERTATION STUDY 
The dissertation presented here aims to assess how individuals reason, both inductively and 
deductively, in a computer-simulated combat environment, and further analyzes the impact of 
resilience and grit on reasoning in such stressful environments. In keeping with the Army‘s 
approach to using technology to train soldiers and combat terrorism, this dissertation utilized 
virtual war-fighting environments to simulate combat environments that induce common 
affective states found in such adverse environments. Additionally, as research is progressing in 
the study of grit and resilience, especially with the belief that these psychological constructs are 
influential in the mental health of individuals exposed to challenges, this dissertation further 
examined their impact on reasoning.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This dissertation attempted to answer and investigate the following research questions:  




simulated combat-like environments? I investigated the effects of simulated 
combat on individuals‘ deductive and inductive reasoning performance. I 
hypothesized that individuals in the combat simulated conditions would suffer 
from more cognitive impairments than individuals in the non-combat simulated 
conditions. 
Question 1b: Do immersive virtual technologies, like Bravemind, influence an  
individual‘s cognitive reasoning performance differently than non-immersive 
virtual technologies, like VBS3? I investigated the immersiveness of virtual 
technologies on individual reasoning. I hypothesized that individuals in the 
immersive conditions would suffer from more cognitive impairments than 
participants in the non-immersive conditions. 
Question 2a: Does an individual‘s grit or resilience influence the way an individual 
inductively or deductively reasons? I investigated the impact of resilience and grit 
on an individual‘s ability to reason. I hypothesized that highly gritty or resilient 
individuals would perform better, overall, on the reasoning tasks than slightly 
resilient or gritty individuals.  
Question 2b: Furthermore, does an individual‘s grit or resilience influence cognitive 
performance immediately following exposure to simulated combat environments? 
I not only investigated whether an individual‘s resilience or grit influenced 
reasoning, but even more particularly, in an interaction following exposure to an 
adverse environment simulated by immersive and non-immersive technologies. I 
hypothesized that individuals who reported higher grit or resilience would 




 combat than individuals who did not report higher grit or resilience. 
Participants 
The participants for this dissertation were 71 men (66%) and 36 women (34%), totaling 
107 participants drawn from the population of Norwich University. Participants ranged between 
the ages of 18-22, with most participants being either 18 (33.6%) or 19 years old (38.3%). Most 
participants were either from the class of 2021 (40.2%), 2020 (33.6%), or the class of 2019 
(20.6%); only six participants were from the class of 2018. Most participants were either 
Psychology majors (36.4%) or Computer Security and Information Assurance majors (18.7%); 
all other participants were in different academic fields such as criminal justice (8.4%), education 
(8.4%), or health sciences (7.5%). Individuals who had previous combat experience or are 
sensitive (i.e., sensitivity to this stimuli will include nausea, headaches, or motion sickness) to 
video game or virtual reality environments were excluded from this study; due to the limited 
exposure of combat experience within the Norwich University population, most individuals were 
still able to qualify for the study, subsequently allowing for a true representative sample.  
Norwich University – The Military College of Vermont is a private university located in 
Northfield, Vermont. It is the oldest private military college in the United States, founded in 
1819. According to Norwich University‘s Registrar Office, in 2017, Norwich University enrolled 
3,150 undergraduate students, with a gender distribution of 22% female students and 78% male 
students, which was consistent to the sample of Norwich University students recruited for this 
study.  
As the birthplace of the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), Norwich University 
houses all four branches of the U.S. Department of Defense military services: Army, Navy, 




cadet undergraduate students. Students enrolled as cadets live an organized, structured, and 
disciplined lifestyle. In the beginning of their time at Norwich, cadet undergraduates are asked to 
complete a number of mandatory training programs to prepare them to be soldiers in the US 
Military. As freshmen, or ―rooks,‖ students are asked to complete three distinct phases: Rook 
Orientation, Rook Basic Skills Training and Rook Basic Leadership Training. During their time 
as rooks, coined as ―Rookdom‖ students do not become cadets at Norwich University until after 
Recognition Day, which is usually held in the springtime (registar.norwich.edu). 
The Norwich University Corps of Cadets are structured like a U.S. Army regiment. In 
their second year, cadets are involved in a Sophomore Training Program which includes a Non-
Commissioned Officers (NCO) course to promote participating cadets to NCO positions. In their 
final two years, cadets who were promoted to cadet NCO positions are later promoted as primary 
trainers in the Corps of Cadets and are then able to compete for officer rank and lead at platoon, 
company, battalion and regimental levels (registar.norwich.edu). As the birthplace of the ROTC, 
most cadets are required to take six semesters of ROTC training, whether they intend to seek a 
Commission or not. 
Though Norwich University takes pride in being the oldest private military academy, 
approximately a third of their undergraduate students are civilians. The civilian students reside 
and learn in this ―distinctive collegiate environment that combines a tradition of service and 
leadership development with a commitment to innovation and scholastic achievement‖ 
(registar.norwich.edu). The two main differences between the cadets and civilian students are 
their residences and the military courses and activities that the cadets must take part in. 
Regardless of the civilian or cadet title, all students are expected to meet the demands of a 





Recruitment and Procedures 
Volunteers were recruited from Norwich University. The sample was recruited using 
word of mouth (i.e., their psychology professor informed them of numerous research projects 
that they would be able to participate in, including the current study) or their psychology 
instructor provided their students with a printed advertisement while in their respective 
psychology course. The printed advertisement include:  
Extra credit for participation in an experiment is offered to individuals from Norwich 
University if deemed appropriate by your instructor. The purpose of the experiment is 
to evaluate the effects of immersive and non-immersive technology on reasoning. 
Exclusion criteria are prior military service; sensitivity to virtual reality environments 
(sensitivity in this context includes nausea, headaches, or motion sickness); not 
having reached the age of 18 on the day of the experiment.  
Participants were not paid to participate; however, they were eligible for extra credit 
in their psychology course, if deemed appropriate by their instructor. This study did not 
purposefully exclude any classes of subjects by gender, class, race, or age. Reasons for 
selecting the subjects included military background, and discussions with Norwich 
University indicated a strong likelihood that the desired numbers would volunteer.  
The study was approved by Teacher‘s College, Columbia University‘s Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) (see Appendix F) and was sponsored by the Army Research Laboratories 
(ARL) as an Open Campus initiative, approved by ARL‘s IRB (see Appendix G).  
Experimental Design 




decrements in individuals‘ ability to reason immediately after war-like environments simulated 
by immersive and non-immersive technology. Participants were placed into one of four 
conditions: 
Immersive Condition: Bravemind with Simulated Combat  
Participants, who were assigned to this immersive technology condition, were asked to 
wear a virtual reality (VR) head-mounted display, (the participant controlled the video game as 
the head-mounted display tracked the motion of the participant‘s head), headphones (which 
incorporated directional 3-D audio), use a video game controller, and sit on a chair placed on a 
vibro-tactile floor board, Rumblefloor (which simulated the vibrations of various actions and 
events such as the detonation of IEDs and numerous weapons fire). In the simulated scenario that 
participants engaged in, participants were asked to drive the desert road of an Iraqi city in a 
HMMWV (Humvee). In this condition, participants were exposed to screams, yells, IEDs, 
missiles, shootings, dead bodies, and fires; participants were able to maneuver within the 
scenario, but were not able to do more than drive the HMMWV. Twenty-seven out of 107 
participants were placed in this condition, approximately 25.2% of participants.  
Immersive Condition: Bravemind with Simulated Non-Combat  
Participants in these immersive conditions donned the same apparatuses, (the VR head 
set, headphones, controller, and Rumblefloor board) as in the Immersive Condition: Bravemind 
with Simulated Combat condition. In this scenario, participants were immersed in the virtual 
reality environment of Bravemind, and were asked to engage in the same scenario as the 
participants in the other Bravemind condition. However, participants in this condition were not 
exposed to any other stimuli and simply drove a Humvee around the Bravemind scenario; 




than drive the HMMWV. Twenty-seven out of 107 participants were placed in this condition, 
approximately 25.2% of participants. 
Non-Immersive Condition: VBS3 with Simulated Combat  
Participants who were assigned to this non-immersive technology condition, were asked 
to utilize a conventional laptop system to play the computer game, VBS3. This virtual 
environment was viewed through a standard high resolution monitor. Interaction with the virtual 
environment occurred through a keyboard, mouse, and earphone. In this scenario, participants 
were asked to drive the desert road of an Iraqi city in a Humvee. Participants were exposed to 
IEDs and numerous weapons fire. I worked with the VBS3 technicians to construct the VBS3 
scenario to match the Bravemind scenario in order to control for activity, and similarly, 
participants were able to maneuver around the scenario, but were not able to do more than drive 
the HMMWV. Twenty-six out of 107 participants were placed in this condition, approximately 
24.3% of participants. 
Non-Immersive Condition: VBS3 with Simulated Non-Combat  
Participants who were assigned to the non-immersive technology condition utilized the 
same apparatuses as the participants in the non-immersive combat condition. Participants also 
engaged in the same scenario, driving the desert road of an Iraqi city in a Humvee. However, 
participants were not exposed to any other stimuli and simply drove the Humvee; similarly 
participants were able to maneuver around the scenario, but were not able to do more than drive 
the HMMWV. Twenty-seven out of 107 participants were placed in this condition, 
approximately 25.2% of participants. 
Performance Metrics and Dependent Measures  




consisted of pretest deductive reasoning and pretest inductive reasoning tasks (see Appendix H). 
Specifically, the pretest and posttest deductive reasoning tasks consisted of Overton‘s (1990) 
version of the Wason Selection Task and the pretest and posttest inductive reasoning tasks 
consisted of Ekstrom, French, Harman, and Derman‘s (1976) Letter Sets Tests. 
Deductive Task: Overton‘s (1990) version of the Wason Selection Task (Ward & 
Overton, 1990; Chapell & Overton, 1998, 2002; Rich, 2014) is composed of a series of 20 
conditional propositions ("If p, then q" form). In this study, Overton‘s version of the Wason 
Selection Task was split into a pretest deductive reasoning task and posttest deductive reasoning 
task: the first ten conditional propositions were utilized in the pretest deductive reasoning task 
and the last ten conditional propositions were utilized in the posttest deductive reasoning task. 
According to Ward and Overton (1990): 
the selection task is clearly a deductive reasoning task and one that requires coordination 
among the permissible and impermissible instances that define implication. Because it 
involves the recognition and coordination of several inference forms, it is well suited for 
evaluating the systemic availability of deductive competence. The selection task also 
presents the opportunity to explore procedures that access and implement competence 
because the rule can be varied in terms of semantic content. (489) 
In this specific task, participants were provided with a conditional rule and were then asked to 
choose specific conditions that either validated or invalidated the conditional rule (Chapell & 
Overton, 1998). According to Chapell and Overton (2002) ―formal deductive understanding of 
an implication ("If p, then q") requires the recognition that particular instances of the antecedent 
and consequent clauses of a sentence are either permissible, not permissible, or indeterminate‖ 




Overton, 1998, 2002; Rich, 2014) was provided to participants in a pen-and-paper format.  
The 10 conditional reasoning problems were presented on five separate pages: two 
deductive reasoning task problems on each page, with similar instructions. There was a slight 
differentiation in instruction specifying if the card had an image of a drink, an age, a shape, a 
color, an action or a result (see Figure 8). However, participants were informed that they would 
be asked to complete several problems and that each problem exhibited a rule; participants were 
asked to figure out the rule and pattern of each problem and solve it. Participants were able to 
answer by checking off the multiple correct answers. The problem order was not randomized 
across participants. The test time was limited to 8 minutes.  








This dissertation followed the same scoring method as utilized in Overton‘s version of 
the Wason Selection Task (Ward & Overton, 1990; Chapell & Overton, 1998, 2002; Rich, 2014). 
Specifically, as stated in Chapell and Overton (2002):  




dependent measure. For each problem participants received one point for each of the 
following: choosing "p," choosing "not q," not choosing "not p," not choosing "q," 
yielding a total possible score with a range of 0 to 40 points, across the 10 problems. The 
correct logical response to selection task problems is the selection of the "p" and the "not 
q" alternatives while not selecting the "not p" or the "q" alternatives. This selection 
combination, which is called the complete falsification solution, was used as a second 
dependent variable. A score of 1 point was given for each problem when this solution 
was selected, and 0 points were given for any other response. Based on prior research 
(Foltz et al., 1995; Overton et al., 1987; Ward & Overton, 1990), a consistency criterion 
of 6 or more complete falsification solutions out of 10 problems was used to categorize 
the individual as having attained a formal reasoning status (304). 
Inductive Task: The Letter Sets Test (Ekstrom, et al, 1976; Willis & Schaie, 1986; 
Saczynski, Zuo, Willis & Schaie, 1998) consisted of a 30-item test, which came from the French 
Kit of Reference Tests for Cognitive Factors; as stated by Ekstrom, et al. (1976), ―the kit is a tool 
for studying reasoning, verbal ability, spatial ability, memory and other cognitive processes … 
[each kit] contains a manual and 72 tests that have been demonstrated to be consistent markers in 
studies of 23 cognitive factors‖ (1). In this study, the Letter Sets Test was split into a pretest 
inductive reasoning task and posttest inductive reasoning task: the first fifteen letter sets were 
utilized in the pretest inductive reasoning task and the last fifteen letter sets were utilized in the 
posttest inductive reasoning task. 
The Letter Sets Test included problems that consisted of five sets of letters and four 
letters per set. These four letters per set followed a certain pattern (or rule) and the participants 




letters that followed the pattern (or rule) and the one that did not. Similar to the deductive 
reasoning task that participants completed, participants were asked to complete the pretest 
inductive reasoning task and posttest inductive reasoning task in a pen-and-paper format. The 
first eight letter sets were presented on one page with instructions, and the last seven letter sets 
were presented on another page with the same instructions as the previous page (see Figure 9).  




The participants were asked to read the instructions silently to themselves and were given 
two warm-up problems followed by the pretest inductive reasoning task and posttest inductive 
reasoning task, respectively. The problem order was not randomized across participants. The test 
time is limited to 7 minutes. 
The second performance metric that was administered, the posttest deductive reasoning 
task and posttest inductive reasoning task, as explained above, was constructed by splitting 
items. Overton‘s version of the Wason Selection Task was split between the pretest deductive 




questions were utilized in the pretest deductive reasoning task and the last ten Wason Selection 
Task questions were utilized in the posttest deductive reasoning task. The Letter Sets Test was 
split between the pretest inductive reasoning task and posttest inductive reasoning task: the first 
fifteen letter sets were utilized in the pretest inductive reasoning task and the last fifteen letter 
sets were utilized in the posttest inductive reasoning task. Therefore, the posttest deductive 
reasoning task and posttest inductive reasoning task mirrored the pretest deductive reasoning task 
and pretest inductive reasoning task, however the questions‘ were split in order to avoid 
redundancy and familiarity with the specific questions (see Appendix I). The problem order in 
either the pre-and post-deductive reasoning task and pre-and post- inductive reasoning task was 
not randomized across participants. By splitting items, there was a presumption that the 
questions that were asked would test the same type of content. Intra-class correlation analysis 
was conducted to verify that the pretest and posttest were highly correlated. Through the splitting 
of the items, I removed carryover effects and fatigue; while participants received similar 
questions, they were not identical, which also helped avoid any repeated measures pitfalls. 
Additionally, I utilized pretest-posttest counterbalancing. 
Demographic Survey 
Participants were first asked to answer demographic questions (age, gender, class year, 
major) and their degree of past experience with video-game and computer- game technology, 
including VBS3 and Bravemind (see Appendix J). Participants were asked to complete this 










Figure 10. Qualtrics Online Survey  
  
A Qualtrics site was constructed, which contained the five assessments: (1) the 
demographic survey, (2) The Grit Scale, (3) the Resilience Scale for Adults, (4) the Flexible 
Regulation of Emotional Expression Scale, and (5) the Brief Self-Control Scale. 
Grit Scale 
The second questionnaire (self-report) administered was the Grit Scale (Duckworth et al., 
2007). The Grit Scale measures grit through 12 items; these items are rated on a 5-point scale 
from 1= not at all like me to 5 = very much like me (see Appendix D). Specifically, the twelve-
item Grit Scale assesses ―trait-level perseverance and passion for long-term goals and 
perseverance for long-term goals that reflect passionate interests or personally valued aim‖ 
(Duckworth and Quinn, 2009, 166). This instrument has been shown to predict achievement in 
vocational, academic, and vocational domains (Duckworth et al., 2007; Duckworth & Quinn, 
2009; Duckworth et al., 2009). Reverse scoring in questions targeting the consistent pursuit of 
passionate interests (six out of the twelve items) was used to compute grit scores. In prior 
research, grit scores have been positively related to self-efficacy scores (Rojas et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, according to Duckworth et al. (2007), ―the resulting 12-item Grit Scale 




(Consistency of Interests,  =.84; Perseverance of Effort,  = .78)‖ (1091). Cronbach‘s alpha 
coefficients ranged from .73 to .83 (Duckworth et al., 2007). Reliability and construct validity of 
the scale were found in research predicting performance of military cadets (Duckworth et al., 
2007). According to Maddi et al. (2012), ―this scale has shown adequate reliability and validity 
across a variety of achievement realms requiring sustained and focused application of talent over 
time‖ (23). For example, a comparable benchmark for grit scores was identified by Kelly, 
Matthews, & Bartone (2014) who measured grit as a possible predictor of academic performance 
among USMA cadets from the class of 2010. Results showed a mean score of grit (M = 3.77) 
during Cadet Basic Training. Unlike previous uses of the Grit Scale, in this study, participants 
were asked to complete this measure using a web-based survey system (see Figure 10). 
 The Resilience Scale for Adults (Wagnild & Young, 1993)  
The third questionnaire (self-report) that was administered was the Resilience Scale for 
Adults. The RSA is an overall positively worded 32-item scale (See Appendix C). The RSA is 
constructed in three different sections. The first section of the RSA includes 25 items on a 7-
point Likert-type scale; these items are rated on a 7-point scale from 1= strongly disagree to 7 = 
strongly agree, with higher scores indicating a higher degree of resilience. The second section 
includes two questions on mental and physical health, while the third section includes similar 
health questions with a ―yes‖ or ―no‖ response. According to Hjemdal et al. (2001) ―the scale is 
intended to measure the protective resources that promote adult resilience …it contains five 
factors: personal competence, social competence, family coherence, social support, and personal 
structure‖ (30). The RSA consists of intrapersonal and interpersonal protective factors presumed 
to facilitate adaptation to psychosocial adversities (personal strength, social competence, 




Cronbach‘s alpha coefficients ranged from .72 to .94 supporting the internal consistency 
reliability of the RSA (Hjemdal et al., 2001; Friborg et al., 2005; Ahern et al., 2006). Friborg et 
al.‘s (2005) study supported convergent and discriminate validity of the scale against measures 
of social intelligence, personality, and cognitive abilities with all the RSA factors significantly 
inter-correlated (ranging from r = 0.31 to 0.57). Particularly, ―concurrent validity was indicated 
by high correlations between the RSA and other well-established valid measures of constructs 
linked to resilience and outcomes of resilience, such as depression (r = -0.37), life satisfaction  
(r = 0.30), morale (r = 0.28) and health (r = -0.26)‖ (Wagnild & Young, 1993, 172). Unlike 
previous use of the RSA, in this study, participants were asked to complete this measure using 
the web-based survey system (see Figure 10). 
The Flexible Regulation of Emotional Expression (FREE) Scale  
The fourth questionnaire (self-report) that was administered was The Flexible Regulation 
of Emotional Expression (see Appendix K). The FREE Scale is a 16-item test that measures a 
person‘s ability to enhance and suppress displayed emotion across an array of hypothetical 
contexts. According to Burton and Bonanno (2015), ―the FREE Scale was designed to provide 
standardized hypothetical scenarios to assess participants‘ perceived ability to modulate their 
emotional expressions … a panel of emotion researchers then selected the final 16 scenarios 
according to their face validity and diversity of contexts ‖ (3). The scenarios were categorized 
into four types of assessments: (a) enhancing positive emotion, (b) enhancing negative emotion, 
(c) suppressing positive emotion, and (d) suppressing negative emotion. Each item asks for the 
participant to indicate how well they are able to express or conceal their feelings respective to 
each scenario on a 6-point scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 6 (very much). Results from 




reappraisal ( = .87). According to Burton and Bonanno (2015), ―establishing correlations of the 
FREE Scale with corresponding expressive flexibility task conditions further establishes its 
convergent and discriminant validity … and the calculated flexibility scores and the expressive 
flexibility task were also positively correlated with one another‖ (10). Unlike previous uses of 
the FREE scale, in this research project, participants were asked to complete this measure using 
the web-based survey system (see Figure 10). 
The Brief Self-Control Scale  
The fifth questionnaire (self-report) that was administered was the Brief Self-Control 
Scale. The BSCS is a 10-item questionnaire that measures dispositional self-regulatory behavior 
in four facets: emotions, performance, thoughts, and impulses (see Appendix L; Tangney, 
Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). The BSCS is rated on a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 (Not at all 
like me) to 5 (Very much like me). The BSCS demonstrates high internal reliability ( =.83 to 
.85) and test-retest reliability was .87 (Tangney et al., 2004). Tangney et al. (2004), who 
investigated the reliability and internal consistency of BSCS with an undergraduate student 
sample, stated that  
results from the current study provide strong support for the reliability and validity of the 
Self-Control Scale … its internal consistency was good, especially for the full scale but 
also for the subscales … retest reliability over a one-to-three-week period was also 
satisfactorily high. (314) 
Furthermore, over 100 published studies on adolescent and adult samples have exhibited that the 
BSCS can be utilized in predicting a number of behavioral outcomes (Geraghty, Wood, & 
Hyland, 2010; De Ridder, Lensvelt-Mulders, Finkenauer, Stok, & Baumeister, 2012; Baay, De 




previous use of the BSCS, in this dissertation, participants were asked to complete this measure 
using the web-based survey system (see Figure 10). 
Apparatuses 
Bravemind: Bravemind is a clinical, interactive, virtual reality (VR) based exposure 
therapy tool that has been utilized to assess and treat post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
(Institute of Creative Technologies, 2012). While this tool was first constructed for clinical 
purposes, this specific dissertation did not utilize this system for clinical assessment, but instead 
for its VR scenario. This study was not the only one that utilizes Bravemind as a VR tool. In 
2013, Rizzo et al. configured the apparatus as a VR tool for cognitive assessment purposes and to 
provide psychological resilience training prior to combat deployment. While Bravemind has 
previously been used in a number of studies and no major risks were associated, participants 
were informed of the potential of experiencing discomfort when wearing a VR head set while 
immersed in the VR scenario; therefore, participants who were sensitive to virtual reality 
environments were excluded from this study (Rizzo et al., 2012; Rizzo et al., 2013). 
Bravemind‘s current application consists of a series of virtual scenarios specifically 
designed to represent relevant contexts, specifically Afghan and Iraqi city and desert road 
environments (see Figure 11). This immersive virtual reality apparatus includes a number of 
displays (visual, auditory, tactile/ haptic) and a tracking system. In this immersive virtual 
environment technology, users are asked to wear a head mounted display system which allows 
for the ability to successfully orient and position the user within the game. According to 
Sanchez-Vives and Slater (2005), ―the visual images displayed will be determined as a function 
of at least the position and orientation of the human participant's head, enabled through head 




all of the senses may be catered for [sic]‖ (336). Auditory elements are presented with the use of 
earphones, incorporated directional 3-D audio, and users utilize a game controller to move 
around within the simulated world. A vibro-tactile floor Rumblefloor board is also utilized in 
order to simulate the vibrations of common combat variables such as bombings and shots. 
Therefore, in this study, participants who were assigned to the immersive technology condition 
were asked to wear a virtual reality head mounted display and headphones incorporating 
directional 3-D audio, use a standard video controller, and asked to sit on a chair placed on the 
Rumblefloor board. 






Virtual Battlespace 3 (VBS3): VBS3 is the flagship of the US Army‘s games for training 
programs and has become the standard in first-person game-based military training simulations 
(Bohemia Interactive Simulations, 2016). VBS3 (See Figure 12) simulates combat scenarios for 
the use of military and tactical training and mission rehearsal. The program director of the U.S. 
Army's Games for Training Program of Record stated that, ―VBS3 brings the user a modernized 
user interface, improved avatar fidelity, better path planning for AI, new AAR display and 
capability, multicast networking and many other new features‖ (Bohemia Interactive 
Simulations, 2016). According to Curthoys (2016), VBS3 is ―facilitated by U.S. Army Training 
and Doctrine Command's Combined Arms Center-Training, and VBS3 provides a visually rich 
gaming environment with flexible scenario and terrain options and includes more realistic 
graphics than previous versions‖ (1). This tool was constructed as a first person shooter 
multiplayer video game with three-dimensional VR environment to be used for military 
simulation and training. There is no study, to the author‘s knowledge, that utilizes this desktop 
tactical trainer as a stimuli; this specific study utilized it for its VR scenario. As VBS3 has never 
served as a research stimuli, participants were informed of the potential of feeling discomfort 
while wearing a VR head set while immersed in the VR scenario; participants who were 
sensitive to virtual reality environments were excluded from this study. 
VBS3‘s current application consists of a series of virtual scenarios specifically designed 
to represent relevant contexts, specifically Afghan and Iraqi city and desert road environments. 
This non-immersive virtual reality apparatus includes limited displays (visual and auditory). 
Participants were asked to use a standard laptop with a 15‖ laptop screen that displayed visuals, 




While participants utilized one of two platforms, Bravemind or VBS3, scenario content 
was controlled for the two computer-simulated scenarios by constructing the VBS3 scenario to 
mirror Bravemind‘s scenario; therefore, regardless of the condition, participants completed 
comparable scenarios.  
Figure 12: Virtual BattleSpace (VBS3) 
  
Procedure 
For this dissertation, the sample was recruited using the recruiting method of word of 
mouth or a printed advertisement. Participants were asked to sign up for a designated time slot if 
there were interested in volunteering to participate in the study. All experimentation was 
conducted at Norwich University in a designated laboratory space. 
Data collection was split into two parts: (1) the first part of the study, in which 
participants were asked to complete the pretest and posttest deductive and inductive reasoning 
tasks and participate in either one of the four VR conditions, and (2) the second part of the study, 
in which participants were asked to complete a number of surveys online. Participants received a 
consent form (see Appendices F & G) to complete prior to participating in the dissertation study. 
Once informed consent was verified by the researcher, participants were randomly placed in one 




Combat, (3) Non-Immersive Simulated Combat, or (4) Non-Immersive Simulated Non-Combat. 
Once the participant was placed in a condition, the participant began the first part of the study.  
For the first part of the study, participants, regardless of condition, were first asked to 
complete the pretest deductive reasoning task and pretest inductive reasoning task using a paper-
and-pen format; the pretest performance metric was randomly counterbalanced, and half of the 
participants were given the inductive task first and the deductive task second, while the other half 
of the participants were given the deductive task first and the inductive task second. Each 
participant was allotted 15 minutes to complete the pretest deductive reasoning task, Overton‘s 
version of the Wason Selection Task and the pretest inductive reasoning task, the Letter Sets 
Series. Second, once the participant completed the pretest deductive reasoning task and pretest 
inductive reasoning task, the participant was asked to participate in his or her corresponding 
condition for approximately ten minutes. 
Second, once the participant completed participating in their corresponding condition, 
each participant, regardless of condition, was asked to complete the posttest deductive reasoning 
task and posttest inductive reasoning task using a paper-and-pen format; the posttest performance 
metric was randomly counterbalanced, congruent to the method utilized in the pretest 
performance metric. Participants were thanked for completing of the first part of the study, and 
were then given the Qualtrics link to complete the second part of the study. 
For the second part of the study, approximately a week after participants completed the first 
part of the study, participants were asked to complete the demographic survey and four 
questionnaires, the Resilience Scale for Adults (RSA), the Grit Scale, the FREE Scale, and the 





CHAPTER V.  
RESULTS 
Experimental Design 
I utilize two 2x2x2 mixed design ANOVA to investigate possible cognitive decrements in 
individuals‘ ability to reason immediately after war-like environments simulated by immersive 
and non-immersive technologies. Using G*Power 3.1.9.2 to complete power analysis, I 
attempted to recruit 108 participants, 27 participants for each condition, a sample size that allows 
the identification of medium-sized effects (Cohen‘s f = .32) with statistical power of .90.  
In total, 107 participants took part in the study. Participants were placed into one of four 
conditions: 27 participants (25.2%) were placed in the immersive simulated combat, 27 
participants (25.2%) were placed in the immersive simulated non-combat, 27 participants 
(25.2%) were placed in the non- immersive simulated combat, and 26 participants (24.3%) were 
placed in the non- immersive simulated non-combat; overall, 54 participants participated in one 
of the two VBS3 conditions while 53 participants participated in one of the two Bravemind 
conditions. All participants took part in one condition and all participants completed the pretest 
and posttest inductive and deductive reasoning tasks and the four measures, the Grit Scale, the 
RSA, the FREE scale, and the BSCS scale, including the demographic survey. Most participants, 
96.3% and 97.2%, reported no past experience with VBS3 and Bravemind, respectively (see 
Appendix M for Correlational Matrix for all Study Constructs).  
Performance Metrics and Scoring Procedure 
The pretest and posttest deductive reasoning tasks and pretest and posttest inductive 
reasoning tasks that were administered were constructed by splitting items. Overton‘s version of 




deductive reasoning task; specifically, the first ten Wason Selection Task questions were utilized 
in the pretest deductive reasoning task and the last ten Wason Selection Task questions were 
utilized in the posttest deductive reasoning task. The Letter Sets Test were split between the 
pretest inductive reasoning task and posttest inductive reasoning task; specifically, the first 
fifteen letter sets were utilized in the pretest inductive reasoning task and the last fifteen letter 
sets were utilized in the posttest inductive reasoning task. Therefore, the posttest deductive 
reasoning task and posttest inductive reasoning task mirrored the pretest deductive reasoning task 
and pretest inductive reasoning task, respectively; the questions were split in order to avoid 
redundancy and familiarity with the specific questions (see Appendices H & I). The problem 
order in both the pretest and posttest deductive reasoning task and pretest and posttest inductive 
reasoning task were not randomized across participants. By splitting items, there was a 
presumption that the questions that were asked would test the same type of content. Correlation 
analysis was conducted to verify that the pretest and posttest were highly correlated. 
Additionally, I utilized pretest-posttest counterbalancing. 
An intraclass correlation was computed to assess the relationship between the pretest and 
posttest deductive reasoning tasks. A high degree of reliability was found between the deductive 
reasoning measurements. The average measure ICC was .642 with a 95% confidence interval 
from .471 to .757 (F (106,106) = 2.918, p<.001) suggesting that the pretest and posttest 
deductive reasoning tasks were highly correlated. Additionally, another intraclass correlation was 
computed to assess the relationship between the pretest and posttest inductive reasoning tasks. 
There was a significant correlation suggesting that the pretest and posttest deductive reasoning 
tasks were highly correlated, but this was not the case for the pretest and posttest inductive 




to .319 (F (106,106) = 1.056, p=.390) suggesting that the pretest and posttest inductive reasoning 
tasks were not correlated; however, a low ICC for inductive reasoning could be viewed as 
evidence that inductive reasoning mattered for intervention. I discuss the potential limitations of 
the research this might cause further in the discussion section. 
Deductive Reasoning Task Scoring: 
I followed the same scoring method as utilized in Overton‘s version of the Wason 
Selection Task (Ward & Overton, 1990; Chapell & Overton, 1998, 2002; Rich, 2014). 
Specifically, as stated in Chapell and Overton (2002):  
A general solution score, giving partial credit for partial solutions, was used as the main 
dependent measure. For each problem participants received one point for each of the 
following: choosing "p," choosing "not q," not choosing "not p," not choosing "q," 
yielding a total possible score with a range of 0 to 40 points, across the 10 problems. The 
correct logical response to selection task problems is the selection of the "p" and the "not 
q" alternatives while not selecting the "not p" or the "q" alternatives. This selection 
combination, which is called the complete falsification solution, was used as a second 
dependent variable. A score of 1 point was given for each problem when this solution 
was selected, and 0 points were given for any other response. Based on prior research 
(Foltz et al., 1995; Overton et al., 1987; Ward & Overton, 1990), a consistency criterion 
of 6 or more complete falsification solutions out of 10 problems was used to categorize 
the individual as having attained a formal reasoning status (304). 
Unlike the scoring method utilized by Chapell and Overton (2002), I obtained the 
composite score for the first ten conditional problems (which were labeled as the pretest 




posttest deductive reasoning task), to account for splitting the items. The overall mean score of 
the pretest deductive reasoning task and the overall mean score of the posttest deductive 
reasoning task are included in Table 10. 
Table 10. Overall Mean and SD of Pre and Posttest Deductive Reasoning Task 
 Mean SD 
Pretest Deductive Reasoning Task 18.11 4.79 
Posttest Deductive Reasoning Task 19.46 4.57 
 
Inductive Reasoning Task Scoring: 
I followed the scoring method proposed by Ekstrom et al. (1976) for the inductive 
reasoning task scoring. The score was derived by the number of problems marked correctly (i.e., 
when the participant was able to differentiate the letter set that did not adhere to the pattern of the 
following four letter sets), the number of problems unmarked (i.e., when the participant did not 
answer the question), and the number of problems marked incorrectly; the problems marked 
incorrectly received a subtraction of a fraction (1/3) point, the problems marked correctly 
received one (1) point, and the unmarked problems received zero (0) points. As Ekstrom et al. 
(1976) expressed, it was not to the participant‘s advantage to guess the correct answer because 
the participant would be penalized for an incorrect answer (i.e., the fraction subtracted). Unlike 
Ekstrom et al. (1976), I obtained the composite score for the first fifteen letter sets (which were 
labeled as the pretest inductive reasoning task) and the second fifteen letter sets (which were 
labeled as the posttest inductive reasoning task score), due to the splitting of the items. The 
overall mean score of the pretest inductive reasoning task and the overall mean score of the 
posttest inductive reasoning task are included in Table 11. 
Table 11. Overall Mean and SD of Pre and Posttest Inductive Reasoning Task 
 Mean SD 
Pretest Inductive Reasoning Task 8.79 2.63 





Results were expected to reveal that the pretest inductive reasoning task and posttest 
inductive reasoning task were correlated to one another, as with the results for the pretest 
deductive reasoning task and posttest deductive reasoning task. The lack of significant 
correlation between the pretest inductive reasoning task and posttest inductive reasoning task is a 
limitation of this study. While there is no clear specific reason as to why the pretest inductive 
reasoning task and posttest inductive reasoning task were not highly correlated, there are a 
number of that might further explain the lack of significant correlation. First, there might have 
been some possible extraneous variables that impacted research process that influenced a lack of 
significant correlation. Second, after further examination of the data (and more particularly, 
frequency analysis), the average score on the pretest inductive reasoning task was higher than the 
average score on the posttest inductive reasoning task; this could indicate that the posttest 
inductive reasoning task was inherently more difficult than the pretest inductive reasoning task if 
more individuals scored lower. This study was the first study to split the Ekstrom et al. (1976) 
assessment; while there is no indication that the questions were progressively harder in the 
assessment, there might have been harder questions in the end, and easier questions in the 
beginning of the assessment. 
Descriptive Statistics 
In total, 107 participants took part in the study. Overall, 54 participants took part in one 
of the two VBS3 conditions while 53 participants took part in one of the two Bravemind 
conditions; furthermore, overall, 54 participants took part in one of the two simulated combat 
conditions while 53 participants took part in one of the two simulated non-combat conditions. 
Most participants, over 95%, did not have any experience with VBS3 or Bravemind. About half 




participants played computer games monthly; the rest of the participants either played daily 
(approximately 18.7%) or weekly (10.3%). Forty-one participants (38.3%) never played video 
games, while approximately 23.4% and 24.3% played video games weekly and monthly, 
respectively; the rest of the participants (14.0%) played video games daily (see Appendix N). 
Along with commonly used demographic questions, participants were asked to rank in 
degree of importance the virtues necessary to be an effective Army leader. The virtues that 
participants were asked to distinguish between included the character strengths and virtues from 
Peterson and Seligman‘s (2004) positive psychology research; accordingly, there are six classes 
of core virtues comprised of twenty-four strengths. Particularly, the virtues are: (1) wisdom and 
knowledge (curiosity, love of learning, creativity, open-mindedness, innovation, and 
perspective), (2) courage (zest, bravely, vitality, persistence, and integrity), (3) humanity (love, 
social intelligence, and kindness), (4) justice (leadership, citizenship, and fairness), (5) 
temperance (humility, prudence, self-control, and forgiveness), and (6) transcendence (humor, 
hope, spirituality, appreciation of beauty, gratitude). Findings showed that participants noted that 
the top three virtues necessary to be an effective Army leader were (1) wisdom and knowledge, 
(2) humanity, and (3) temperance; most participants ranked transcendence was the virtue least 
necessary for an individual to be an effective Army leader.  
Psychological Constructs 
All participants were asked to complete four scales: (1) the Grit Scale, (2) the RSA, (3) 
the FREE scale, and (4) the BSCS. The overall mean score of the scales task are included in 
Table 12. Overall, participants self-reported as moderately gritty (M= 3.78, SD= .47), 
moderately resilient (M= 5.54, SD= .93), moderately self-controlled (M= 3.44, SD= .75), and 




Table 12. Overall Mean and SD of Constructs 
 Mean SD 
Grit Scale (Grit Construct) 3.78 .47 
RSA (Resilience Construct) 5.54 .93 
FREE Scale (Flexible Regulation of Emotional  
           Expression Construct) 
11.99 1.77 
BSCS Scale (Self-Control Construct) 3.44 .75 
 
A Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was computed to assess the 
relationship between all four constructs (see Table 13). There are significant positive correlations 
between grit and self-control, r= .257, n= 107, p= .008, grit and flexible regulation of emotional 
expression, r= .240, n= 107, p= .013, and resilience and flexible regulation of emotional 
expression, r= .369, n= 107, p< .001. Interestingly, resilience is not correlated to self-control or 
grit.  










1 .187 .257** .240* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
.053 .008 .013 
Resilience  Pearson 
Correlation 
.187 1 .061 .369** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .053  .534 <.001 
Self-Control  Pearson 
Correlation 
.257** .061 1 .125 





Correlation .240* .369** .125 1 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .013 <.001 .200  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Due to possible concerns with multicollinearity, I only utilize the psychological constructs of 
resilience and grit (as they were not correlated to one another) to further investigate their impact 
on inductive and deductive reasoning, as these two constructs were not correlated to one another. 
Inferential Statistics 




differences across the conditions. Findings reveal no statistical significant differences between 
participants in combat and non-combat conditions and their deductive (t (105) = -1.128, p= .262, 
NS) and inductive reasoning abilities (t (105) = -1.247, p=.215, NS). Further results show no 
statistical significant differences between participants in immersive and non-immersive 
conditions and their deductive (t (105) = 1.011, p=.315, NS) and inductive reasoning abilities (t 
(105) = -.900, p=.370, NS).  
Results for Question 1a: Effects of Simulated Combat on Reasoning 
Is an individual‘s cognitive performance (specifically, inductive and deductive reasoning) 
impaired following immersion to simulated combat-like environments? I investigated the effects 
of simulated combat on individuals‘ deductive reasoning performance.  
A 2x2x2 mixed design ANOVA was performed to assess the effects of deductive 
reasoning following exposure to simulated combat-like environments. Pretest and posttest 
deductive reasoning task scores were the within-subjects factors, simulation (two levels: combat 
or non-combat environment) and immersiveness (two levels: immersive and non-immersive 
virtual reality) were the between subjects factors, and grit and resilience were the covariates. 
Table 14 shows the means of the pretest and posttest deductive reasoning task scores.  
Table 14. Means and SD of Pre- and Post- Deductive Reasoning Scores 
  Mean SD 
 















Non-Immersive 17.31 3.74 
Immersive 17.89 5.32 
 
Immersive 18.70 4.98 
Total 17.58 4.95 
 
Total 18.02 4.43 
Combat Non-Immersive 19.85 4.15 
 
Combat Non-Immersive 20.66 4.92 
Immersive 17.41 4.82 
 
Immersive 21.07 3.62 
Total 18.63 4.62 
 
Total 20.87 4.28 
Total Non-Immersive 18.58 4.54 
 
Total Non-Immersive 19.02 4.66 
Immersive 17.65 5.03 
 
Immersive 19.89 4.47 
Total 18.11 4.79 
 
Total 19.46 4.57 
 
No significant interaction was found between simulated combat exposure on time (pretest 
and posttest deductive reasoning task scores) (F (1, 101) = 3.277, p = .074, ηp
2




suggesting that individuals who were assigned to the simulated combat conditions did not 
perform worse on the deductive reasoning task than individuals who were assigned to the 
simulated non-combat conditions (see Table 15). Particularly, the exposure of the combat-like 
environments neither negatively or positively influenced an individual‘s ability to engage in 
deductive reasoning following immersion to simulated combat-like environments. 
Table 15. Tests of Between and Within-Subjects Effects: Deductive Reasoning 
 





Time 1.021 1 1.021 0.095 0.758 0.001 0.061 
Time * Grit 0.258 1 0.258 0.024 0.877 0 0.053 
Time * Resilience 0.458 1 0.458 0.043 0.837 0 0.055 
Time * Simulation   35.14 1 35.14 3.277 0.073 0.031 0.434 
Time * Immersiveness 44.101 1 44.101 4.113 0.045 0.039 0.519 
Time * Simulation  *  Immersiveness 12.734 1 12.734 1.188 0.278 0.012 0.19 
Time * Simulation  *  Immersiveness *  
Grit 9.146 4 2.287 0.210 0.932 0.009 0.094 
Time * Simulation  *  Immersiveness *  
Resilience 14.307 4 3.577 0.329 0.858 0.013 0.121 
Grit 33.253 1 33.253 1.083 0.301 0.011 0.178 
Resilience 45.546 1 45.546 1.483 0.226 0.014 0.226 
Simulation 84.017 1 84.017 2.735 0.101 0.026 0.374 
Immersiveness 0.145 1 0.145 0.005 0.945 0.000 0.051 
Simulation  *  Immersiveness 71.393 1 71.393 2.324 0.131 0.022 0.327 
  
Further analysis reveals the main effect of simulation is non-significant, (F (1, 101) = 2.735, p = 
.101, ηp
2
 = 0.026, NS), suggesting simulated combat did not generally impact individual‘s 
deductive reasoning abilities (see Table 15). 
Furthermore, another 2x2x2 mixed design ANOVA was performed to assess the effects 
of inductive reasoning following immersion to simulated combat-like environments. Similar to 
previous 2x2x2 mixed design ANOVA, simulation (two levels: combat or non-combat 
environment) and immersiveness (two levels: immersive and non-immersive virtual reality 




and posttest inductive reasoning task scores were the within-subjects factors. Table 16 shows the 
means of the pretest inductive reasoning task scores and posttest inductive reasoning task scores.  
Table 16. Means and SD of Pre- and Post- Inductive Reasoning Scores 
  Mean SD 














Non-Immersive 8.71 2.23 
Immersive  8.49 2.16 
 
Immersive  8.44 2.54 
Total 8.47 2.53 
 
Total 8.58 2.38 
Combat Non-Immersive 8.67 2.61 
 
Combat Non-Immersive 5.83 2.65 
Immersive  9.53 2.80 
 
Immersive  5.99 1.80 
Total 9.10 2.72 
 
Total 5.91 2.25 
Total Non-Immersive 8.55 2.74 
 
Total Non-Immersive 7.25 2.84 
Immersive  9.01 2.53 
 
Immersive  7.22 2.51 
Total 8.79 2.63 
 
Total 7.23 2.66 
 
A significant interaction is found between time (pretest and posttest inductive reasoning 
task scores) and simulation, (F (1, 101) = 26.156, p < .001, ηp
2
 = 0.206) suggesting that 
individuals who were assigned to the simulated combat conditions (regardless of platform) 
performed worse on the inductive reasoning task than individuals who were assigned to the 
simulated non-combat conditions (see Table 17). Particularly, the exposure of the combat-like 
environments negatively influenced and impaired an individual‘s ability to inductive reasoning 
following immersion to simulated combat-like environments. 
Table 17. Tests of Between and Within-Subjects Effects: Inductive Reasoning 
  Type III 
SS 




Time 2.075 1 2.075 0.381 0.538 0.004 0.094 
Time * Grit 9.860 1 9.860 1.811 0.181 0.018 0.266 
Time * Resilience 18.137 1 18.137 3.332 0.071 0.032 0.440 
Time * Simulation   142.393 1 142.393 26.156 0.000 0.206 0.999 
Time * Immersiveness 3.891 1 3.891 0.715 0.400 0.007 0.133 
Time * Simulation * Immersiveness 
0.064 1 0.064 0.012 0.914 0.000 0.051 
Time * Simulation * Immersiveness *  
Grit 17.355 4 4.339 0.787 0.536 0.031 0.244 
Time * Simulation * Immersiveness *  
Resilience 31.061 4 7.765 1.409 0.237 0.054 0.424 
Grit 0.141 1 0.141 0.021 0.886 0.000 0.052 
Resilience 13.598 1 13.598 1.999 0.160 0.019 0.288 
Simulation  38.644 1 38.644 5.681 0.019 0.053 0.656 




* Simulation * Immersiveness 2.194 1 2.194 0.322 0.571 0.003 0.087 
 
Results show that participants (n= 54) who were placed in the simulated combat-like 
conditions performed significantly worse on the inductive reasoning task (M= 5.91, SD= 2.25) 
than participants (n = 53) who were placed in simulated non-combat conditions (M= 8.58, SD= 
2.38), suggesting that individuals who were exposed to an adverse environment, such as a 
combat-like simulation, performed cognitively worse inductively than individuals who were not 
exposed to an adverse environment (see Graph 1). 
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Particularly, these findings show that challenging environments could be a disadvantage to 
individuals who must inductively reason following an adverse exposure. This finding is in 
agreement with previous findings (Palfai & Salovey, 1993; Blanchette, 2006; Wranke et al., 
2009). 
The hypothesis is partially supported in that I hypothesized that participants who were  
assigned to the simulated combat conditions would suffer from more cognitive deficits and 
impairments than individuals who were assigned to the simulated non-combat conditions. 
Participants who were placed in the simulated combat conditions did suffer from cognitive 




participants who were placed in the simulated non-combat conditions; however, participants did 
not suffer from cognitive impairment when tasked to complete the deductive reasoning task. 
However, as previously reported, the significant results found in participants‘ inductive 
reasoning task performance could be unreliable due to the lack of significant correlation found 
between the pretest inductive reasoning task and posttest inductive reasoning task.  
Results for Question 1b: Effects of Immersiveness on Reasoning 
Second, I investigated the immersiveness of virtual technologies on individual reasoning. 
Particularly, does the immersive technology of Bravemind influence an individual‘s reasoning 
performance differently than non-immersive technology of VBS3? 
Findings revealed a significant interaction between time (pretest and posttest deductive 
reasoning task scores) and immersion showing a significant difference between individuals‘ 
pretest and posttest deductive reasoning scores, (F (1, 101) = 4.113, p= .045, ηp
2
 = 0.039) 
suggesting that individuals who were assigned to the immersive conditions showed significant 
deductive reasoning improvements compared to individuals who were assigned to the non-
immersive conditions (see Table 15). Particularly, immersiveness positively influenced an 
individual‘s ability to reason deductively. 
Results showed that participants (n= 54) who were placed in the immersive conditions 
performed significantly better on the deductive reasoning task (M= 19.89, SD= 4.47) than 
participants (n = 53) who were placed in the non-immersive conditions (M= 19.01, SD= 4.66), 
suggesting that individuals who were immersed in the virtual reality simulation were able to 
perform cognitively better on deductive reasoning tasks than individuals who were placed in the 
non-immersive conditions (see Graph 2). 
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Furthermore, findings revealed no significant interaction between time (pretest and 
posttest inductive reasoning task scores) and immersion showing no significant difference 
between individuals‘ pretest and posttest inductive reasoning scores, (F (1, 101) = .715, p= .400, 
ηp
2
 = 0.007, NS) suggesting that individuals who were assigned to the immersive conditions 
showed no inductive reasoning improvements or impairments compared to individuals who were 
assigned to the non-immersive conditions (see Table 17). Further analysis revealed no significant 
main effect of immersiveness, (F (1, 101) = .307, p = .581, ηp
2
 = 0.003, NS), suggesting 
immersiveness did not impact an individual‘s inductive reasoning abilities (see Table 17). 
The hypothesis is not supported in that I hypothesized that participants who were 
assigned to the immersive conditions would suffer from more cognitive deficits and impairments 
than individuals who were assigned to the non-immersive conditions. While participants who 
were placed in the immersive conditions did not suffer from cognitive impairment when tasked 
to complete the inductive reasoning task, they instead showed improvement in their deductive 
reasoning, and no impairment.  
Question 2a: Effects of Grit and Resilience on Reasoning 
Third, I examined if an individual‘s grit or resilience influenced the way an individual 




perform better overall on the reasoning tasks, while individuals who reported lower grit or 
resilience would perform worse on the deductive reasoning tasks. 
In order to measure grit and resilience, I utilized the Grit Scale and the RSA. These 
assessments respectively measure grit and resilience as continuous variables. The Grit Scale 
assesses an individual‘s grit through a 12-item 5-point Likert type scale, with a range of 12 (not 
gritty) to 60 (very gritty). The RSA measures an individual‘s resilience through a 25-item 7-point 
Likert type scale, with a range of 25 (not resilient) to 175 (very resilient).  
Findings showed no significant interaction between time (pretest and posttest deductive 
reasoning task scores) and resilience (F (1, 101) = .043, p = .837, ηp
2
 < .001, NS) suggesting that 
individuals who reported as highly resilient did not perform better on the deductive reasoning 
task than slightly resilient individuals (see Table 17). Additionally, no significant interaction was 
found between time (pretest and posttest deductive reasoning task scores) and grit (F (1, 101) = 
.024, p = .877, ηp
2
 < .001, NS) suggesting that individuals who reported as highly gritty did not 
perform better on the deductive reasoning task than non-gritty individuals (see Table 17). Further 
analysis revealed no significant main effect of resilience, (F (1, 101) = 1.483, p = .226, ηp
2
 = 
0.014, NS) or grit (F (1, 101) = 1.083, p = .301, ηp
2
 = 0.011, NS), suggesting grit or resilience did 
not impact individual‘s deductive reasoning abilities (see Table 15). 
As with my investigation of the impact of grit and resilience on deductive reasoning, the 
2x2x2 mixed design ANOVA found no significant interaction between time (pretest and posttest 
inductive reasoning task scores) and resilience (F (1, 101) = .1.811, p = .181, ηp
2
 < .018, NS) 
suggesting that individuals who reported as highly resilient did not perform better on the 
inductive reasoning task than slightly resilient individuals (see Table 17). While results showed 




grit, there was a modest interaction (F (1, 101) = .3.332, p = .071, ηp
2
 < .032, NS) suggesting that 
there might be a relationship between grit and time. Further analysis revealed no significant main 
effect of resilience, (F (1, 101) = 1.999, p = .16, ηp
2
 = 0.019, NS) or grit (F (1, 101) = .021, p = 
.886, ηp
2
 < 0.001, NS), suggesting grit or resilience did not impact individual‘s inductive 
reasoning abilities (see Table 17). 
Hypothesis 2a is not supported in that I hypothesized that individuals who reported 
higher grit or resilience would perform better, overall, on the reasoning tasks, while individuals 
who reported lower grit or resilience would perform worse, overall, on the reasoning tasks. 
While a modest relationship was revealed between time (pretest and posttest inductive reasoning 
task scores) and grit, there was no statistically significant relationship among the psychological 
constructs and participants‘ inductive and deductive reasoning.  
Question 2b: Impact of Resilience and Grit x Immersiveness x Simulation on Reasoning 
Fourth, I not only investigated whether an individual‘s resilience or grit influenced 
reasoning, but also examined reasoning abilities following the presence of combat-like 
environments simulated by immersive and non-immersive technologies.  
Findings revealed no statistically significant three-way interaction between grit, 
immersiveness (immersive or non-immersive virtual technology) and simulation (simulated 
combat or simulated non-combat environment) (F (1, 101) = .210, p = 0.932, ηp
2
 = .009, NS) and 
no statistically significant three-way interaction between resilience, immersiveness and 
simulation (F (1, 101) = .329, p = .858, ηp
2
 = 0.013, NS), suggesting that participants‘ resilience 
and grit did not impact deductive reasoning immediately after presence of simulated combat 




Furthermore, results revealed no statistically significant three-way interaction between 
grit, immersiveness (immersive or non-immersive virtual technology) and simulation (simulated 
combat or simulated non-combat environment) (F (1, 101) = .787, p = 0.536, ηp
2
 = .031, NS) and 
no statistically significant three-way interaction between resilience, immersiveness and 
simulation (F (1, 101) = 1.409, p = .237, ηp
2
 = 0.054, NS), suggesting that participants‘ resilience 
and grit did not impact inductive reasoning immediately after presence of simulated combat 
environments (see Table 17).  
Hypothesis 2b is not supported in that I hypothesized an interaction where individuals 
who reported higher grit or resilience would perform better on reasoning tasks immediately after 
presence of simulated combat environments, while individuals who reported lower grit or 
resilience would perform worse on reasoning tasks immediately after presence of simulated 
combat environment.  
CHAPTER VI.  
DISCUSSION FOR DISSERTATION 
Anecdotal evidence and limited research suggest that exposure to adverse environments 
like combat can severely affect cognitive processes. I focused on assessing how combat-like 
environments influence an individual‘s ability to effectively and efficiently reason, and further 
examined whether an individual‘s grit and resilience impacted deductive and inductive reasoning 
in stressful environments. Recruiting participants from Norwich University, the first private 
military academy, I leveraged a pretest-posttest mixed research design to investigate possible 
cognitive decrements in individuals‘ ability to reason immediately following war-like 
environments simulated by immersive and non-immersive technology. Particularly, I 




reasoning (as measured by The Letter Sets Test and Overton‘s (1990) version of the Wason 
Selection Task, respectively), placing participants into immersive or non-immersive conditions. 
Resilience and grit were assessed for interaction effects through self-assessments to examine 
how an individual‘s resilience and grit mediates an individual‘s ability to reason in war-like 
environments. Results revealed that participants who were exposed to the combat simulation 
performed worse on the inductive reasoning task and participants who were exposed to 
immersive (Bravemind) technology performed better on the deductive reasoning task; no 
interaction effects were found amongst grit, simulation, and immersiveness or amongst 
resilience, simulation, and immersiveness on inductive or deductive reasoning. 
As previous discussed, Lieberman and colleagues (2005) argue that while there is 
anecdotal documentation of the influence of war-fighting environments on the ability to reason 
(e.g., process cognitive information and act quickly, effectively, and decisively in combat), there 
still is a need for scientific research to investigate reasoning in combat-like environments. Due to 
the limited quantifiable research in the decrement of cognitive performance, and the continued 
acts of terror that produce combat and war-fighting environments in otherwise peaceful 
environments, scientific research is imperative for the mental and cognitive health of those 
exposed to these environments. This dissertation investigated how combat-like environments 
through the use of computer-simulated war environments influence an individual‘s ability to 
inductively and deductively reason. I further examined how resilience and grit influence 
individuals‘ cognitive performance after engaging in a highly charged, negative affective state. 
As these individual psychological traits have been shown to be influential in the successful 
adjustment of an individual‘s cognition during and immediately after experience adverse 




Overall, through the utilization of a 2x2x2 mixed research design, results of this study 
showed significant interactions between time (pretest and posttest inductive reasoning task 
scores) and simulation, and time (pretest and posttest deductive reasoning task scores) and 
immersion. While findings did not reveal any statistical significant interactions or main effect of 
resilience or grit, suggesting that these psychological constructs did not impact reasoning 
following exposure to simulated combat-like environments, a modest relationship was revealed 
between time (pretest and posttest inductive reasoning task scores) and grit, further implying a 
possible impact of grit on reasoning following exposure to simulated combat-like environments. 
First, findings showed that simulation (the combat or non-combat environment) 
significantly impacted an individual‘s inductive reasoning, not deductive reasoning, suggesting 
that exposure to combat-like environments negatively influences and impairs an individual‘s 
ability to inductively reason following immersion in simulated combat-like environments. 
Particularly, participants in the simulated combat conditions performed significantly worse on 
the inductive reasoning task than participants in the simulated non-combat conditions; however, 
participants did not suffer from cognitive impairment when tasked with completing the deductive 
reasoning task. These findings demonstrate that such challenging environments could 
disadvantage individuals who must inductively reason following such adversarial exposure. This 
finding supports previous research on reasoning (Palfai & Salovey, 1993; Blanchette, 2006; 
Blanchette & Richards, 2004; Kemp et al., 1997; Oaksford et al., 1996).  
As shown in this study and the aforementioned studies, adverse environments produce 
deleterious effects on the higher-level cognitive functioning of inductive reasoning. Particularly, 
this harmful impact could influence individual cognitive resources, which promotes impairments 




another study that found that stress, trauma, and other adverse situations induce various affective 
states, which in turn, impact inductive, but not deductive reasoning. As Blanchette and Campbell 
(2012) explain, ―new paradigms in the psychology of reasoning have included a consideration 
for general contextual factors that may impact on the reasoning process, including individuals‘ 
goals and motivations … emotions are one such important contextual factor that influences 
reasoning‖ (162). As such, there are a number of reasons to investigate this phenomenon further. 
For example, since Schwarz and Clore introduced the ―Feelings-as-Information‖ theory which 
posits that ―people attend to their feelings as a source of information, with different feelings 
providing different types of information‖ in the 1980s, Schwarz has attempted to explain the 
cognitive consequences of affect (Schwarz & Clore, 2003, 296). The ―feeling-as-information‖ 
theory, then, implies that negative affect indicates that something is wrong, and that vigilant and 
cautious information processing is necessary, which promotes the need for elaborative 
processing. This elaborative processing could cause possible cognitive load and thus impair 
inductive reasoning. Additionally, as Kyllonen and Christal (1990) have shown, numerous 
research has shown that working memory capacity is predictive of performance in reasoning 
tasks, suggesting that, perhaps, concerns in working memory capacity could have influenced an 
individual‘s ability to inductively reason. 
However, it is important to note that there is a lack of significant correlation between the 
pretest inductive reasoning task and posttest inductive reasoning task, suggesting that perhaps, 
these tasks were not assessing the same measure or that one task was more difficult that its 
counterpart. Any significant findings on the inductive reasoning tasks could therefore be 
unreliable. While there is no specific reason as to why the pretest inductive reasoning task and 




explain the lack of significant correlation. First, there might have been some possible extraneous 
variables that impacted the research process that influenced a lack of significant correlation. 
Second, after further examination of the data (and more particularly, frequency analysis), the 
most frequent score on the pretest inductive reasoning task was higher than the most frequent 
score on the posttest inductive reasoning task; this could indicate that the posttest inductive 
reasoning task was inherently more difficult than the pretest inductive reasoning task if more 
individuals scored lower. This study is the first study to split the Ekstrom et al. (1976) 
assessment; while there is no indication that the questions were progressively harder in the 
assessment, there might have been harder questions in the end, and easier questions in the 
beginning of the assessment. 
Immersion (immersive or non-immersive virtual reality technology) significantly 
impacted an individual‘s deductive reasoning, suggesting that participants who were in the 
immersive conditions did not suffer from more cognitive deficits and impairments, but instead 
benefitted from immersion. Particularly, participants who were placed in the immersive 
conditions did not suffer from cognitive impairment when tasked with completing the deductive 
reasoning task, but instead, showed improvement in their deductive reasoning, indicating 
immersion did not impact inductive reasoning. This finding supports previous research 
(Blanchette et al., 2007; Blanchette & Campbell, 2012). 
While decrements in logical reasoning have been linked to affect and emotionality 
induced by adverse environments (or what Blanchette and Campbell (2012) label as ―incidental 
emotions‖), such as combat-like environments, some studies have shown the beneficial influence 
of affect on inductive and deductive reasoning. For example, victims of sexual abuse who 




improved relative logicality in reasoning about emotional content (specifically, abuse-related), 
compared to non-emotional content (Caparos & Blanchette, 2013), participants who suffered 
from Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) and different phobias reasoned better when 
participants completed syllogisms that were associated to their psychopathology only (Johnson-
Laird et al., 2006), and veterans reasoned more logically about combat-related syllogisms than 
structurally identical syllogisms with neutral content (Blanchette, & Campbell, 2012). As 
explained by Blanchette and Campbell (2012), the  
positive impact of integral emotions on reasoning can be explained by increased utility of 
problem content and increased utility of reasoning … this may be associated with integral 
emotions, when the affective reaction is relevant to the semantic contents reasoned about 
(162).  
Particularly, this dissertation might have shown that individuals reason better, at least 
deductively, when they are used to particular content. The sample of military students for this 
dissertation reasoned deductively better following exposure of combat environment.  
Additionally, my findings further support previous research showing the impact of 
immersion on performance. Like previous studies, I show that participants in the immersive 
conditions performed differently than participants in the non-immersive condition. Particularly, 
in this study findings revealed that individuals were more influenced by immersion such that 
individuals in the immersion conditions performed better on the deductive reasoning tasks 
regardless of combat or non-combat exposure than participants in the non-immersion condition. 
It was interesting to see in these results that immersion, rather than the presence of combat, 
impacted individual‘s deductive reasoning abilities. According to Green and Seitz (2015), 




principles known by psychologists, neuroscientists, and educators to be fundamental to altering 
behavior, producing learning, and promoting brain plasticity‖ (101). As other aforementioned 
studies in the literature review have shown, while virtual reality impacts cognition and affect, 
immersion appears to be significantly more influential. One reason for this could be that 
individuals in the immersive conditions experienced more cognitive load as they engaged in the 
scenario; particularly, participants might have placed more mental effort, which in turn would 
impact their working memory, as they tried to physically and mentally navigate through the 
immersive scenarios. Given that research has shown that deductive reasoning is greatly 
dependent upon working memory (Copeland & Radvansky, 2004), perhaps, the immersive 
condition impacted working memory, and subsequently, impacted the ability to reason 
deductively. These findings could also be caused by the emotional and affective state that the 
immersive conditions promoted over the non-immersive conditions. The immersive conditions 
moved participants from a position of observation to immersion, and the participants engaged 
both mentally and physically in an environment that participants in the non-immersive 
technology could not integrate fully into. This study was one of many that demonstrates that as 
the degree of immersion increases, so does the potential to strongly alter cognition and affect.  
As part of the study, all participants were asked to complete four scales: (1) the Grit 
Scale, (2) the RSA, (3) the FREE scale, and (4) the BSCS. These scales were utilized to assess 
participants‘ grit, resilience, flexibility in regulation of emotional expression, and self-control, 
respectively. As this dissertation attempted to investigate the impact of adverse environments on 
inductive and deductive reasoning, I was also interested in looking at the impact of known 
determinants of success (Duckworth & Gross, 2014), performance and personality (Duckworth 




experiences that induce trauma and stress (Judge et al., 1999; Steel et al., 2008) on the 
individuals‘ ability to successfully reason. Particularly, I believed that these constructs could 
have interfered with the environments‘ adverse impact on cognitive functioning. However, due 
to possible concerns with multicollinearity, I only utilized the psychological constructs of 
resilience and grit to further investigate their impact on inductive and deductive reasoning, as 
these two constructs were not correlated to one another. Interestingly, grit and resilience were 
uncorrelated, which does not complement previous research findings (Perkins-Gough, 2013; 
Arthur, Fitzwater, Hardy, Beattie, & Bell, 2015); perhaps, the way resilience is measured and 
operationalized in the RSA did not correlate to the construct of grit as measured by the Grit 
scale. Furthermore, this study could impact future research that associates grit and resilience as 
correlated constructs. 
While a modest relationship was revealed between time (pretest and posttest inductive 
reasoning task scores) and grit, there was no statistically significant relationship among the 
psychological constructs and participants‘ inductive and deductive reasoning. Furthermore, 
similar to the limitations found in the preliminary work, while grit and resilience were not 
statistically significant, it can be said that due to the short length of the study, there was a 
limitation in determining if participants‘ resilience and/or grit impacted deductive and inductive 
reasoning following exposure to combat-like environments. As explained by Duckworth et al. 
(2017), grit is categorized ―based on an individual‘s passion for a particular long-term goal or 
end state‖ (1087). Therefore, this particular study might not have been able to create the passion 
that is needed to provoke gritty people into exceling in cognitive tasks. Possibly, the study did 
not promote enough interest for the participants to truly work on the different tasks to promote a 




Quinn (2009) were able to attain significant findings on grit with a similar population, their 
stimuli included the execution of West Point‘s rigorous summer training program, whereas this 
study involved a ninety minute study with no overarching goal.  
Limitations 
A number of limitations could have influenced the results of this study. First, this study 
utilized a military college population, and it could be argued that the results might not be 
generalizable beyond the military sample. According to Bartone et al. (2008), ―military training 
academies like West Point provide unusual environments and experiences, and the military 
occupation itself is not directly comparable to most other occupations‖ (208). Additionally, as 
participants were members of Norwich University‘s Corps of Cadets, this sample of participants 
did provide a broad sample of resilience and grit; specifically, the sample of participants rated 
themselves as more gritty, hardy, and resilient than most non-military populations. No 
participants reported as slightly resilient or slightly gritty; therefore, due to the lack of variability, 
these results may not be generalizable to a broader population, where many individuals report 
being slightly resilient and/or gritty (alternatively, there may have been stronger presentation 
effects in this population than in other populations; this limitation could lower the correlations); 
this limitation could lower the correlations.. As such, the Norwich University curriculum 
demands levels of resilience and grit that are not expected in other institutions. Further analyses 
with non-military cadet samples need to be conducted.  
Second, the recruiting process could have been considered a possible limitation since 
participants volunteered to complete this study as a way to gain extra credit in their respective 
psychology courses. While recruiting participants from their psychology courses and providing 




field, there are risks in interpreting studies conducted in this context; perhaps participants were 
not truly interested in participating in the study and might have not felt the motivation to place 
effort in each task assigned to them. Furthermore, each scale that participants completed was 
self-report; while self-reports are also a common methodology in many behavioral science 
disciplines, there are many risks to this methodology. Particularly, participants might not have 
reported truthfully in response to their feelings of resilience, grit, self-control, or flexible 
regulation of emotional expression. As I utilized a military population, many cadets might have 
felt that they should report as more resilient or grittier as they are starting their military life.  
Third, while this study attempted to look at the impact of resilience and grit on inductive 
and deductive reasoning after exposure to combat-like environments, this study might not have 
grasped the genuine decrements due to imperfectly measuring task-relevant cognitive 
performance. The pretest and posttest inductive and deductive reasoning tasks utilized in this 
study were validated assessments of inductive and deductive reasoning; however, these tasks 
were not analogous to the virtual reality simulation, and more particularly, not genuine examples 
of what soldiers experience in such adverse environments. Therefore, the findings of this 
dissertation could have been altered due to the lack of task-relevant cognitive performance. The 
study could have benefitted from speaking to veterans about what they consider typical cognitive 
tasks in combat situations; perhaps, the higher cognitive function of deductive and inductive 
reasoning might not be the most relevant cognitive function in such adverse environments. For 
example, individuals might not need the ability to successfully reason deductively or inductively 
in order to distinguish between a woman in a hijab and a terrorist; instead, other types of 
reasoning or cognitive tasks might have been more applicable to this particular context. 




perhaps, this context promotes abductive reasoning. This dissertation intended to refrain from 
looking at abductive reasoning as soldiers are not trained to infer or abduce a guess from 
observation, and therefore, abductive reasoning was deemed irrelevant to the investigation. 
Additionally, the reasoning tasks that were utilized could have considerably influenced the 
results of this dissertation. As previous research has shown, content found in the reasoning tasks 
could significantly impact individual cognitive performance (Jung et al., 2014). For instance, 
content found in the reasoning tasks could induce numerous reactions which could adversely 
influence individual performance on a reasoning task. 
Fourth, in order to investigate the impact of resilience and grit on inductive and deductive 
reasoning after exposure to combat-like environments, this study asked participants to complete 
two inductive reasoning tasks and two deductive reasoning tasks. In order to gain baseline 
reasoning abilities, this study utilized a pretest-posttest methodology, with participants 
completing the pretest inductive and deductive reasoning tasks before the virtual reality 
simulation, and then completing the posttest inductive and deductive reasoning tasks after the 
virtual reality simulation. Future work in this field would benefit from having in-game tasks. For 
example, reasoning tasks can be created within the simulation in order to better determine an 
individual‘s reasoning during exposure to combat-like environments, instead of following the 
exposure to the combat-like environment. In this particular study, while participants were driving 
in the simulated Afghanistan environment, inductive and deductive reasoning tasks could have 
been implemented to test individual ability. 
Fifth, unlike the preliminary study, this dissertation did not incorporate any physiological  
or diagnostic monitoring apparatuses to examine if resilience and grit influenced an individual‘s 




an adverse environment. While the preliminary work showed that individuals who were highly 
resilient and highly gritty exhibited lower levels of ECG and GSR, this current research study 
might have benefitted from measuring vital physiological signs to better explain the impact of 
resilience and grit on reasoning. Particularly, as this study examined the influence of these 
psychological constructs on the higher level cognitive function following exposure to adverse 
environments, the measuring of physiological factors could have aided in the comprehension of 
how exposure to an adverse environment truly influenced the cognitive enhancements and 
deficits exhibited. In addition, by utilizing the diagnostic apparatus BioRadio, the preliminary 
study examined if the immersive virtual technology of Bravemind was as an effective virtual 
reality tool to induce appropriate affective states through measuring the effects of this virtual 
reality technology on individuals‘ ECG and GSR levels. As the preliminary study showed, 
Bravemind influenced levels of GSR and ECG, such that during combat exposure, GSR and 
ECG levels increased. While this preliminary study evaluated Bravemind, no study evaluated 
VBS3 and its capability of being an affective virtual reality tool to induce appropriate affective 
states. Future work would benefit from utilizing such physiological apparatus to examine the 
influence of the non-immersive virtual technology of VBS3 as well as further support the 
evaluation of the Bravemind.  
Sixth, in addition to measuring physiological factors, this dissertation study could have  
benefitted from supplementary electrophysiological monitoring apparatuses such as mobile  
electroencephalography (EEG) as another possible variable for the cognitive impairments and 
improvements that were found in this study. For example, Chepenik, Cornew, and Farah (2007) 
completed a number of neuroimaging studies to investigate the influence of mood on brain 




results revealed that when individuals were placed in a condition that induced a negative 
emotion, participants‘ ―sad mood affected memory for emotional words and facial emotion 
recognition, but not the other processes measured, with a significant non-uniformity of effect 
over tasks‖ (802). While this study did not look at memory, findings from this research showed 
that affect influenced a number of brain regions associated with the particular cognitive function 
that was studied. While findings from Chepenik et al. (2007) showed significant change 
suggesting that affect has an ubiquitous impact on cognition, these neuroimaging studies showed 
the importance of investigating the effects of affect on reasoning by measuring the impact of 
different brain regions. Furthermore, according to Blanchette and Richards (2004),  
various methodologies such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and 
electroencephalography (EEG), event-related potentials (ERPs), and 
magnetoencephalography (MEG) in conjunction with sound behavioural paradigms and 
peripheral psychophysiological measures can highlight different aspects of the same 
process, and collectively have the potential to produce a more comprehensive 
understanding of the processes and constituent components. (186) 
Seventh, there could be a number of alternative variables that must be taken into account 
when looking at the findings. For example, researchers Harmon-Jones and Gable theorize that 
numerous affective states can impact individuals‘ motivation which in turn influences cognitive 
tasks (Harmon-Jones, Gable, & Price 2012; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2012, 2013). Specifically, 
Harmon-Jones, Price, and Gable (2013) suggest ―that the influence of affective states on 
cognitive broadening ⁄ narrowing does not depend on the positivity or negativity of the affective 
state but may instead depend on the motivational intensity of the affective state‖ (314). The 




influenced by the lack of motivation that was elicited in this study. For example, did the distinct 
conditions provoke affective states that induced motivational intensity? Did the combat-like 
environments, regardless of the virtual reality platforms, influence motivational intensity to 
influence inductive and deductive reasoning abilities? Additionally, 40% of the participants 
reported that they never played video games while 40% of the participants reported that they 
never played computer games; their lack of gaming knowledge might have influenced how the 
participants reacted to the game experience. 
Eighth, while results from this study showed cognitive deficits, suggesting that affect 
induced by exposure to adverse environments impacts inductive and deductive reasoning, there 
are possible objective cognitive deficits such as working memory problems, high cognitive load, 
or dyslexia that might have influenced the findings of this dissertation study. During adverse 
environments, individuals are placed in highly demanding and challenging situations where they 
are tasked with completing numerous functions; these tasks can require incredible mental effort 
that influences their working memory and information acquisition negatively (Lindley et al., 
2008; Raslear et al., 2011). Cognitive deficits can yield problems within the structure of the 
human cognitive architecture, which causes disruptions in cognitive functioning such as 
impairments in deductive and inductive reasoning. By not focusing on other variables such as 
objective cognitive deficits, this study might not be targeting the true reason for the impairment 
(or even improvement) exhibited in deductive and inductive reasoning.  






 (SCI; such as depression, frustration during planning, and lack of 
concentration, attention or thought), that might have influenced the results of this study. SCI, 
unlike objective cognitive deficits, are considered milder impairments as they are harder to 
diagnose since they cannot be verified by standard tests, but are still significant for evaluation as 
possible extraneous variables; SCIs can emerge in the absence of cognitive deficits (Gauthier et 
al. 2006). Subsequently, the results found in this dissertation study could have been influenced 
by SCIs; for example, a participant could have suffered from a lack of attention or concentration 
while completing this study, and subsequently, be less likely to do well on the deductive and 
inductive reasoning tasks, regardless of exposure to combat-like environment. 
Implications 
Anecdotal evidence from soldier narratives have depicted the detrimental effects of 
adverse circumstances on an individual‘s cognitive functioning on the battlefield (Blanchette & 
Campbell, 2012). This study served as one of the first scientific studies to address how 
challenging environments and an individual‘s grit and resilience impact an individual‘s inductive 
and deductive reasoning skills following exposure to simulated combat environments.  
The value of comprehending the impact of grit and resilience on cognitive functions such 
as inductive and deductive reasoning is incalculable as these psychological constructs are 
integral factors in promoting positive and stable mentally healthy individuals, in shaping human 
performance, and in producing a number of protective mechanisms that shield individuals from 
stressful and adverse environments and situations (McEwen & Stellar, 1993; Masten, 2001; 
Bonanno, 2004; Agaibi, & Wilson, 2005; Friborg et al., 2005; Bonanno et al., 2007; Campbell-
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known as subjective memory disorder, is when a patient reports a worsening of their thinking 




Sills et al., 2009). While this study did not show significance, the modest relationship revealed 
here could further the need to understand these psychological constructs and their influence in 
higher executive functions following adverse environments. As previously shown, most 
individuals experience some sort of life-threatening or violent encounter during their time, and it 
is therefore essential that we further comprehend constructs such as resilience and grit that 
protect us from such adverse situations (Ozer et al., 2003; Bonanno, 2004). 
According to Elbert, Rockstroh, Kolassa, Schauer, and Neuner (2006), ―even a single 
traumatic experience can initiate a cascade of dynamic brain processes which may result in 
enhanced vulnerability to subsequent stressors or even in a break-down of normal functioning as 
seen in the pathologies of the trauma spectrum‖ (33). Consequently, questions attempting to 
understand how adverse environments influence cognitive functions, and more so, how 
numerous psychological constructs can impact cognitive functions even after exposure to 
traumatic experience become essential. By better understanding this phenomenon, researchers 
are more likely to better recognize how to decrease the possible vulnerability to further stressors, 
or measure the supplementary impact on individual mental well-being. According to Litz (2014), 
―the discourse about resilience has also been shaped and intensified by the long wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan —it might be said that we have emerged as an uneasy, concerned and weary society 
arguably looking for comfort and reassurance‖ (2). While Litz (2014) focused solely on 
resilience, this discourse can be extended to other psychological constructs such as grit, self-
control, and flexible regulation of emotional expression.  
Importantly, while only a modest relationship was revealed, this dissertation showed the 
possible significance of expanding resilience and grit research and further investigating their 




relationship was non-significant, the more we learn about grit and resilience, the more likely we 
are to incorporate salient concepts of grit and resilience into relevant contextual environments for 
research in the fields of mental health, medicine and science. Incorporating these concepts can 
facilitate a significant and necessary approach to thinking about adversity and challenge. 
According to Southwick et al., (2014), ―rather than spending the vast majority of their time and 
energy examining the negative consequences of trauma, clinicians and researchers can learn to 
simultaneously evaluate and teach methods to enhance resilience‖ (4). This potential paradigm 
shift could help move the mental health, medicine and science fields away from the typical 
―purely deficit-based model,‖ to instead, models that focus on individualized strengths and 
positive human functioning, which centers on the prevention and deterrence of dysfunction, and 
the facilitating of strengths in understanding and attending to psychopathology (Litz, 2014). 
Additionally, such research could also help better understand the effects of the psychological 
construct of resilience and grit in combat-like contexts and its influence on individual mental 
health. For example, PTSD has been shown to be one of the more likely mental health 
consequences of war on US military personnel, and research like that reported here is necessary 
in the hopes of preventing or mitigating PTSD.  
Additionally, according to Litz (2014) ―in addition to setting in motion innovative 
research on models of adaptation to trauma, loss and serious life challenges that posit varied 
response typologies,‖ the focus on grit and resilience, especially after and during exposure to 
adverse environments, ―stems from the aspiration to determine the modifiable and trainable keys 
to successful navigation of high-magnitude events and losses‖ (5). While I do not attempt to 
answer the effectiveness of resilience or grit training, these findings, however, can advance work 




or grittier. For example, this study shows that ―knowing what predicts sustained resilience in the 
face of horrific traumatic events in the military will allow professionals to develop and adopt 
training and preparation programs, and policy-makers can shape post-exposure contexts to 
promote these outcomes and processes‖ (Litz, 2014, 5). This study tried to enhance our 
understanding of resilience and grit, specifically following adverse situations, in order to help 
train individuals on how to respond to such adverse environments. While Litz (2014) focused 
solely on resilience, this discourse can be extended to other psychological constructs such as grit, 
self-control, and flexible regulation of emotional expression. Particularly, this study helps to 
critically understand the impact of grit and resilience on cognitive functions, and this 
understanding can help better understand these constructs.  
As immersive and non-immersive virtual reality environments become more integral to 
military training and more accessible to civilians, comprehending the effects of immersive and 
non-immersive virtual reality environments on performance and behaviors is becoming as 
essential as understanding reactions that are induced in the real-world (Riva et al., 2007; Rizzo et 
al., 2011). According to Rizzo et al. (2011), immersive and non-immersive virtual reality 
environments ―can provide greater experimental control, more precise measurement, ease of 
replication across participants, and high ecological validity, making it attractive for researchers‖ 
(379). Furthermore, the influence of adverse environments, and more particularly, combat 
environments, on reasoning is essential to assess as the United States has, and continues to, 
encounter numerous acts of terror and violence on home soil. Through the research presented 
here, the Armed Forces and other agencies that expose their employees to traumatic and stressful 
environments can learn how to construct new training, operations, and systems to focus on the 




validity of simulations for training soldiers to respond effectively to difficult situations; this 
study is essential in helping better prepare new soldiers for their first experience with a real 
enemy. 
I utilized a military sample to investigate the impact of resilience and grit on deductive 
and inductive reasoning after exposure to combat-like environments. While results were non-
significant, it is important to understand what psychological constructs and mechanisms are 
present in such environments. In a military environment, the shaping and predicting of human 
performance is essential in successful military leadership (Cosentino & Solano, 2012) and officer 
development (Matthew et al., 2006). Therefore, it would be vital to understand the constructs that 
play an integral role in influencing and affecting human performance, such as reasoning, 
especially since grit and resilience might not appear to be essential within this context. As 
Gayton and Kehoe (2015) explain, ―a sound character has long been thought be necessary for 
individuals who operate in the military … although personality concerns differences among 
individuals in the style of their reactions to circumstances, character concerns the values that 
channel one‘s actions and behaviors‖ (860). Instead of focusing on grit and resilience, further 
work could look at character strengths, hardiness, or the Big Five (openness to experience, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism). While this study employed a 
military population, research has shown similar decrements in reasoning among first responders 
or even children from violent communities (Levenson & Acosta, 2000). This research would 
help find more effective platforms through which to better protect and train people who are more 
likely to be exposed to adverse environments, like civilian emergency personnel and disaster 
victims. Particularly, these findings can benefit the Armed Forces, police, and fire and 




highly stressful environments. Furthermore, while this study specifically looked at the impact of 
grit and resilience on inductive and deductive reasoning following exposure to combat-like 
environments, these findings generalize beyond combat. Particularly, most individuals, as 
explained in previous literature, will experience some sort of life-threatening or violent 
encounter during their lifetime (Ozer et al., 2003; Bonanno, 2004), and it can be assumed that 
these results could be generalized to other possible adverse circumstances and environments. 
Additionally, as this study looked solely at deductive and inductive reasoning, these findings can 
be generalized to other higher levels of cognitive functions since cognition, emotion, and 
motivation are intricately intertwined (Crocker et al. 2013). 
General Conclusion 
The completion of the dissertation provides better comprehension of the cognitive 
impairments and improvements that arise from exposure to adverse situations. The previous 
research on the impact of negative and positive affect on the higher level cognitive processes of 
deductive and inductive reasoning have been shown to be both detrimental and beneficial. As 
such, this study attempted to further understand the impact of negative affect on reasoning by 
utilizing an extremely adverse environment, simulated combat, to assess such effects. The 
dissertation presented here aimed to assess how individuals reason, both inductively and 
deductively, in a computer-simulated combat environment, and further analyze the impact of 
resilience and grit on reasoning in such adverse environments. As research is progressing in the 
study of grit and resilience, especially with the belief that these psychological constructs are 
influential in the mental health of individuals exposed to stress, I further examined their impact 
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 Demographic Survey 
Major: _____________________________________________ 
What is your ethnicity? _____ 
What state did you grow up in? _____ 
What is your age? _____ 
What is your gender? _____ 
Class Year: __________ 
 
SAT Verbal: _____ 
SAT Mathematics: _____ 
GPA: _____ 
 
How would you describe the economic status of your family when you were growing up? 




___ Very wealthy 
 












Which types of computer games do you spend the most time playing? 
___ Strategy games 
___ Role playing games 
___ First person shooter 
___ Other video games 
___ A mixture of games 
 




































Rank in degree of importance, the virtues necessary to be an effective Army leader (1 – most important to 6 – least important):  
______ Wisdom and Knowledge 
______ Courage 
______ Humanity 
______ Justice  
______ Temperance  
______ Transcendence 




























Please rank in degree of importance, the virtues necessary to be an effective Army leader (1 – most important to 3 – least important): 
 
______ Inquisitiveness 















The Flexible Regulation of Emotional Expression (FREE) Scale 
The following scenarios involve POSITIVE emotion. For each scenario, indicate how well would you be 
able to be even MORE EXPRESSIVE than usual of how you were feeling: 
   Unable                                              Very able 
1) A friend wins an award for a sport that doesn’t interest you.       1           2           3           4            5            6 
2) A coworker gets a promotion and wants to talk about it.       1           2           3           4            5            6 
3) A friend is talking about a great date she had the other night.       1           2           3           4            5            6 
4) You receive a gift from a family member but it’s a shirt you 
dislike. 
      1           2           3           4            5            6 
 
The following scenarios involve NEGATIVE emotion. For each scenario, indicate how well would you be 
able to be even MORE EXPRESSIVE than usual of how you were feeling: 
   Unable                                              Very able 
5) Your friend is telling you about what a terrible day they had.       1           2           3           4            5            6 
6) Your boss is complaining about a project you know little about 
and have no involvement with. 
      1           2           3           4            5            6 
7) A friend is talking about a break-up that you secretly think is a 
good thing. 
      1           2           3           4            5            6 
8) You’re attending the funeral of someone you don’t know.       1           2           3           4            5            6 
 
The following scenarios involve POSITIVE emotion. For each scenario, indicate how well would you be 
able to CONCEAL how you were feeling: 
   Unable                                              Very able 
9) While having dinner with a friend who has just recently lost their 
job, you receive a phone call from your boss stating you will get a 
raise. 
      1           2           3           4            5            6 
10) You are in a training session and you see an accidentally funny 
typo in the presenter’s slideshow. 
      1           2           3           4            5            6 
11) You’re a guest at a solemn religious ceremony and the person 
sitting next to you just whispered a funny joke. 
      1           2           3           4            5            6 
12) During a meeting with a supervisor, his/her phone unexpectedly 
begins to play an embarrassing ringtone. 
      1           2           3           4            5            6 
 
The following scenarios involve NEGATIVE emotion. For each scenario, indicate how well would you be 
able to CONCEAL how you were feeling: 
   Unable                                               Very able 
13) You are at a social event and the person you’re talking to 
frequently spits while they speak. 
      1           2           3           4            5            6 
14) You have just heard about the death of a close relative right 
before an important work meeting. 
      1           2           3           4            5            6 
15) You are on a first date at a restaurant having dinner, and a 
stranger spills their drink on you. 
      1           2           3           4            5            6 
16) After you have a very irritating and stressful day, a sometimes-
annoying neighbor stops by to say hello. 

















Descriptive Factors with Pretest and Posttest Scores  
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